Report on US barriers to trade and investment 1994. April 1994 by unknown
1994 
REPORT ON US BARRIERS 
TO TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
Published by the 
Services of  the European Commission 
Brussels, April 1994 
Doc No I/194/94 CONTENTS 
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
A 
B 
c 
Objectives of the Report .....................................................  . 
The Economic Relationship ..................................................  . 
Summary of Findings .........................................................  .. 
CHAPTER 2:  HORIZONTAL ISSUES 
A  Unilateralism in US Trade Legislation 
1 
2 
3 
General Remarks  ........  : ....................................................  . 
Provisions in Trade Legislation ..........................................  . 
Comments ....................................................................  .. 
B  Enforcement of  US Legislation outside US Territory 
1 
2 
3 
The Principle .................................................................  .. 
Illustrative Cases ............................................................  . 
Comments .....................................................................  . 
C  Impediments Through National Security Considerations 
1 
2 
Some General Remarks ....................................................  . 
Restrictions Applied in Various Fields ............  :  .....................  . 
a) Import Restrictions  ................................................  .. 
b) Export Restrictions  .................................................  . 
c) Procurement Restrictions ........................................  . 
d) Investment Restrictions ..........................................  . 
1 
3 
7 
11 
11 
15 
17 
17 
21 
23 
23 
23 
24 
24 
27 D  Public  Procurement 
1 
2 
3 
An Introduction 
The Relevant Legislation in Point ......................................  . 
a) Federal Buy America Legislation ..............................  . 
b) State BuY' America Legislation ................................  . 
c) Set Aside for Small Business  ..................................  . 
Comments ....................................................................  . 
E  Tariff Barriers and Equivalent Measures 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Tariffs as Trade Impediments ...........................................  . 
Custom User Fe~~s ..........................................................  . 
Excessive Invoicing Requirements .....................................  . 
Comments ············'························································ 
F  Tax Legislation Affecting Trade and Investment 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Some Introductory Remarks  ............................................  . 
Cumbersome and Discriminatory Reporting ........................  . 
Requirements for non-US Enterprises 
"Earnings Stripping" Provisions  ........................................  . 
State Unitary Income Taxation  ..........................................  . 
US Car Taxes Discriminate Against European .....................  . 
Imports 
Beer and Wine Excise Taxes ............................................  . 
G  Standards, Testing, Le1belling  and  Certification 
1 
2 
3 
A  Closer Look at the Issue  ..............................................  . 
Some Illustrative Cases ...................................................  . 
Comments ....................................................................  . 
H  The Protection of Intellectual Property 
J 
1 
2 
3 
Patents and Related Areas  ..............................................  . 
Copyright and R1~lated Areas  ...........................................  . 
Comments .....................................................................  . 
Conditioning National Treatment 
1 
2 
3 
The Principle of  National Treatment ..................................  . 
Proliferation of Conditional National Treatment ...................  . 
in the US 
Undesirable consequences  ..............................................  . 
The Application of Countervailing Duty Legislation ................  . 
31 
32 
32 
36 
37 
37 
39 
40 
42 
43 
47 
47 
48 
49 
50 
54 
55 
56 
60 
61 
62 
63 
65 
65 
67 
69 CHAPTER 3:  SECTORIAL BARRIERS 
AND IMPEDIMENTS 
A  Agriculture and Fisheries 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
An Introduction  .............................................................  . 
Export and Other Subsidies .............................................  . 
Trade Hampering Import Quotas ......................................  . 
Disproportionate Burden through Cotton Import Fee  ...........  . 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Requirements ..........................  . 
Domestic Content Requirement for Tobacco  ......................  . 
Inadequate Protection of Geographical Indications of ..........  . 
European Wines and Spirits 
Labelling .......................................................................  . 
Phytomedicines  .............................................................  . 
Driftnet Fishing  ...............................................................  . 
Allocations to Foreign Fishing Fleets ..................................  . 
Comments ....................................................................  . 
B  Services 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
An Introduction 
Financial Services  ..........................................................  . 
a) Federal Restrictions ...............................................  . 
b) State Restrictions  .................................................  . 
c) An Assessment  ....................................................  . 
Air Transport .................................................................  . 
Space Launching  ...........................................................  . 
Professional Services ......................................................  . 
Comments ....................................................................  . 
C  Telecommunications and Broadcasting 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
An Overview .................................................................  . 
Investing in Telecommunications and Broadcasting .............  . 
Public Procurement Restrictions  .......................................  . 
Standardisation in the Telecommunications Field ................  . 
Services in  Telecommunication and Broadcasting  ...............  . 
Comments .....................................................................  . 
D  The Maritime Sector 
1 
2 
3 
Some General Remarks ....................................................  . 
Subsidies and Tax Policies  .............................................  .. 
Maritime Transport .........................................................  . 
71 
71 
73 
74 
75 
80 
80 
81 
82 
82 
83 
83 
85 
85 
85 
89 
90 
91 
93 
94 
95 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
105 
107 
107 
109 
Table of abbreviations ....................................................  ·....................  113 Uruguay Round 
1 
CHAPTER!: 
INTRODUCTION 
A  Objectives of the Report 
The  present  1994  Report  on  United  States  Barriers  to  Trade  and 
Investment is the tenth annual report in a series in which the services of 
the  European  Commission  aim  at  presenting  as  comprehensive  an 
inventory  as  possible  of  impediments  for  European  industry  and 
investors  gaining  access  to  US  markets  and  carrying  out  economic 
operations within them. The report discusses the measures deemed to 
be  a barrier or impediment to  trade  and  investment,  assesses where 
appropriate  and  feasible  their  economic  impact,  points  out  the  EU's 
legal  and  political  position,  and  refers  to  action  which  has  been 
undertaken in the past or which is envisaged for the future. Some care 
has been taken to outline the effects of the Uruguay Round conclusion 
for the different sectors discussed in  this year's report,  although much 
will depend on  how the Uruguay Round Agreements are translated into 
US national legislation. 
As a means of identifying problems of access to and of operating within 
US markets, the European Commission services' reports have become 
a  useful  tool  for  focusing  dialogue  and  negotiations,  both  multilateral 
and bilateral, on  the elimination of the obstacles inhibiting the free flow 
of trade  and  investment.  The  1994  report  will  in  addition  serve  as  a 
means  of monitoring  US  measures to  implement the  Uruguay  Round 
Agreements.  In  this  connection  it  is  hoped that the  report  can  play a 
useful part in  the formation of the US Administration's future policy on 
the issues highlighted. 
The report has taken into account developments until the end of March 
1994. Trade flows 
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B  The Economic Relationship 
The report's stocktaking of US trade and investment barriers should be 
seen against an  overall EU-US economic relationship which continues 
to improve. Bilateral EU-US agreements paved the way for a successful 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round in  1993. Both these and the Uruguay 
Round package,  provided they are fully and faithfully implemented, will 
contribute  considerably  towards  further  reducing  transatlantic  trade 
barriers and impediments to trade. 
Together,  the  European  Union  and  the United States  are  the world's 
largest trading  partners,  accounting for more than  one third  of world 
trade.  Bilaterally,  the  EU  and  the  US  continued  to  be  each  others 
largest  trade  partner.  In  1993,  trade  flows  between  them  will  have 
reached an  estimated ECU  165 billion,  constituting some 7% of world 
trade. Total exports from the EU to the US will have increased to a new 
peak of almost ECU  80  billion  compared to  ECU  73.9  billion  in  1992. 
Imports from  the  US  into  the  EU  have  remained  almost the  same at 
around ECU  86 billion.  The increase in  European exports to the US in 
1993 will  reinforce the tendency towards more bilateral balanced trade 
accounts as indicated in  last year's report.  However, there still remains 
a US trade surplus of ECU 6.5 billion. 
.  .. 1992  1993* 
•:Estimated  .• Foreign Direct 
Investment 
4 
Mio;ECU'  .EU/US Track:Ba/ance 
··=r···.··.·.~··  ... ·  .... ·  ..  ····.···  .. ·'  ·.····~  1~'t-.·.~··. __ _ 
1989•:  1990  ·1991  1992 * EStimatec1993* 
The  substantial  foreign  direct investment (FDI)  flows  between  the  EU 
and the US have in the past greatly increased their economic linkages. 
Although  foreign  direct  investment  in  the  US  generally  has  slowed 
down,  investors from the EU  maintained in  1992 more than half of the 
FDI  stocks  in  the  US,  equalling  almost  $220  billion.  By  contrast,  US 
investors held in the same year $200 billion worth of FDI  stocks within 
the EU, which constituted 41% of all US direct investment abroad. 
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European foreign direct investment in the US has considerable positive 
effects on the US economy. With  regard to the US  labour market,  US 
affiliates of European companies employed 3.2% of the total workforce 
in  the  US  in  1991,  which  in  absolute  figures  amounted  to  almost Economic benefits 
New protectionism? 
Market opening 
necessary 
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3 million  people.  Also,  according  to  the  US  Council  of  Economic 
Advisers' 1991  "Report to the President",  European-owned firms in  the 
US  spend  significant  amounts  on  US  R&D  than  US  manufacturing 
firms. 
Economic interdependence  between the  US  and  the  EU  continues to 
grow.  This  in  itself,  however,  does not  prevent the two  partners from 
taking up different views on economic issues and becoming engaged in 
conflictual  situations.  In  this  context,  the  EU  follows  with  growing 
concern  the  proliferation  of  discussions  in  the  US  on  the  role  that 
foreign-controlled  companies  should  play  in  the  US  economy,  and  on 
the  benefits  for  the  US  of opening  up  its  markets  for freer  trade  in 
goods  and  services.  The  potential  positive  economic  impact  of the 
successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round should not be endangered 
by  a new protectionist philosophy in the disguise of ensuring industrial 
competitivity.  Only  recently,  studies  of  the  US  International  Trade 
Commission and  the Washington  Institute for International Economics 
independently  came  to  the  significant  conclusion  that  US  tariffs  and 
quantitative restrictions would cost the American consumer more than 
1% of gross domestic product. This illustrates that liberalised trade and 
investment are not zero sum games, but are principally beneficial to the 
nations involved. The present report nevertheless shows that continued 
efforts  are  necessary  to  further  eliminate  existing  barriers  and 
impediments to trade and investment in the US in order to open up US 
markets and to widen the scope of benefits both to the economy in the 
US and in the EU. 
The EU is concerned about some recent policy developments in the US 
concerning  the  apparent  gradual  installation  of  an  industrial  policy, 
leveraged by switching funds from the US's large military and research 
expenditures.  This  report  analyses  in  detail  a  significant  number  of 
barriers and  impediments to  international trade that the EU  wants the 
US to remove.  These barriers,  some of which  have been  in  existence 
for decades, reduce the benefits which can  be  gained from free trade, 
they cause distortions to the efficient flow of capital and investment and 
in  many  cases  cause  significant  market  distortions  and  losses  of 
business to European firms in the US. Unilateralism 
endangers world 
trade system 
Extraterritoriality 
National security 
also economic 
security? 
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C  Summary of Findings 
As in previous reports,  the persisting unilateral elements in  US trade 
legislation  have  continued  to  be  of  major  concern  to  the  EU.  A 
multilateral  trade  system  which  is  to  function  to  the  benefit  of  its 
participants,  could  increasingly be  endangered  by  continued  unilateral 
US  dispute settlement.  No  other major trading  partner of the  EU  has 
similar  trade  legislation.  The  comprehensive  multilateral  dispute 
settlement mechanism which  has been  agreed  upon  in  the framework 
of  the  new  World  Trade  Organisation  (WTO)  will  restrain  the 
Contracting  Parties  from  further  having  to  resort  to  unilateral 
determinations  in  trade  disputes,  and  will  oblige  them  to  bring  their 
domestic  legislation  in  conformity  with  all  of  the  Uruguay- Round 
Agreements. Contrary to this,  the US have only recently undertaken to 
renew  the  so-called  Super  301  legislation  by  way  of a  Presidential 
Executive Order.  Such  moves are  not only indicative of an  impetus in 
the  US  towards  increased  use  of unilateral  or  bilateral  measures,  but 
are  also  an  expression  of  a  continuing  debate  on  the  scope  for 
operating  such  measures alongside the  present GATT and  the  future 
WTO dispute settlement system. The EU is extremely concerned about 
these  adverse  developments  which  eventually  may  bring  European 
companies  into  the  firing  line,  as  is  presently  the  case  with  the  US 
retaliating  against  the  application  of the  EU  Utilities  Directive  in  the 
telecommunications sector. 
The extraterritorial enforcement of US legislation impacting on trade is 
closely linked to the aspect of unilateralism. The extraterritorial reach of 
national legislation may  not only  provoke clashes with the  sovereignty 
of trading  partners,  but may  also  lead to unsolvable legal  conflicts for 
economic  operators.  In  these  circumstances,  trade  as  well  as 
investment may be negatively affected.  Examples of the US legislation 
in  point are the  Cuban  Democracy Act,  re-export controls and  the 
Marine  Mammal  Protection  Act.  There  is  no  room  in  a  multilateral 
trading system for one country imposing its own standards and its own 
policies  on  others,  nor  to  claim  'consent  rights'  as  in  the  case  of a 
Nuclear Co-operation Agreement between the EU and the US. 
The US continues to  put forward  national security considerations to 
justify  trade  and  investment  restrictions  which  rather  pursue 
protectionist objectives. Measures range from limits on  market share to 
procurement  restrictions,  such  as  those  contained  in  Berry 
Amendment  legislation,  and  from  unilateral  export  controls  to  the 
screening  of and  possible  prohibition  of foreign  direct  investment  as 
provided  for  by  the  so-called  Exon-Fiorio  Amendment.  There  is  no 
question  about  the  right  of  every  sovereign  country  to  take  the 
necessary measures  in  defence  of its  national security.  However,  the 
EU  is  increasingly concerned that the rather vague and  undefined US Full implementation 
a prerequisite 
Tariff  peaks only 
partially removed 
Discriminatory 
US car taxes 
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concept  of  national  security  is  beginning  to  embrace  aspects  of 
domestic economic security as  well.  Also  in  this  area,  multilateral 
criteria should be developed. The EU will  pursue the issue with the US 
as a matter of priority. 
The public procurement sector has for years  now been  of particular 
sensitivity for European companies seeking access to US markets. The 
extensive  discrimination  or even  total  exclusion  of non-US  controlled 
companies in  and  from  public procurement at Federal as well as  State 
level  by  so-called  "Buy America" legislation  has  led  to  considerable 
potential for conflict. A recent joint study by the EU  and the US  pointed 
out  the  extent  of these  measures.  Excluding  for the  time  being  the 
telecommunications  sector as  well  as  state,  municipal  and  other sub 
federal  entities,  the  May  1993  Memorandum  of  Understanding 
between the US  and the EU  on  government procurement has resulted 
in progress on this issue. The US have agreed to waive the application 
of the  Buy  America  Act  for  goods,  works  and  other  services  above 
certain thresholds at federal  level  and  for electrical  utilities.  The EU  is 
continuing  negotiations  with  the  US  with  a  view  to  reaching  a  more 
comprehensive  agreement  on  procurement  dovetailed  with  a  self-
contained  agreement on  telecommunications  procurement,  the  results 
of which could  be  incorporated  into  an  expanded  GATT  Government 
Procurement  Code.  A  prerequisite  for  this  would,  however,  be  full 
implementation  by  the  US  of  the  EU-US  Memorandum  of 
Understanding  on  public  procurement,  the  revocation  of  presently 
applied  retaliatory  measures  in  this  sector and  on  agreement  that  is 
balanced. 
As  a  result  of the  Uruguay  Round  negotiations,  the  overall  US  tariff 
burden  on  EU  exporters will  be  reduced,  and  thus the  issue  of high 
tariffs  has lost some of its importance.  However,  notably for products 
such as  textiles, clothing, footwear, tableware, and glassware, some of 
which are burdened with tariffs of up to 40%, the EU  has only partially 
succeeded in obtaining reductions. This also holds true for the question 
of  classification  of  two-door  multi-purpose  vehicles,  presently 
considered by the US as trucks with a 25% tariff applied when imported 
into the US. Although the US  Court of International Trade in  May 1993 
ruled that two-door multi-purpose vehicle are  passenger cars to which 
only  a  2.5%  tariff is  applied,  the  US  Government  has  appealed  this 
decision. 
US  tax  legislation  may  adversely  affect  trade  and  investment. 
Examples  range  from  reporting  requirements  and  corporate  income 
taxation provisions to the issue of luxury and gas guzzler tax, as well as 
the CAFE payments on cars imported from Europe. The latter has been 
made  subject  to  a  GATT  panel  procedure  the  outcome  of which  is 
expected later this year. Regulatory 
cooperation 
US GATT 
compliance 
Investment less 
attractive 
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The  growing  economic  interdependence  between  the  US  and  the  EU 
increasingly  makes  apparent  that  the  multiplicity of standards and 
standard-making  procedures  in  the  US,  their  sometimes  lack  of 
conformity with  international norms,  and  the resulting  fragmentation  of 
the US market take on the character of impediments and even barriers 
to trade. The EU  has engaged in  consultations with the US with a view 
to  advancing  regulatory  co-operation  between  each  other  through 
agreements on  mutual recognition  of conformity assessment and  good 
laboratory  practices,  as  well  as  beginning  consultations  in  specified 
priority  sectors.  A  successful  conclusion  of these  endeavours  would 
undoubtedly have considerable positive effects on European trade with 
the US. 
The protection of intellectual property rights has been at the origin of 
several  trade  conflicts  between  the  EU  and  the  US.  Notably  the 
continuing discrimination of non-US products as provided for by Section 
337  of the  Tariff  Act  of  1930,  despite  a  GATT  Panel  ruling  to  the 
contrary, is unacceptable to the EU. The Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) resolve some of the 
issues  in  point where  its  provisions  are  fully  and  faithfully  transposed 
into national legislation. Particularly, recourse by the US to Special 301 
legislation with  a view to unilaterally defending  its  industries' interests, 
has been  rendered unnecessary. The  EU will therefore closely monitor 
all US implementation legislation to this aspect. 
There  is  a growing  concern  in  the  EU  about the  discussion  in  the  US 
about  'condition' national treatment of foreign-controlled  economic 
operators. Thus,  companies with non-US parents are treated differently 
to  those  with  US  parents  as  regards  i.e.  antitrust  exposure  of 
production  joint ventures  or the  participation  in  federally  funded  R&D 
activities.  This  discrimination  is  brought about  mainly  by  sectoral  and 
cross-sectoral  reciprocity  conditions  as  well  as  economic 
performance requirements.  If the  trend  notably  in  the  US  Congress 
towards  more  conditional  national  treatment  were  to  prevail,  it  would 
seriously  make  European  investment  in  the  US  less  attractive  and 
impact on  the  overall  EU-US  trade  relations.  In  a multilateral  context, 
proliferation  of  provisions  conditioning  national  treatment  would 
profoundly  distort  a  major  element  of the  global  trade  system,  and 
eventually even  lead to  blurring the  principle of Most Favoured  Nation 
(MFN) treatment. 
In  the  same  spirit the  EU  is  concerned  about  impediments to  foreign 
service providers to obtain effective access to the service market in the 
US  as  well  as  the  tendancy  in  the  US  to  discriminate against foreign 
banks. 
It is the legitimate objective of countervailing duties to offset competition 
distorting effects of subsidies bestowed in a foreign country on products 
entering the  domestic market.  However, the recent application of US GATT  panel under 
way 
Further US market 
opening necessary 
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countervailing duties legislation to a significant part of the EU's steel 
exports to the US has assumed the character of a barrier to trade. This 
is  because the  US  has not respected reasonable CVD/AD procedures 
and methodology. As a result,  the EU  had to request a GATT panel on 
the issue. 
Also  the  application  of anti-dumping  measures against exports from 
the Community constitutes a serious barrier to trade for the companies 
concerned.  While  the  principle  of trade  defence  is  enshrined  in  the 
GATT,  its .  trade  restrictive  effect  should  be  contained  as  much  as 
possible.  In  this  respect,  the  European  Commission  is  particularly 
concerned  as  regards  the  measures taken  by  the  US  Department of 
Commerce  concerning  imports  of  certain  steel  products  from  the 
Community. 
In  sectors  such  as  agriculture  and  fisheries,  services, 
telecommunications and  broadcasting, the successful conclusion of 
the  Uruguay  Round  has  brought  some  relief to  conflictual  situations, 
although to  a differing degree.  There  remain  in  the  US  notably in  the 
telecommunications,  broadcasting  and  services  sectors  considerable 
obstacles which will have to be overcome to provide European industry 
with meaningful market access opportunities. 
Other areas  of concern  are  the  direct  and  indirect support  measures 
provided for the US  shipbuilding and  aircraft industries.  In  both sectors 
the EU urges the US to work on the basis of what has been achieved in 
the  UR  negotiations  for  a  multilaterally  agreed  framework  to  reduce 
barriers and distortions, also in these important sectors. 
To sum up, the impression has been reinforced that the US will have to 
continue  efforts  to  open  up  home  markets  to  live  up  to  their  own 
perception of representing  "still  the  most open  major trading  nation  in 
the world" (1993 Annual Report of the President of the United States on 
the  Trade  Agreements  Program).  In  1994,  the  EU  in  its  turn  will  not 
cease  to  pursue  the  objective  of securing  a  wider  scope  of market 
access for European industry to US markets. Unilateralism 
ignores multilateral 
agreements  ... 
..• and damages the 
world trading 
system! 
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CHAPTER2: 
HORIZONTAL ISSUES 
A  Unilateralism in US Trade Legislation 
1  General Remarks 
Unilateralism  in  US  trade  legislation  takes  the  form  of either unilateral 
sanctions  or  retaliatory  measures  against  "offending"  countries,  or 
natural or legal persons. These measures are unilateral in the sense that 
they  are  based  on  an  exclusively  US  appreciation  of the trade  related 
behaviour  of  a  foreign  country  or  its  legislation  and  administrative 
practice,  without  reference  to,  and  often  in  open  defiance  of,  agreed 
multilateral rules. 
The  principal  motivation  behind  this  kind  of unilateralism  appears to  be 
the  opening  up  of foreign  markets  for US  industry.  For the  US,  this  is 
seen as vital in order to cut the trade deficit and to prevent the economic 
distortions that foreign trade barriers allegedly cause.  But unilateralism in 
US trade legislation has also always mirrored the US's limited confidence 
in,  and  discontent  with,  GATT  rules  and  the  multilateral  dispute 
settlement process.  In  addition, Congress had the chance to respond to 
public  demands  for  an  active  support  of  US  business  concerns  by 
enacting  unilateral  trade  provisions.  However,  the  very  nature  of  US 
unilateral trade  legislation  implies  a real  risk that the  affected  countries 
will  adopt quid pro quo measures.  Inevitably,  such  developments would 
considerably damage the multilateral trading system. 
2  Provisions in Trade Legislation 
Section  301  of the  1974  Trade  Act  as  amended  by  the  Omnibus 
Trade  and  Competitiveness  Act  of  1986  authorises  the  US 
Administration  to  take  action  to  enforce  US  rights  under  any  trade 
agreement and to combat those practices by foreign governments which 
the  US  government deems  to  be  discriminatory  or unjustifiable  and  to 
burden or restrict US commerce.  Even in those areas covered by GATT 
and its dispute settlement mechanism, the provision still requires the US 
to  take  unilateral  action  against  its  trading  partners,  without  any  prior 
authorisation of the GATT Contracting Parties.  Retaliation is thus rather 
mandatory than discretionary. 12 
The  Omnibus Trade  and  Competitiveness Act of 1988  also  introduced 
the  so-called  "Super  301 ".  "Super 301"  is  the  term  of art  given  to  a 
special initiation procedure for unfair foreign trade practice investigations 
following  the  Section  301  procedure.  On  the  basis  of the  information 
contained in an annual National Trade Estimates Report which identifies 
foreign  trade  restrictions  and  estimates their impact on  US  commerce, 
the  USTR  is  required  to  identify  US  trade  liberalisation  priorities  and 
priority  foreign  countries  against  which  investigations  and  eventually 
trade  action  are  officially  to  be  initiated.  These  Super 301  procedures 
could  only  have been  introduced  in  1989 and  1990.  In  1993 and  1994, 
proposals  to  reinstate  a  Super 301  provision  were  introduced  into  the 
Senate  (eg. Trade  Enforcement  Act,  S.  90;  Trade  Compliance  Act, 
S.  268;  Super 301,  S.  301,  Bancus/Danforth Bill,  S.  1898). Since none 
of  them  had  been  approved  by  Congress  so  far,  on  3 March  1994 
President  Clinton  issued  an  Executive  Order  on  Identification  of 
Trade  Expansion  Priorities.  Referring  to  the  lapsed  Super 301 
provision, the  Executive Order requires the US  Trade Representative to 
identify "priority" unfair trade practices from "priority" countries and  self-
initiate Section 301  cases against them. 
The  1988  Omnibus  Trade  and  Competitiveness  Act  furthermore 
introduced a Special 301  procedure targeting intellectual property rights 
protection  outside  the  US.  Under  Special 301  the  USTR  identifies 
"priority"  foreign  countries  that  are  deemed  to  deny  adequate  and 
effective  protection  of intellectual  property  rights  and  officially  initiates 
investigation  procedures which  may eventually  result  in  unilateral trade 
measures. 
The  unique  feature  of the  family  of "301"  legislation  is  that  it  permits 
unilateral determinations and action, or threats thereof, inconsistent with, 
and  in  clear contradiction to,  the  multilateral trading  system.  The GATT 
Section 301  does  not  allow  for  any  unilateral  interpretation  of  the  rights  and 
contradicts GATT  obligations  of  contracting  parties,  nor for  unilateral  action  by  any  one 
contracting party aimed at inducing another contracting party to bring its 
trade  policies  into  conformity  with  the  General  Agreement.  Under the 
GATT dispute settlement procedures, any trade retaliatory measure has 
to be authorised by the Council. 
The US has initiated Section 301  procedures against the EU  in 28 cases 
altogether.  In  at  least 7 cases,  the  US threatened with the imposition of 
punitive  duties  or  counter  subsidies,  or  eventually  resorted  to  such 
unilateral retaliation against the EU. 
•  Subsidies to wheat flour in 1975; 
•  Preferential tariffs for citrus fruits in 1976; 
•  Export  subsidies  for  pasta  products  and  production  subsidies  for 
canned fruit in  1981; Telecom products 
and  services 
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•  Accession of Spain and  Portugal to the EU  leading to reduced import 
quotas for US agricultural products in 1986; 
•  Oilseed subsidies in 1987; 
•  Ban of hormones in meat in 1987. 
The continuing retaliation measures in the case of the ban  of hormones 
in  meat is  plainly contrary to GATT rules  (see for more details Chapter 
3A5). 
The  objectives of the Telecommunications Trade Act of 1988 are  to 
"provide  mutually  advantageous  market  opportunities",  to  correct 
imbalances  in  market  opportunities,  and  to  increase  US  exports  of 
telecommunications products and services in so far as the Act allows for 
the  identification  of "priority countries" for negotiation  and  the  threat of 
unilateral  action  (e.g.  termination  of trade  agreements,  use  of Section 
301  and bans on government procurement) if US objectives are not met. 
To  meet  these  objectives  the  Act  furnishes  provisions  analogous  to 
"Super 301". The EU continues to be designated a priority country under 
the Act.  However,  in  February  1992 the  US  Trade  Representative said 
that sanctions were not felt appropriate for the time being as negotiations 
in the telecommunications sector were ongoing. 
Pursuant  to  the  1987  Green  Paper  on  Telecommunications,  EU 
legislation which  liberalises procurement by telecom  utilities,  introducing 
a high level of transparency and leading to improved market access, the 
sale  of terminal  equipment,  and  the  provision  of value-added  and  data 
services,  is  now  in  force.  Liberalisation  in  the  satellite  and  mobile 
telecommunications sectors is also under way,  and  a review is currently 
being  conducted  of  the  entire  service  sector  by  the  European 
Commission. In view of this the EU cannot accept that the US unilaterally 
determine  what  constitutes  a  barrier  or  when  "mutually  advantageous 
market opportunities" in telecommunications had been obtained. Nor can 
the  EU  accept US  attempts to conduct negotiations under the threat of 
unilateral retaliation. 
Title VII  of the  Omnibus  Trade  and  Competitiveness  Act  of 1988 
stipulates that  US  procurement of goods from  signatories to  the  GATT 
Government Procurement  Code  which  are  "not  in  good  standing" with 
the Code shall be prohibited. A procurement prohibition is also mandated 
against  any  country  which  discriminates  against  US  suppliers  in  its 
procurement of goods or services, whether or not covered by the Code, 
and  where  such  discrimination  constitutes  a "significant  and  persistent 
pattern  or practice" and  results  in  identifiable  injury to  US  business.  To 
this effect,  the  US  President is  required to  publish  an  annual  report  on 
those  foreign  countries  which  discriminate  against  US  products  or 
services in their procurement. Continuing trade 
retaliation 
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Unilateral US determination on whether GATT Government Procurement 
Code signatories are in compliance with the Code represents a violation 
of GATT procedures.  These  require  the  US  to  raise  the  matter in  the 
relevant  committee  and  pass  through ·a  process  of consultations  and 
dispute  settlement.  Unilateral  action,  at  any  stage,  to  institute 
preferences or to  ban  certain countries from  access to US  procurement 
would clearly be contrary to the Code's provisions.  Such measures can 
only be authorised by the relevant committee. 
Since the  public procurement sector will  be  covered  by  the new World 
Trade Organisation (WTO),  its reinforced Dispute Settlement Procedure 
will also apply to those areas of government procurement which are not 
yet covered by the GATT Government Procurement Code.  The US  will 
therefore  have  to  resort  to  the  WTO  dispute  settlement  procedure 
regardless of exclusions or exceptions in its schedule of concessions. 
By a determination of the US  President of 27 April 1992, the EU  and 
certain  Member  States  were  identified  as  countries  alleged  to 
discriminate  in  public  procurement  against  US  products  and  services. 
Reference  was  made  notably  to  Article 29  of  the  Utilities  Directive 
(EEC/90/531). The President's determination also set 1 January 1993 as 
the  date  on  which  sanctions  would  be  effective  against  the  EU  if the 
discriminatory  provision  of  the  Utilities  Directive  was  applied.  On 
31  January  1993,  the  US  Trade  Representative  announced  that . a 
prohibition  of award  of contracts  by  Federal  agencies for products and 
services not covered by the GATT Government Procurement Code from 
some  or all  of the  Member States of the  European  Union  would  enter 
into force as of 22 March 1993. In addition, the US Trade Representative 
immediately  solicited  public  comments  concerning  the  impact  of other 
possible  actions  restricting  imports  of telecommunications  and  power 
generating equipment from the European Union, and held out a prospect 
of a study on  the  desirability and  feasibility of the  US  withdrawing from 
the GATT Government Procurement Code. 
On  25 May  1993,  the  EU  and  the  US  concluded  a bilateral  agreement 
which  waives  Article  29  of  the  Utilities  Directive  for  a  number  of 
procurement  utilities  sectors,  but  which  failed  to  include  the 
telecommunications  sector.  On  21  April  1993  the  EU  and  the  US 
reached  an  interim  agreement  which  waives  Article  29  of the  Utilities 
Directive for  a number of procurement  utilities  sectors,  but  it failed  to 
include  the  telecommunications  sector.  Because  of  this  unresolved 
issue,  the  US  Government decided  on  28  May  1993 to  impose limited 
sanctions  against  the  EU  relating  to  US  federal  procurement  below 
minimum thresholds ($ 176,000 for goods and services and $ 6.5 million 
for  public  works),  which  are  still  in  place.  This  leaves  a  number  of 
European  companies  unable  to  bid  for  public  procurement  contracts, 
such  as  the supply of a laser interferometer to the  National  Institute of 
Science and Technology.  In  reaction,  on  8 June  1993 the  EU  adopted Binding dispute 
settlement 
procedures 
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measures  to  similarly  restrict  access  for  US  tenderers  in  respect  of 
certain contracts awarded by Member States' public authorities. 
3  Comments 
Since last year's report,  the  landscape of unilateral US trade provisions 
has  remained  substantially  unchanged:  Unilateralism  has  continued  to 
be  a  characteristic  element  of  US  trade  laws.  The  EU  therefore 
considered  it  to  be  an  absolute  necessity  in  the  UR  to  overcome 
· unilateral  ism  and  the  defiance  of GATT  panel  rulings  by  Contracting 
Parties, and to strengthen the multilateral system  by  setting up the new 
World Trade Organisation (WTO). 
The  obligation  of  Contracting  Parties  to  ensure  conformity  of  their 
domestic legislation, regulations and administrative procedures with all of 
the  Uruguay  Round  Agreements  (Art. XVI.4  of  the  Agreement 
establishing the World Trade Organisation) is an essential element of 
the  WTO's  legal  structure,  combined  with  the  new  integrated  dispute 
settlement procedure (DSP). 
The DSP is the core element of the WTO. The improvements of the DSP 
in  the  form  of  stringent  decision  making  procedures  will  provide  an 
effective  mechanism  to  any  infringements  of any  part  of the  Uruguay 
Round Agreement.  Paragraph 23  of the  Understanding on  Rules and 
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes contains a binding 
commitment by the Contracting Parties that they will  have  "recourse  to, 
and abide  by,  the  rules  and procedures" of the  DSP.  Thus,  the  DSP 
renders the use of any unilateral trade measures on  matters covered by 
the  WTO  illegal.  Accordingly,  the  Contracting  Parties  will  also  have to 
revise  their  trade  policy  instruments  to  the  extent  that  they  contain 
elements of unilateralism.  For the  US,  this  means that Section 301  and 
its  hybrids will  h.ave  to  undergo  revision  in  order to  ensure compliance 
with  the  new WTO  dispute  settlement structure.  In  view  of this,  it  is  a 
matter for regret that the  US Administration  has felt  it  necessary to  re-
enact the Super 301  provision which is objectionable in principle. The EU 
looks to the US to conduct its trade policy in all respects according to the 
requirements  of the  multilateral trade  system,  including the  principle  of 
non-discrimination, and avoiding unilateral trade sanctions. 
This also holds true for sectors which become more and more interfaced 
with trade. 
Indeed,  the  US  Trade  Representative  has  already  made  public  his 
intention  to  consider  whether  non-WTO  covered  issues  could  be 
subjected  to  new  initiatives  for  Section 301  provisions,  such  as  a 
"blue 301"  for  labour  rights  and  human  rights  and  a  "green 301"  for 
environmental  protection.  The  EU  is  concerned  about  such  initiatives, 16 
since they will  inevitably lead  to  the same  problems as  experienced  in 
the past with the old family of "301" legislation. Conflicting 
requirements 
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8  Enforcement of US Legislation outside 
US Territory 
1  The Principle 
For  reasons  of  domestic  and  foreign  policy,  the  us" has  adopted  a 
number  of  laws  which  are  to  some  extent  applicable  outside  US 
territory.  In  some  cases  the  EU  does  understand  the  underlying 
reasons  for,  and  might  agree  with,  the  objectives  of  these  laws. 
However,  it  does  not  agree  with  the  measures  by  which  these 
objectives  are  being  achieved.  The  enforcement  of  US  legislation 
outside US territory can expose EU  enterprises to unjustified hardships 
and  conflicting  requirements.  The  extra-territorial  scope  of  US 
legislation affects inter alia importers and  exporters based  outside the 
US,  who  have  to  comply  with  US  export  and  re-export  control 
requirements  and  prohibitions;  US  owned  or controlled  businesses  in 
Europe which  have  to  comply with  US  foreign  policy trade  legislation, 
for example the Cuban Democracy Act;  as well as  manufacturers, who 
have  to  keep  track  of  end-users  or  potential  misusers  of sensitive 
items.  It  is  generally recognised  that the  extra-territorial  application  of 
US  laws  and  regulations  may  have  a  serious  effect  on  international 
trade  and  investment  if  and  when  they  expose  foreign-incorporated 
companies  to  conflicting  legal  requirements.  Moreover,  in  many 
instances  the  extra-territorial  application  of certain  laws  implies  an 
intention to override the laws or fundamental  policy of a supranational 
entity, or other country,  such  as  the EU  and  its Member States, within 
its own territory by the policy or laws of the US.  This is clearly contrary 
to generally accepted principles of international law. Accordingly, many 
close trading partners of the US,  such as  Canada and certain Member 
States of the EU  have "blocking statutes" in order to preclude the extra-
territorial application of foreign legislation within their territory. 
2  Illustrative Cases 
One  of the  most  blatant and  problematic examples  of extra-territorial 
application  are  the  US  Export  Administration  Regulations  (EAR}, 
whose  legislative  authority  was  the  Export  Administration  Act  of 
1979 (EAA}, as amended. The authority granted under the EAA expired 
on  30 September 1990 after which the President invoked his authority, 
including his authority under the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act of 1977 (IEEPA),  to  continue the  system  of controls that 
had  been  in  place  under  the  EAA.  The  EAR,  among  other  things, 
require companies incorporated and operating in  EU  Member States to 
comply with  US  re-export  controls.  This  includes  compliance  with  US 
prohibitions  on  re-exports  for  reasons  of  US  national  security  and 
foreign policy subject to US jurisdiction. While the extra-territorial nature Sanctions against 
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of these  controls  has  repeatedly  been  criticised  by  the  EU  and  its 
Member States,  notably during  the  Siberian  pipeline  dispute  of 1982, 
they continue to be applied. 
Furthermore, serious concerns have also been  raised  by the 1988 US 
Trade  Act's  amendment  to  Section  II  of  the  EAA  providing  for 
sanctions  against  foreign  companies  which  have  violated  their  own 
countries' national export controls,  if such violations are determined by 
the President to  have had  a detrimental effect on  US national security. 
The  possible  sanctions  consist  of  a  prohibition  of  contracting  or 
procurement by  US  entities and the banning  of imports of all  products 
manufactured  by  the  foreign  violator.  These  sanctions  are  of such  a 
nature that they must be  deemed contrary to  the GATT and  its  Public 
Procurement Code. 
Since 1962, the year in which the US first proclaimed a trade embargo 
against  Cuba,  the  relations  between  the  two  countries  have  mainly 
been determined by Section 620 (a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
1961  (FAA),  as  amended,  the Trading with  the Enemy Act of 1917 
(TWEA),  as  amended,  and  the  International  Emergency  Economic 
Powers Act (IEEPA). 
The FAA and TWEA provide the legal basis for the promulgation of the 
Cuban  Assets  Control  Regulations,  which  prohibit  virtually  all 
commercial and financial transactions with Cuba or Cuban nationals by 
US  companies,  US  owned  or controlled  companies and  US  nationals, 
unless  specifically  licensed  by  the  Department  of the  Treasury.  The 
IEEPA provides the legal authority to control and prohibit US exports to 
Cuba. 
The  Cuban  Democracy  Act  of  1992  (CDA)  amends  the  Cuban 
Assets  Control  Regulations  and  further restricts  licensed trade with 
Cuba to only humanitarian and food aid operations. Section 1706 of the 
CDA lays down a number of trade prohibitions. These are: 
•  a  prohibition  of  all  commercial  transactions  and  payments  with 
Cuba  by  US  companies  including  US  owned  or controlled  foreign 
firms. This will, however, not affect contracts entered into before the 
date of enactment of the CDA; 
•  a  180  days  landing  ban  on  commercial  vessels  departing  from 
Cuba,  except if they hold a licence issued  by the US  Secretary of 
Treasury; 
•  a landing  ban  on  vessels carrying goods or passengers to  or from 
Cuba  or carrying  goods  in  which  Cuba  has  any  interest,  except if 
they hold a licence issued by the US Secretary of the Treasury. 
•  a  prohibition  on  supplying  ships  carrying  goods  or  persons  to  or 
from Cuba. _I 
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The Cuban Democracy Act and the Cuban Assets Control Regulations 
are enforced by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).  A list of 
individuals and companies which do business with Cuba (the SDN  list) 
is  maintained.  The  OFAC  can  deny  authorisation  to  any  financial 
transaction  that the OFAC  suspects  to  be  linked  indirectly  or through 
various  means  to  a  Cuban  business.  Furthermore,  European 
companies are reporting lengthy OFAC procedures, which tend to harm 
the operation of normal business between non-US companies. 
The CDA aims at closing a loophole which allowed foreign subsidiaries 
of US  companies to  make $583  million  in  Cuban  operations,  in  1991. 
US  subsidiaries  abroad  have  requested  Treasury  licences  for  $718 
million of trade with Cuba.  The impact of the CDA upon  EU  trade and 
investment with Cuba will probably affect a fraction of that amount. 
That part of the CDA which  purports to prohibit foreign firms owned or 
controlled  by  US  companies  from  trading  with  Cuba  is  clearly  extra-
territorial.  Accordingly,  the  Governments  of Canada  and  the  United 
Kingdom  invoked their blocking  legislation  on  9 and  14 October 1992 
respectively  to  counter the  extra-territorial  scope  of the  CDA  and  to 
protect the trading interests of their companies. 
I 
The  opposition  of  the  EU  to  the  CDA  was  made  clear  on  many 
occasions  without  success,  including  a  final  demarche  to  the 
Department of State in  October 1992,  urging the President to veto the 
CDA.  The  EU  has  also  noted  the  threat  expressed  by  the  US 
Government  to  prohibit,  under  the  Food  Security  Act  of 1985,  as 
amended by the Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 
1990, the allocation of a preferential sugar import tariff quota to any 
country that is  a net importer of sugar from  sugar cane of sugar beets 
unless that country verifies that it did not import sugar from Cuba for re-
export to the US. As a matter of fact, the US have denied a preferential 
sugar  quota  to  a  Member  State  which  has  refused  to  give  the 
assurances demanded. 
Furthermore several  European  airlines  operating flights to  Cuba  have 
their reservation  databases in  the  US;  however,  due to  the  rules  of 
the Cuban Democracy Act,  these flights are  not displayed. Apart from 
the  commercial  implications,  these  airlines  also  face  the  danger  of 
incurring a fine,  since the EU  rules for Computer Reservation Systems 
(CRS)  require  the  information  displayed  to  be  complete.  Both  the 
Treasury and DoT are aware of the problem, and it was also brought to 
the  attention  of  the  State  Department  at  the  EU-US  Sub-cabinet 
meeting in February 1994. As a consequence, with regard to one CRS, 
Gallileo, the problem appears to be solved. 
The EU  recognises that the extra-territorial application of US  laws and 
regulations  also  has  the  effect  of  prohibiting  non-US  owned  or 
controlled subsidiary companies incorporated and domiciled outside the The tuna-
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US from doing business with Cuba. Thus, the US Treasury Department 
blocked  a  payment  made  through  the  Bank  of  New  York  from  a 
European company to another non-US owned company based  on  the 
Trading with  the  Enemy Act.  Such  extensive application  of CDA rules 
could  affect  many  European  companies  which  engage  in  legitimate 
transactions with Cuba. 
The  US  Marine  Mammal  Protection  Act  of  1972  (MMPA},  as 
amended,  aims  at  protecting  marine  mammals,  particularly  dolphins. 
The Act progressively reduces the acceptable level of dolphin mortality · 
in  US tuna-fishing operations in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean and 
provides for sanctions to be  taken against other countries which fail to 
apply similar standards for dolphin protection. "Primary" embargoes are 
currently  being  applied  to  imports  of certain  yellowfin  tuna  products 
from Mexico and Venezuela. "Secondary" embargoes on yellowfin tuna 
products are imposed on  imports from "intermediary nations" - namely, 
countries which are exporting to the USA and  have failed to certify that 
they have  not  imported from  the  primary  embargoed  countries  during 
the preceding six months. 
Italy  is  the  only  EU  Member  State  currently  subject  to  a  secondary 
embargo.  At the  time  of the  imposition  of the  embargo,  the  value  of 
frozen yellowfin tuna exports affected by the embargoes was estimated 
at  some  ECU 5.5  million.  These  embargoes  have  had  a  negative 
impact  on  the  image  of  EU  products  and  have  contributed  to  the 
disturbance of the EU tuna market. 
The  EU  shares the declared  aim  of the  MMPA,  but  believes that any 
measures for the  conservation  of living  resources,  including  dolphins, 
should  be  achieved through  international cooperation.  Unilateral trade 
measures  which  are  adopted  for  environmental  reasons  should  be 
avoided in favour of multilaterally agreed measures. 
At the  request  of Mexico,  as  a  primary-embargoed  country,  a  GATT 
Panel  has reported  on  the terms of the  MMPA.  The Panel  considered 
that the US practices were not in  conformity with GATT Articles II I and 
XI  and that the GAIT-illegal and unilateral trade elements of the MMPA 
should  be  repealed.  The  EU  fully  agrees with  this  analysis along with 
most GATT Contracting  Parties.  However,  the  Panel's  report  has  not 
yet been adopted. Consultations with the US have taken place, but they 
have  failed  to  produce  any  agreement.  Because  of  this  lack  of 
progress, the EU requested the establishment of a further GATT Panel. 
This  Panel's  proceedings  are  currently  under  way  and  the  Panel's 
report should be available shortly. 
A new problem caused by the extra-territorial application of US law has 
arisen  with  regard  to  the  EU-US  negotiations for the  conclusion  of a 
new  Nuclear Cooperation  Agreement.  The  US  side  has  underlined 
that,  in  these negotiations,  it is  bound to  observe the  requirements of Legal uncertainty 
Blocking statutes 
21 
the  1978  US  Nuclear  Non-Proliferation  Act  (NNPA).  These 
requirements include an obligation for the US to obtain certain "consent 
rights"  over  reprocessing,  enrichment  and  over  certain  storage  and 
alterations  in  form  and  content  of  nuclear  material  supplied  in 
accordance  with  a  nuclear  agreement.  Other  requirements  relate  to 
such matters as a right to seek the return of nuclear items (in the event 
of a basic infringement of the  agreement),  extension of the  agreement 
to  non-American  items  in  certain  cases  ("contamination"),  a  right  to 
decide  on  the  safeguardability  of new  types  of installations  and  the 
maintenance of intrusive rights in perpetuity. This means that the future 
bilateral  EU/US  agreement  should,  in  the  view  of  the  US  side,  be 
subordinate to US domestic law. 
3  Comments 
The  continued  extra-territorial  application  of  US  laws  contributes  to 
serious  jurisdictional  conflicts  between  the  US  and  the  EU  and  its 
Member  States.  Quite  obviously,  it  has  a  negative  influence  on  the 
overall bilateral trade and investment climate. 
Individual  enterprises  whose  operations  are  subject  to  the  extra-
territorial scope of certain US legislation suffer severe and  unwarranted 
economic  discrimination.  In  addition,  they  have  to  cope  with  a 
considerable  amount of legal  uncertainty as  they  are  often  subject to 
contradictory requirements of US and their respective national laws. 
Despite  frequent  international  criticism,  the  US  has  so  far shown  no 
willingness  to  bring  this  aspect  of its  legislation  in  line  with  generally 
accepted  principles  of  international  law.  The  EU  will  continue  to 
reiterate its opposition to the extra-territorial provisions of US law.  It will 
continue  to  raise  the  issue  in  the  appropriate  fora,  in  particular  the 
OECD  Committee  on  International  Investment  and  Multinational 
Enterprises. The EU  and  its Member States are closely monitoring the 
effects of the US  extra-territorial legislation.  Some  Member States are 
considering  adopting  blocking  statutes  similar  to  those  of the  United 
Kingdom  and  Canada  which  would  protect their businesses  from  US 
requirements  and  would  give  them  a  legal  basis  to  plead  "foreign 
government compulsion" in US courts. Disguised 
protectionism? 
Economic welfare 
of  a company 
23 
C  Impediments Through National Security 
Considerations 
1  Some General Remarks 
Sovereign  nations  have  a  right  to  take  any  measure  to  protect  their 
essential  national  security  interests.  This  has  also  been  widely 
recognized by  multilateral and  bilateral trade agreements. However,  it is 
in  the  interest  of  all  trade  actors,  as  for  example  manifested  by  the 
National  Treatment  Instrument  of OECD  as  well  as  by  its  Codes  of 
Liberalization,  that such  measures are  prudently and  sparingly  applied. 
There is an inherent danger that restrictions to trade and  investment that 
are  justified  on  national  security  grounds  are,  in  reality,  merely 
expressions of protectionist policies. 
The  US  has  always  been  at  the  forefront  of developing  national  trade 
laws  and  regulations to  implement  and  enforce  national  security  policy 
objectives.  Thus,  US  trade legislation includes various provisions which 
refer to  national security considerations to  justify restrictions  on  foreign 
imports,  procurement,  exports and  investment.  In  his 1993 Trade Policy 
Report  to  Congress,  the  US  Trade  Representative  reinforced  this 
p,osition,  indicating  that  the  US  will  regard  its  national  security  as 
interwoven with domestic economic strength. 
2  Restrictions Applied in Various Fields 
a)  Import restrictions 
On  the  grounds  of national  security,  the  US  can  restrict  imports  from 
third  countries.  Such  restrictions  are  triggered  by  US  industry  petitions 
under  Section  232  of the  Trade  Expansion  Act of 1962.  Protective 
measures can  be  used for an  unlimited period of time.  The Department 
of Commerce investigates the effects of imports which threaten to impair 
national security either by  quantity or by  circumstances.  Section  232  is 
supposed  to  safeguard  the  US  national  security,  not  the  economic 
welfare of any company,  except when that company's future may affect 
US national security. The application of Section 232 is not dependent on 
proof of injury to US industry. 
In  the  past,  the  EU  has voiced  its  concern  that  Section  232  gives  US 
manufacturers an  opportunity to seek protection on  grounds of national 
security, when in reality the aim is simply to curb foreign competition. An 
example of this is the (US-Japan-Taiwan) Voluntary Restraint Agreement 
on  machine tools which has been extended to the end of 1993 for "high 
tech"  machine  tools.  It  was  announced  that  if during  the  phase-vout Repeated conflicts 
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period imports from major machine tool supplier countries were capturing 
an  increasing US  market share thus undermining the integrity of the US 
machine tool revitalization program,  the  US Government would consider 
taking  appropriate  remedial  action.  The  EU  will  continue  to  closely 
monitor the impact of these restrictions on its exports of machine tools to 
the US. 
b)  Export restrictions 
A comprehensive system  of export controls was established,  under the 
Export  Administration  Act  of 1979  (EAA),  and  continued  under the 
International  Economic  Emergency  Powers  Act of 1977 to  prevent 
trade to unauthorized destinations. This system  is  also used to enforce 
US  foreign  policy  decisions  and  international  agreements  on  non-
proliferation  of certain  types  of goods  or  know-how.  It  has  repeatedly 
created  a  conflict  of  jurisdictions  and  requirements  for  European 
companies whenever their products or exports have had a component or 
an element controlled under US export control regimes. 
The Member States of the EU have their own export control systems and 
cooperate  with  the  US  in  the  COCOM  which  is  presently  being  re-
negotiated.  This  makes  the  extra-territorial  characteristics  of the  EEA 
mentioned  in  Chapter 281  and  the  Arms  Export  Control  Act  all  the 
more inappropriate.  Furthermore,  the  EU  has  in  the  past expressed  its 
concern  with  regard  to  the  unilateral  determination  made  by  the  US 
concerning export licences for products made in  the  EU.  The EU  has in 
particular  protested  because the  US  considers  the  subsidiary  of a  US 
company incorporated in  one  of the  Member States of the EU  as  a US 
company and as such subject to US jurisdiction for actions within the EU. 
It  is  therefore  welcomed  that  the  US  have  shown  some  interest  in  a 
working-level  exchange  of  information  with  the  EU,  because  it  has 
launched  a  common  export  control  regime.  Likewise,  the  US  and  the 
Member States of the  EU  are taking  part  in  "non-proliferation" treaties, 
such  as  on  nuclear,  chemical  and  biological  warfare,  and  missile 
technology  non-proliferation.  Appropriate  early  consultations  should 
allow both  legitimate  trade to  take  place  and  an  efficient  prohibition  of 
exports to unauthorized destinations. 
c)  Procurement restrictions 
Procurement  by  the  Department of Defense  (DoD)  is  regarded  as  one 
way  of addressing  the  issue  of the  maintenance  of an  industrial  base 
capable  of  meeting  national  security  requirements.  According  to  the 
1991  DoD Report to Congress on  the Defense Industrial Base,  "national 
security  includes  economic  security  and  requires  th~t  DoD  have  an 
assured and reliable source of supply of defense material in peace time, Tile 
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crisis,  and war,  in an era of declining budgets and increasing of defense 
markets". 
Although  the  concept of national  security  can  be  invoked  under Article 
VIII  of the  GATT  Government  Procurement  Code  to  prohibit  national 
treatment in  the defense sector to foreign  suppliers,  the  use of national 
security  considerations  by  the  US  has  led  in  practice  to  an  unjustified 
further substantial reduction in the scope of DoD supplies covered by the 
GATT Government Procurement Code. 
The  concept  of  "national  security"  was  originally  used  in  the  1941 
Defense Appropriation Act to  restrict  procurement by  the  DoD  to  US 
sourcing.  It  is  now known  as  the  Berry Amendment and its  scope has 
been  extended  to  secure  protection  for  a wide  range  of products  only 
tangentially related to  national security concerns - for example, the GAO 
1992 ruling that the purchase of fuel cells for helicopters is subject to the 
Berry  Amendmet;~t fibre  content  provisions,  and  the  withdrawal  of  a 
contract to supply oil  containment booms to the US Navy because of the 
same textile restrictions. 
Nevertheless, the Berry Amendment allows for some exceptions when: 
•  the purchase does not exceed $25,000; 
•  satisfactory quality  and  sufficient quantity  cannot  be  supplied when 
needed afUS market prices; 
•  procurements outside the US are in support of combat operations, or 
are by vessels in foreign waters, or are emergency procurements, or 
procurements of perishables by establishments outside the US; 
•  speciality metals or chemical warfare protective clothing are procured 
outside the US to comply with agreements with foreign governments 
either requiring the US to make purchases to offset sales, or in which 
both governments agree to remove barriers to purchases of supplies 
from each other. 
It  is,  however,  not  clear whether the  DoD  actually makes  use  of these 
possibilities for waivers.  Further DoD procurement restrictions are based 
on the National Security Act of 1947 and the Defense Production Act 
of  1950  which  grant  authority  to  the  President  and  the  Secretary  of 
Defense  to  impose  restrictions  on  foreign  supplies  to  preserve  the 
industrial mobilization base and the overall preparedness of the US.  This 
does  not  apply  to  Canada  because  it  is  considered  to  be  part  of the 
North American Mobilization sphere. 
Finally, Congress can  adopt Buy America restrictions allegedly based on 
national security considerations.  Congress makes use  of this facility  by 
providing  the  DoD  Authorization  and  Appropriation Acts  with  additional 
Buy America requirements for the Department of Defense each year. Bilateral 
arrangements 
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US  Allies  including  certain  EU  countries  have  concluded  with  the  US 
various  Cooperative  Industrial  Defense  Agreements  or  Reciprocal 
Procurement  Agreements  (MOUs)  (UK/1975,  France/1978, 
Germany/1978,  ltaly/1978,  Netherlands/1978',  Portugal/1978, 
Belgium/1979,  Denmark/1980,  Luxembourg/1982,  Spain/1982, 
Greece/1986). These agreements provide for a blanket waiver of the Buy 
America  Act  by  the  Secretary  of  Defense  with  respect  to  products 
produced by the Allies.  They aim  to promote more efficient cooperation 
in  research,  development  and  production  of defence  equipment  and 
achieve  greater  rationalization,  standardization,  and  compatability. 
However,  the  US  Administration  (DoD  and  USTR)  can  determine  the 
standing of an Ally with respect to its discrimination against US products 
under the bilateral agreements and rescind the blanket waiver of the Buy 
America Act.  In addition, Congress is unilaterally modifying the coverage 
of MOUs  by  imposing  ad  hoc  Buy  America  requirements  during  the 
annual  budget  process  as  legal  norms  overriding  the  MOU  itself. 
According  to  EU  industrial·  sources,  there  are  indications  that  US 
procurement officers disregard the exemption of Buy America restrictions 
for MOU countries, eg.  in the case of fuel-cells and steel forging items. 
A DoD  report to  Congress  in  1989 said  that  many  of the  procurement 
restrictions ''provide protection and guaranteed business to US industries 
without any requirement or incentives for the industry to modernize and 
become  competitive",  and  therefore  do  not  even  fulfil  the  domestic 
objective of maintaining an essential US industrial base. The Department 
of Defense therefore concluded that in  many cases,  restrictions  should 
be  terminated and  Congress should instead support a Domestic Action 
Plan  or  National  Stockpiling  Programs.  The  main  arguments  against 
procurement restrictions are that they: 
•  increase by 30 to 50% the price of DoD requirements; 
•  are a disincentive for investment and innovation; 
•  are costly in terms of paperwork and management; 
•  have  produced  increased  lead-times  for  supply  by  domestic 
industries; 
•  maintain a climate of protectionism; 
•  create an  atmosphere of animosity with  allies,  particularly when they 
violate the spirit of the MOUs. 
During the  Uruguay Round  negotiations,  in  the  Market Access  Group -
Tariff  and  Non-Tariff  measures  - and  in  the  Procurement  Informal 
Negotiating Group, the EU  requested that the US eliminate Buy America 
restrictions applicable to broad categories of products regardless of their 
relation to  defence issues.  The  US  denied that there was any abuse of 
the  security exemption  in  the  General Agreement and  the  Government 
Procurement  Code.  The  US  indicated  that  they  were  ready,  in  the 
context of the implementation of the Government Procurement Code, to 
disseminate  more  guidance  to  US  procurement  officials  for  identifying Screening of 
acquisitions 
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Code-covered  procurements  and  national-security-restricted 
procurements  in  "Commerce  Business  Daily"  notices,  to  ensure  clear 
and  consistent  identification  of  national  security  procurements,  and  to 
develop concordances between  national  clarification systems,  including 
the  US  Federal  Supply  Classification  System  and  the  Harmonized 
System. 
d)  Investment restrictions 
Section  5021  of  the  1988  Trade  Act,  the  so-called  Exon-Fiorio 
amendment,  authorises the President or his nominee to investigate the 
effects  of  any  merger,  acquisition  or  takeover  which  could  result  in 
foreign  control  of legal  persons  engaged  in  interstate commerce  in  the 
US  on  US  national  security.  This  screening  is  carried  out  by  the 
Treasury-chaired  Committee  on  Foreign  Investment  in  the  US 
(CFIUS).  Should  the  President  decide  that  any  such  transactions 
threaten  national  security,  he  can  take  action  to  suspend  or  prohibit 
these transactions.  This  could  include the forced  divestment of assets. 
There  are  no  provisions  for judicial  review  or for compensation  in  the 
case of divestment. 
A number of bills intended to extend the scope of Exon-Fiorio provisions, 
or to widen the concept of national security to purely economic matters, 
have  been  tabled  in  Congress.  The  Fiscal  Year  1993  Defense 
Authorization  Act  has  strengthened  Exon-Fiorio  procedures  by 
requiring  a report  by  the  President to  Congress  on  the results  of each 
CFIUS  investigation  and  by  including,  among  other  factors  to  be 
considered,  "the potential effect of the proposed or pending transaction 
on  US's  international  technological  leadership  in  areas  affecting  US 
national security". This economic criterion is new. 
Since  1992,  there  is  a  statutory  requirement  that  an  Exon-Fiorio 
investigation be  made  if a foreign  government engages  in  any  merger, 
acquisition  or take-over which  gives  it  control  of the  company.  Further 
provisions  contain  a  declaration  of  policy  aimed  at  discouraging 
acquisitions by and the award of certain contracts to such entities. At the 
beginning  of  1994,  the  Office  of  International  Investment  proposed 
implementing rules to the  amendments to Section 721  of Title VII  of the 
Defense  Production  Act  of  1950.  The  proposed  rules  will  expand  the 
scope  of facts  the  President will  have  to  take  into  consideration  when 
making  a  Section 721  determination.  Thus  additional  requests  for 
information  will  be  presented  to  entities  controlled  by  foreign 
governments. 
While the  EU  understands the  wishes  of the  US  to  take  all  necessary 
steps to safeguard its  national security,  there is  continued concern that 
the  scope  of application  may  be  carried  beyond  what  is  necessary to 
protect essential security interests.  In this context, the EU  has drawn the Going beyond 
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wide scope of the statute, the lack of a definition of national security and 
the uncertainty as to which transactions are notifiable to the attention of 
the  US  Administration.  Although  the  US  Treasury's  implementing 
regulations,  which  were published  in  November 1991,  do  provide some 
additional  guidance  on  certain  issues,  these  uncertainties  remain. 
Coupled with the fear of potential forced divestiture, this has in  practice 
meant that many,  if not most,  foreign  investors have felt obliged to give 
prior  notification  of  their  proposed  investments.  In  effect,  a  very 
significant number of EU  firms' acquisitions  in  the US will  be  subject to 
pre-screening. 
The Exon-Fiorio provisions could inhibit the efforts of OECD members to 
improve the free flow of foreign  investment and  could  conflict with  the 
principles  of the  OECD  Code  of Liberalization  of Capital  Movements. 
Such an  approach would also harm common EU-US efforts to establish 
and  implement  multilateral  disciplines  on  trade-related  investment 
agreements  (TRIMs)  and  to  enhance  liberalization  measures  and 
instruments in the OECD. 
With  regard  to  foreign  ownership,  the  US  has  told  the  OECD  of a 
number of additional  restrictions,  which  it justifies "partly or wholly"  on 
the  grounds  of  national  security.  Foreign  investment  is  restricted  in 
coastal  and  domestic shipping under the  Jones Act and  the  US  Outer 
Continental  Shelf  Lands  Act,  which  includes  fishing,  dredging, 
salvaging or supply transport from a point in the US to an offshore drilling 
rig  or platform on  the Continental Shelf (see also Chapter 303). Foreign 
investors must form  a US  subsidiary for exploitation of deep water ports 
and  for fishing  in  the  Exclusive  Economic Zone  (Commercial  Fishing 
Industry  Vessel  Anti-reflagging  Act  of  1987).  Licences  for  cable 
landings  are  only  granted  to  applicants  in  partnership with  US  entities 
(Submarine Cable Landing Licence Act of 1921). 
Under  the  Federal  Power  Act,  any  construction,  operation  or 
maintenance of facilities for the development, transmission and utilization 
of power  on  land  and  water over which  the  Federal  Government  has 
control  are  to  be  licensed  by  the  Federal  Energy  Regulatory 
Commission.  Such  licenses  can  only  be  granted  to  US  citizens  and  to 
corporations organized  under the  laws of the  United States.  The  same 
applies under the Geothermal Steam Act to leases for the development 
of geothermal steam and associated resources on lands administered by 
the Secretary of the Interior or the Department of Agriculture. As regards 
the operation, transfer,  receipt,  manufacture, production, acquisition and 
import or export of facilities which produce or use nuclear materials, the 
Nuclear Energy  Act requires  that  a licence  be  issued  but the  licence 
cannot  be  granted  to  a  foreign  individual  or  a  foreign-controlled 
corporation, even if there is incorporation under US law. 
The conveyance of public lands to foreign investors or the use of public 
lands by foreign  investors for the exploitation of energy resources such 29 
as oil and gas, coal,  and certain other minerals, is limited to corporations 
organized  under US  federal  or state laws,  provided  that the  country  of 
the  foreign  investor provides  like  or similar privilege  to  US  citizens  or 
corporations  (Reciprocal  Investment  Privileges  Requirement:  Mineral 
Leasing  Act  of 1920,  Mineral  Leasing  Act  for  Acquired  Lands  of 
1947,  Geothermal  Steam  Act  of  1970).  This  applies  also  to  the 
acquisition of rights-of-way for oil or gas pipelines across onshore federal 
lands.  However,  the  Reciprocal  Investment  Privileges  Requirement 
appears to be  interpreted  by  the  Department of the  Interior and the  US 
courts  in  a flexible  way  so  that  at  present  no  country  is  considered  to 
deny reciprocal investment privileges. 
According to the Naval Petroleum Reserves Act the  leasing of mineral 
rights may be denied to foreign nationals, or corporations in  which such 
citizens  are  stockholders,  if  the  foreign  country  does  not  allow  US 
citizens or corporations to  lease public lands.  Leases for minerals in the 
Outer  Continental  Shelf  may  be  held  by  aliens  lawfully  admitted  for 
permanent residence in the US or by associations of such resident aliens 
(Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act). International 
obligations 
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D  Public Procurement 
1  An Introduction 
Discriminatory  government  procurement  prov1s1ons  known  as  "Buy 
America"  are  implemented in  the US  at Federal,  State and  even  lower 
levels.  Under the  US  doctrine  of international trade  law,  domestic law 
such  as  the Buy America Act of 1933 overrides the US's international 
obligations.  The  practical  application  of this  principle  means  that  Buy 
America  provisions  apply  unless  waived  in  response  to  specific 
international  obligations  of the  US,  such  as  the  GATT  Government 
Procurement Code.  The outcome of the continuing  amendments to the 
Buy  America  Act  is  a  lack  of transparency  and  predictability  in  the 
implementation of US obligations under the GATT. 
Buy America restrictions may take several forms. Some straightforwardly 
prohibit  public  sector  bodies  from  purchasing  goods  from  foreign 
suppliers. Others establish local content requirements ranging from 50% 
to 65%, while others still extend preferential terms to domestic suppliers, 
the price preference ranging anywhere from 6% to 50%. 
As  in  earlier  years,  the  US  Congress  enacted  in  fiscal  year  1993  a 
number of ad hoc Buy America provisions when adopting the budget 
of the  different  Federal  departments  and  agencies.  These  provisions 
extend the scope of the Buy America Act of 1933 as amended and affect 
primarily  products/sectors  not  covered  by  the  GATT  Government 
Procurement Code,  in  particular in  the  defense field.  In  the  latter,  they 
represent unilateral changes to the Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) 
signed  in  the  defense  cooperation  field  between  foreign  governments 
and  the  US  Administration  (see  Chapter 2C2c).  In  1993,  the  EU 
presented  two  demarches  to  the  US  Department  of  State  and  the 
Department of Defense on  Buy America provisions raising  the  point  of 
procurement restrictions for steel plate and oil containment booms by the 
Department of Defense. 
The  EU  and  the  US  have  liberalized  their  procurement  markets, 
bilaterally through the conclusion of a Memorandum of Understanding in 
May  1993.  Under the bilateral agreement,  barriers to EU  companies to 
bid  to  supply  contracts for goods,  works  and  services  with  US  central 
government agencies ("A" agencies) were removed as well as those for 
goods and works for six federally financed electrical utilities. The US also 
made  a  commitment  to  start  an  internal  process  to  get  a  maximum 
coverage  of sub-federal  entities  and  the  elimination  of  Buy  America 
provisions  in  a  subsequent  agreement.  It  was  agreed  to  aim  for 
additional coverage of the sub-federal (Category "B") and  public utilities 
(Category  "C")  level  in  the  negotiations  for a  new  GATT Procurement 
Agreement (GPA). 32 
However,  public procurement in  the telecommunications sector remains 
a bone of contention between the EU and the US. Sanctions imposed by 
the  US  in  May  1993 under Title VII  of the  1988  Trade Act are  still  in 
Telecommunications force against EU  bidders for certain federal contracts. The US sanctions 
remain bone of  prevent  European  bidders  from  9 Member States  from  participating  in 
contention  federal  agency below $176,000 for supplies and  services contracts and 
below  $6.5  million  for  construction.  The  US  estimates  the  effect  of 
sanctions on EU  business to  be of the order of $19 million. The counter-
sanctions implemented by the EU  on  8 June 1993 are also still  in  force 
against US  bidders for supplies,  works and services; they mirror the US 
sanctions in that they apply to below-threshold procurements. 
US public 
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US  procurement  at  Federal  level  totals  approximately  $210 billion 
annually.  The  value  of  US  procurement  covered  by  the  GATT 
Government  Procurement  Code  as  reported  by  the  US  has  declined 
from  $18.8 billion in  1985 to $13.1  billion in  1990, whereas contracts not 
within the scope of the Code have increased over the same period. This 
potential  US  market  for  EU  exports  is  significantly  affected  by  Buy 
America restrictions. 
Within  the  framework of the  GATT,  a  new Agreement on  Government 
Procurement (GPA) is  being  negotiated.  In  this context,  agreement has 
already been reached to expand GPA coverage to new entities at federal 
level,  e.g.  the  Department  of  Transportation  and  the  Department  of 
Energy, and to include procurement in services, whereas negotiations on 
the  inclusion  of  sub-federal  entities  (Category B)  and  on  utilities 
(Category C)  are  continuing.  It  is  rather doubtful whether the new GPA 
will  eventually  dissolve existing  uncertainties as  to  the  actual  scope of 
the  exemptions  authorized  for  reasons  of public  interest  and  national 
security.  Similarly,  differences of interpretation between the EU  and  the 
US  may  remain  regarding  the  case  of  the  sonar  mapping  system 
procurement.  The  US  continues to block the adoption of the respective 
GATT panel report of 1992, which establishes that the exclusion of a EU 
bidder from  the  procurement of a mapping  system for the  US  National 
Science  Foundation  infringed  upon  US  GATT  obligations  on  national 
treatment.  In the GPA negotiations, the US have now filed a reservation 
with  a  view  to  excluding  such  procurement  from  the  scope  of a  new 
GATT Agreement on Government Procurement. 
2  The relevant Legislation in Point 
a)  Federal Buy America Legislation 
The  Buy  America  Act  of  1933,  as  amended,  contains  the  basic 
principles  of  a  general  buy  national  policy.  It  applies  to  government 
supply  and  construction  contracts  and  requires  that  Federal  agencies 
procure  only  unmanufactured supplies for public  use  which  have  been Exemptions 
Waivers 
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mined  or  produced  in  the  US,  and  only  manufactured  goods  with  a 
substantial  local  content  of  a  minimum  of  50%  as  defined  by  the 
Executive Order 1  0582  of 1954.  The  Executive Order 10582 of 1954, 
as amended, expands the scope of the Buy America Act in order to allow 
procuring  entities  to  set  aside  procurement  for  small  businesses  and 
firms in labour surplus areas, and to reject foreign bids either for national 
interest  reasons  or  national  security  reasons.  In  the  construction, 
alteration,  and  repair of public buildings and  public works only domestic 
materials shall be used. 
Exemption from the Buy America Act is given for public interest reasons. 
Furthermore,  the  Buy  America  obligations  do  not  apply  to  the 
procurement of supplies to be  used outside the US territory, to products 
which  are  unavailable  in  the  US  in  sufficient  quantities  or satisfactory 
quality and to domestic materials which would entail unreasonable costs 
to acquire. Whereas the Executive Order of 1954 defines "unreasonable" 
as  a cost differential greater, than 6% of the bid  price including duty and 
all costs after the arrival in the US, the Department of Defense applies a 
50% price differential. 
Similar restrictions as in the Buy America Act are contained in: 
•  the National Security Act of 1947 and the Defense Production Act 
of 1950, which  grant authority to the  President and  the Secretary of 
Defense to impose restrictions on foreign supplies in order to preserve 
the domestic mobilization base and the overall preparedness posture 
of the US. These restrictions are "justified" on the grounds of national 
security,  although in  most cases the issue is  not the achievement of 
defense  objectives  but  the  protection  of  US  industry  (see 
Chapter 2C2c); 
•  the Department of Defense Balance of Payments Program, which 
provides for a 50% price correction on foreign offers, when compared 
with US offers; 
•  the  Competition  in  Contracting  Act  of  1984,  which  allows  the 
procuring agencies to  restrict procurement,  on  a case by  case basis, 
in order to achieve industrial mobilization objectives. 
The US Congress annually adopts some ad  hoc Buy America provisions 
as  part  of  the  Budget  Authorizations  and/or  Appropriations 
legislation, raising price preferences from a standard 6% up to 10-25%, 
notably  in  the  water,  transport  (mass  transit,  airport  and  highway 
construction), energy, and telecommunications sectors. 
The application of the Buy America legislation may be waived in order to 
give preferential treatment to certain countries. On the basis of the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979, this was the case for Free Trade Agreements 
between  the  United  States  and  Canada,  Israel  and  Mexico.  Until 
recently,  it  was  generally  assumed  that  a  Memorandum  of 34 
Understanding  (MOU)  signed  between  the  US  DoD  and  the  Defense 
Authorities of a third country regarding defense cooperation constituted a 
waiver from the application of the Buy America legislation. However, the 
US  Administration  responded  to  recent  EU  demarches against specific 
Buy America DoD restrictions by saying that MOU provisions allowing for 
a waiver of the  Buy  America  Act  of 1933  could  be  implemented  only 
where  they  are  consistent  with  US  national  laws.  Therefore,  ad hoc 
legislation  adopted  by  Congress  under  the  Department  of  Defense 
Appropriation Act is obviously seen as superseding the respective waiver 
provisions of MOUs (see also Chapter 2C2c). 
The  Defense Appropriation and  Authorization  Acts  for Fiscal  Year 
1994 contain the following Buy America provisions: 
•  supercomputers; 
•  shipboard  welded  anchors,  mooring  chains  4  inches  or  less  in 
diameter; 
•  multibeam sonar mapping systems and supporting software (subject 
to waivers); 
•  carbon, alloy or armour steel plate (subject to waivers); 
•  coal and coke for use at US defence facilities in Europe; 
•  for  National  Defense  Sealift  Fund  programs,  procurement  of 
shipboard components and propulsion system components; since FY 
1994 shipboard cranes and  spreaders for shipboard cranes are also 
covered; 
•  aircraft fuel cells (subject to waivers if a US product is not available in 
adequate quantities on  a timely  basis  and  is  purchased for national 
security purposes); 
•  enclosed lifeboat survival systems (local content rule); 
•  prohibition of contract in case of fraudulent "Made in USA" labels; 
•  Buy  America  Act  waiver  restrictions  where  countries  violate  their 
MOUs with the US by discriminating against US products covered by 
the MOU; 
•  the Traficant amendment which requires reciprocity in  procurement 
unless  this  violates  US  international  agreements  or  US  GATT 
obligations. 
Although they are not formally included in the FY 1994 DoD Appropriation 
and  Authorization  Acts,  some  Buy  America  restrictions  are  still 
implemented for: 
•  food,  clothing,  natural  fibre  products,  synthetic  fabrics,  specialty 
metals,  handtools and  measuring tools (Berry Amendment which has 
been made permanent since FY 1993); 
•  ball bearings and roller bearings (through FY  1995 as part of FY 1993 
DoD Authorization Act); 
•  machine tools (through FY 1996). Steel products 
Mass transit 
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35 
The  Airport and  Airway  Safety,  Capacity,  Noise  Improvement and 
lntermodal Transportation Act of 1993 extends for the fiscal year 1994 
the authorizations for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the 
associated  Buy Arnerica  provisions,  notably a 25%  price preference for 
US  steel  and  manufactured  products  with  respect  to  funds  for  FAA 
operations,  FAA equipments and facilities,  and  with  respect to grants to 
airports.  Federal  grants  awarded  to  airport  authorities  by  the  FAA  are 
subject to Buy America restrictions. In particular, only domestic steel and 
manufactured products can be used in capital projects. For procurement 
of equipment  and  construction  of facilities,  there  exists  a 60%  content 
requirement.  If these criteria are not met,  the bid  price of the contract is 
to  be  raised  by  25%.  Considering  that  the  Airport  Improvement 
Program grants awarded in  fiscal  year 1992 totalled almost $1.7 billion, 
the  Buy America restrictions constitute a significant barrier to  European 
companies trying to  supply i.e.  the fire fighting equipment market at  US 
airports. 
Under  the  Waste  Water  Treatment  Construction  Program,  the 
Environment  Protecting  Agency  (EPA)  provides  funds  to  local  units  of 
government for up to 75% of the cost of the projects. The Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act,  as  amended  by  Section  39  of the Clean Water 
Act,  provides for a 6% price preference for US suppliers. Although funds 
are still being allocated to  contractors, the Construction Grants Program 
is being phased out.  However, the Buy America restrictions attached to it 
remain  in  force.  In  fiscal  year  1992,  the  federal  funding  waste  water 
grants totalled almost $2 billion to the benefit of the states. 
According  to  the  Surface  Transportation  Assistance  Act  of  1978 
(STAA)  US States  must  meet  several  requirements  to  receive  federal 
funds from  the  Urban Mass Transport Administration.  Among these are 
that  standard  specifications  in  work  contracts  must favor US  supplies, 
and that any steel used in  a project must have been manufactured in the 
US.  The  STAA as  applied  to  mass transit equipment (rolling  stock and 
other) requires local transit authorities to provide for a 25% preference to 
bidders  supplying  US  manufactured  equipment.  For  contracts  entered 
into,  on  or after  1 October 1991,  the  equipment procured  must  have  a 
domestic  content  of  60%.  In  addition,  final  assembly  of  any 
transportation vehicles must have been carried out in the US. As with all 
Buy America  restrictions,  any  non-federal  dollars  matched  with  federal 
dollars are subject to the same rules.  The domestic content requirement 
was also extended, in  1987, to subcomponents. Waivers for products or 
subcomponents  may  be  granted  by  the  Urban  Mass  Transportation 
Administration, when the use of domestic suppliers provesuneconomical 
and will result in unreasonable costs. These Buy America provisions also 
apply to  Federally assisted  programmes  and  contracts  awarded  by  the 
Federal  Aviation  Administration  and  the  Federal  Highway 
Administration. Strong preference is given to domestic bids in  all these 
programmes,  therefore  constituting  an  effective  exclusion  of  foreign Highway 
construction 
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contractors from winning bids for mass transit projects. The federal mass 
transit  grants  awarded  to  cities  in  fiscal  year  1992  were  about  $2.6 
billion. 
The  lntermodal  Surface  Transportation  Efficiency  Act  of  1991 
(ISTEA)  defines the  US  national  policy  for intermodal  transport,  which 
includes  a  national  highway  system  and  arterial  roads  essential  for 
international, interstate and regional commerce, travel, national defence, 
intermodal  transfer facilities,  etc.  The  ISTEA  extends  the  existing  Buy 
America restriction on steel to iron products.  It reserves at least 1  0%  of 
the  total  appropriations  for  US  small  and  disadvantaged  businesses. 
Under Section 1  048, it also provides for trade sanctions against a foreign 
country which  is  considered to  have discriminated against US  suppliers 
or which has violated,  as  determined by the Secretary for Transport (in 
consultation with the USTR), either an agreement in respect of transport 
activities or one  in  respect  of products  covered  by  ISTEA.  The  federal 
aid  highway  funds  awarded  to  the  states  in  fiscal  year  1992  totalled 
almost $18 billion. 
The  Amtrak  Improvement  Act  of  1978  and  successive  legislation 
provides that steel products,  rolling stock and  power train equipment be 
purchased  from  US  suppliers,  unless  US-made  items  cannot  be 
purchased and delivered in the United States within a reasonable time. 
The Rural Electrification Administration (REA) awards loans and loan 
guarantees to telephone and electric authorities. These loans are subject 
to Buy America restrictions. Specifically, all the materials and equipment 
must be domestic, although exceptions are made for certain items which 
are not made in  a high  enough quantity or quality in  the US.  For those 
non-domestic  components,  6%  is  added  to  the  bid  price.  The  REA 
awarded almost $1.2  billion  in  loans  and  loan  guarantees to telephone 
and electric authorities in fiscal year 1992. 
The  Clean  Coal  Technology  Program,  which  is  part  of the  Energy 
Policy Act,  includes Buy America restrictions.  Those company projects 
selected by the Agency of International Development for this programme 
have to respect a local content rule which means that at least 50% of the 
equipment supplied has to have been manufactured in the US. 
b)  State Buy America legislation 
Legislation in at least 40 States provides for Buy America restrictions on 
procurement.  Many  of the  States'  requirements  cover  purchases  of 
steel  used  for construction  and  infrastructure work  and  are  applicable 
not  only  to  the  public  purchaser,  but  also  to  private  contractors  and 
subcontractors.  Buy  America  restrictions  on  steel  are  implemented  by 
the states of Connecticut, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Illinois, Maryland, 
New  York,  Pennsylvania,  Rhode  Island  and  West  Virginia.  General Support for small 
business 
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preferences for supplies and works contracts, which can be as high as 
10%,  are found  in Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas,  Massachusetts, 
Maine,  Montana  and  Wyoming.  In  public  work  projects,  New  Jersey 
legislation requires that only domestic materials such as US cement may 
be used. 
c)  Set Aside for Small Business 
The  Small  Business  Act  of  1953,  as  amended,  requires  executive 
agencies to place a fair proportion of their purchases with small business 
concerns.  These are defined as businesses located in the United States 
which  make  a significant  contribution  to  the  US  economy  and  are  not 
dominant.  Currently,  the  concept  of  fair  proportion  means  that  the 
Government-wide  goal  for  participation  by  small  businesses  shall  be 
established at no  less than 20%  of the total  value of all  prime contract 
awards for each fiscal year. Moreover, each executive agency shall have 
an  annual  goal,  which  is  currently  10%  for the  Department of Defense, 
and 5% for other agencies. Under the normal bid  procedures, there is  a 
12%  preference  for  small  businesses  in  bid  evaluation  for  civilian 
agencies (instead of the standard 6%).  In the case of the Department of 
Defense,  the  standard  50%  preference  applies  to  all  US  businesses 
offering  a  US  product.  An  important  number  of  states  also  operate 
particularly proactive small businesses and  minority set-aside policies.  It 
is  estimated  that  in  states  like  California  and  Texas  such  policies 
effectively close off around 20%  of procurement opportunities to  foreign 
firms.  In  Kentucky,  in  practice,  as  much  as  70%  is  set  aside for small 
businesses.  The  present and  the new GATT Government Procurement 
Code  contain  a  US  reservation  indicating  that  their  provisions  do  not 
apply to small and minority businesses set aside. 
3  Comments 
Throughout 1993, the EU  and the US were engaged in talks to ensure a 
successful  conclusion  to  negotiations  on  an  expanded  GATT 
Government  Procurement  Agreement  (GPA).  However,  whilst  the  EU 
was able to reach an agreement with the US and every other party to the 
Code as regards Category A procurement, it was not able to conclude an 
agreement  with  the  US  regarding  sub-federal  procurement 
(Category "B") and  procurement in the utilities sectors (Category "C") as 
the  US  offer in  those areas was  insufficient.  Negotiations will  therefore 
continue in  1994 in order to try to reach an  agreement with the US on  a 
balanced  package  that  will  lead  to  a  major  reduction  in  Buy  America 
provisions at all levels. 
The EU's  objective  in  negotiations with  the US  has  been to  reduce the 
negative economic impact of protectionist legislation at federal and  sub-
federal  level.  By  agreeing to  open  public markets on  a reciprocal  basis Submission to 
GATT  disciplines 
required 
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under the GATT Government Procurement Code, US entities are obliged 
to  submit  to  GATT  disciplines,  under which  Buy  America  stipulations 
should  disappear.  A common  study  by  the  European  Commission  and 
the  US  government on  the  bidding  potential  that companies  from  both 
sides  have  in  each  others'  markets  indicates  that  Buy  America 
restrictions and other exemptions (such as those for small businesses) in 
the  US  cover large  areas  of procurement  opportunities  at  state  and  at 
other  sub-federal  levels.  The  conclusion  of  a  balanced  agreement, 
covering  a  broad  range  of  sub-federal  and  publicly-owned  utility 
procurements  would  therefore  dramatically  increase  procurement 
opportunities for EU bidders in the US. Difficulties  for 
EU  exporters 
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E  Tariff Barriers and Equivalent Measures 
1  Tariffs as Trade Impediments 
Tariffs  are  a  classic  means  of  protecting  a  market  against  foreign 
imports. The US  maintains high tariffs called tariff peaks (defined as 
tariffs of 15% and higher) on numerous products imported from the EU. 
As  ceramics,  tableware,  glassware,  vegetables  and  footwear  are  all 
subject  to  tariffs  of 20%  or more,  the  respective  EU  exporters  face 
considerable difficulties. The following  examples illustrate some of the 
high  US  tariffs  which  reduce  market  access  possibilities  for  EU 
products (the corresponding EU tariff rates are in brackets): 
Ceramic tiles, etc. 
Certain tableware 
including hotel porcelain dinnerware 
Certain glassware 
Certain footwear 
Garlic and dried or dehydrated onions 
Zinc alloys 
Certain synthetic organic colouring matter 
20% (8-9%) 
26-35% (5.1-13.5%) 
35% (5.1-13.5%) 
20-38% (12%) 
37.5-48% (4.6, 5,  8,  20%) 
35% (16%) 
19% + 48.5 cents/kg (3.5%) 
20% (10 %) 
However,  much  of this  protective effect will  be  reduced  when  the  US 
tariff concessions obtained within the framework of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations are fully implemented (see also below under Section 4). 
The EU has also been faced with a series of tariff measures as a result 
of US Customs services reclassifications following the introduction of 
the Harmonised System (HS). 
Duties on  some marbles, in  particular on  "ivory cream  marbles" have 
increased  from  2.8%  to  6%.  The  type  of Spanish  marble  known  as 
"Crema marfil" marble, was formerly classified under the TSUSA tariff 
classification as "marble; slabs; rubbed; or polished in whole or in part" 
(item 514.65),  and  was subject to  an  ad  valorem tariff of 2.8%.  In  the 
new harmonised classification (HTSUS,  Harmonised Tariff Schedule of 
the  United  States},  the  US  customs  authorities  have  classified  this 
marble under item 68.02.92.00, "other calcareous stones", with a tariff 
of6%. 
The new classification of red dye has led  to an  increase in  duty rates 
from 3.1% to 15%, without having been subject to joint HS negotiations. 
In  the same way,  a reclassification  of ·sugar confectionery (including 
white chocolate) has meant that the duty rate has increased from 7% to 
17.5%. US Court of 
International 
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According  to  a  Treasury  Department  ruling  of  1989,  multi-purpose 
vehicles  remain  classified  under  heading  87.03  of  the  Harmonised 
System, that is "motor vehicles, designed for the transport of persons", 
provided that they contain four doors.  Thus,  effectively two-door multi-
purpose  vehicles  are  classified  as  trucks  under  HTS  heading  87.04, 
which are subject to a tariff of 25%, while four-door vehicles are treated 
as cars, and are subject to a tariff of 2.5%. 
The  number of side-doors criterion  is  inadequate for classifying  multi-
purpose  vehicles.  With  the  exception  of the  US,  this  inadequacy  is 
recognised by all members of the Customs Cooperation Council (CCC), 
whose  Harmonised System Committee has on  several occasions said 
that the classification cannot be made by counting the number of doors. 
In  1993,  at least two bills in  Congress were introduced which aimed at 
laying down the reclassification by  law.  On  14 May 1993 the US Court 
of International Trade  (CIT)  issued a ruling  overturning the Treasury's 
classification of the two-door Nissan Pathfinder as  a truck.  Despite the 
fact that the Pathfinder had some "truck-like attributes", it was regarded 
as  a passenger car which  should  have  been  subject to  a 2.5%  tariff 
instead of the 25%  tariff collected  on  trucks shipped  into the US.  The 
US  Administration  has  appealed  against this  ruling.  The  EU  supports 
the view that duty increases by way of reclassification, as in the case of 
multi-purpose  vehicles,  are  not  justified  and  contravene  the  agreed 
GATT guidelines for transposition to the HS. 
On  31  December  1992  most  of the  duty  suspensions  contained  in 
Chapter 99,  Subchapter II  of the  US  Harmonised  Tariff Schedule 
expired,  thereby  reverting  the  duty  rates  for  a  substantial  number of 
agricultural  and  industrial  products  to  the  applicable  most  favoured 
nation  rates.  The  estimated  total  volume  of imports  from  the  EU  of 
products  covered  by  Chapter  99,  Subchapter  II,  amounted  to  $1.27 
billion  in  1991.  With  some  of the  currently  applicable duties  being  as 
high  as  38%,  the economic impact of the  expiry  is  considerable.  The 
EU has requested a renewal. While recognising that the US is under no 
obligation to  provide one,  such a move would assist companies both in 
the EU and the US in offering a permanent system which would remove 
uncertainty of trade. 
2  Customs User Fees 
As  a  result  of laws  enacted  in  1985  and  1986,  the  United  States 
imposes user fees on the arrival of merchandise, vessels, trucks, trains, 
private  boats  and  planes,  as  well  as  passengers.  The  Customs  and 
Trade Act of 1990 and  the Omnibus  Budget Reconciliation Act of 
1990  extend  and  modify  these  provisions  by,  among  other  things, 
considerably  increasing  the  level  of  the  fees.  This  legislation 
demonstrates a tendency to seek to  use fees,  rather than taxes,  as  a 
source  of revenue.  Excessive  fees  levied  for  customs,  harbour  and 41 
other  arrival  facilities,  that  is  for  facilities  mainly  used  by  importers, 
place  foreign  products  at  an  unfair competitive  disadvantage vis-a-vis 
US competition. 
The  most  significant  of  the  Customs  User  Fees  (CUF)  is  the 
Merchandise Processing Fee (MPF) which was fixed  at 0.17% of the 
value  of the  imported  goods  for  1988  and  1989.  The  Customs  and 
Trade  Act  of 1990,  effective  1 October  1990,  provided  a  number of 
modifications  to  the  previous  law  for one  year.  The  Omnibus  Budget 
Reconciliation Act of October 1990 extended it for five  more years,  to 
30 September 1995. It also provided for the discretionary adjustment of 
fees.  As of 1 October 1992, the Merchandise Processing Fee is 0.19% 
ad valorem. 
The  main  provisions  of the  current  law  as  opposed  to  the  pre  1990 
situation are: 
Current law  Previous law 
0.19 % ad valorem rate on formal  0.17 ad valorem rate on 
entries  formal entries 
$21  minimum and $400 maximum on  no floor or ceiling 
formal entries 
$3 surcharge for manual formal  no surcharge 
entries 
discretionary adjustment of fees for  no adjustment 
formally entered merchandise within a 
range of 0.15 to 0.19% so as to offset 
Customs salaries and expenses 
Informal entries 
$2 for automated informal entries,  no charge on informal 
$5 for manual not Customs prepared,  entries 
$8 for manual Customs prepared 
informal entries 
It is estimated that if the value of US  imports from the EU  in  1992 was 
about  $96  billion  the  Merchandise  Processing  Fee  cost  the  EU 
approximately $160 million (fees for informal entries not included). 
At the  request  of Canada  and  the  EU,  the  GATT Council  instituted  a 
Panel  in  March 1987, which  in  November 1987 concluded that the  US GATT  panel 
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Customs User Fees for merchandise processing were not in conformity 
with the General Agreement. The Panel ruled that a Customs User Fee 
was  not  in  itself illegal  but  that  it  should  be  limited  in  amount to  the 
approximate cost of services rendered. The GATT Council adopted the 
panel report in February 1988. 
The  new  legislation  of  1990  provides  a  somewhat  more  equitable 
Customs  User Fees  structure,  since the fixing  of a  ceiling  makes the 
CUF less onerous for high-value consignments. However, the fee is still 
likely,  in  many cases,  to exceed the cost of the service rendered since 
the  fee,  irrespective  of the  level,  is  still  based  on  the  value  of the 
imported goods. This is admitted in a GAO study, which concludes that 
it is unclear whether even modified ad valorem fees would approximate 
the costs of processing an importer's individual shipment. 
The  Merchandise  Processing  Fee  is  levied  on  all  imported 
merchandise,  except for products  from  the  least developed  countries, 
from eligible countries under the Caribbean Basin Recovery Act and 
the Andean Trade Preference Act, or from  US insular possessions.  It 
is  also  levied  on  merchandise  entered  under  Schedule  8,  Special 
Classifications,  of  the  Tariff  Schedules  of  the  United  States.  In 
Article 310  of the  North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
the US has committed itself to eliminating existing customs user fees in 
accordance with a timetable -and not to impose new customs user fees. 
There  is  some  concern  that the  loss  of revenue  incurred through  the 
US' NAFTA commitment will be compensated for by increasing the fees 
on  imports  of  non-NAFTA  origin  products.  The  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  has  some  room  for  manoeuvre with  the  fees  applied,  while 
having to  respect certain  legal minimum and  maximum percentages in 
order  to  ensure  sufficient  collection  of  revenue.  Indeed,  though 
purportedly  to  offset  increased  costs  of  US  Customs  commercial 
operations,  US Customs has now proposed an  increase in the MPF to 
become efffective in  FY 1995, which would  change the current rate  of 
0.19%  to  0.24%  ad  valorem.  Minimum  and  maximum  MPF  would 
increase from $21  and $400 to $25 and $485 respectively. 
3  Excessive Invoicing Requirements 
Invoice requirements for exporting  certain  products to  the  US  can  be 
excessive.  This  is  particularly  the  case  for  textiles/clothing  where 
customs  formalities  include  the  provision  of particularly  detailed  and 
voluminous  information.  Much  of this  information  would  appear to  be 
irrelevant  for  customs  or  statistical  purposes.  For  example,  for 
garments with an outer shell of more than one construction or material, 
it  is  necessary  to  give  the  relative  weight,  percentage  values  and 
surface area of each component; for outer shell components which are 
blends of different materials,  it  is also necessary to include the relative 
weights of each component material. Amendments to 
Customs 
Regulations 
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EU  exporters of footwear and machinery are faced with the same type 
of  complex/irrelevant  questions  (e.g.  a  requirement  to  provide  the 
names  of the  manufacturers  of wood-working  machines,  and  of the 
numerous  spare  parts).  Furthermore,  the  US  Customs  and  customs 
house brokers can  also request  proprietary business information (e.g. 
listing of ingredients in perfumes or composition of chemicals). 
In September 1992 the US Customs Service proposed amendments to 
the Customs Regulations.  The proposed amendments, implementation 
of which  is  still  pending,  are  intended  to  ensure  that  Customs  has 
sufficient  information  to  determine  the  tariff  classification  and 
admissibility  of  the  merchandise  with  reference  to  the  numerical 
scheme  and  product  description  contained  in  the  Harmonised  Tariff 
Schedule of the United States. 
~The legislation  limits the  specific and  very detailed  invoice description 
requirements  in  19 CFR 141.89  (a)  Customs  Regulations  to  three 
groups of merchandise: 
•  Textile  and  apparel  products which  are  subject to  quotas  and  visa 
requirements under the US textile import program; 
•  Steel and  steel products which  until  31  March  1992 were subject to 
voluntary restraint arrangements; and 
•  Machine  tools  which  until  31  December  1991  were  subject  to 
voluntary restraint arrangements. 
The  information requirements  in  their amended form  are  unnecessary 
and  constitute  a  considerable  additional  burden  on  the  trade 
community. They are unnecessary because customs are entitled to ask 
for  all  necessary  supplementary  documents  and  information  during 
clearance  (standard  15  of Annex 81  of  the  Kyoto  Convention). 
There should be no systematic demand for this kind of information. 
The information required by the US Customs Service on trade invoices 
goes  far  beyond  the  information  which  is  necessary  for  a  customs 
declaration and for tariff procedures. These formalities are burdensome 
and costly; they thus also constitute a barrier against new entrants and 
small companies. As a result,  large established suppliers are privileged 
and  small  new  competitors  disadvantaged.  These  effects  are 
particularly  disruptive  in  diversified  high-value  and  small-quantity 
markets which are of special relevance for the EU. 
4  Comments 
As  a  result  of  the  Uruguay  Round  negotiations  substantial 
improvements were  brought about in  the  area  of tariffs.  The  US  have US tariff  offer 
Reduction of 
tariff  peaks 
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offered in the Uruguay Round an average tariff reduction on industrial 
tariffs which meets the Montreal market access target of a 33% depth 
of reduction. According to the USTR,  the average depth of cut is  34%. 
On  EU  exports,  industrial tariffs will be  reduced by  a larger amount,  ie 
46%. 
The US tariff reduction is  based on the reciprocity given by  US trading 
partners  on  each tariff item,  on  the participation  of these  countries  in 
covering whole categories  and  it is  obviously conditioned  by  domestic 
product sensitivity. The US Uruguay Round tariff offer covered both the 
elimination  and  harmonisation  of duties  in  certain  sectors  and  the 
reduction of certain tariff peaks. 
As  to  the  former,  total  tariff elimination  has  been  negotiated  on  a 
plurilateral basis in the following sectors: 
•  beer (HS 2203) 
•  whisky and brandy (HS 2207 ex, 2208 ex) 
•  pharmaceuticals and intermediate chemicals 
a)  all pharmaceuticals in Chapter 30; all products under headings 
HS 2936, 2937, 2939 and 2941 
b)  specified pharmaceutical active ingredients which bear an 
international non-proprietary name (INN) and salts, esters and 
hydrates of these INNs 
c)  specified products used for the production and manufacture of 
finished pharmaceuticals; 
•  paper, pulp and printed matter (HS 47, 48 and 49) 
•  most steel headings 
•  construction equipment products 
•  agricultural equipment products 
•  medical equipment products 
•  scientific instruments products 
•  certain furniture products (HS 9401  ex, 9402 ex, 9403 ex) 
•  certain toys (ex HS 9501-9505) 
•  semi-conductor manufacturing and testing equipment. 
With  regard  to  other  chemicals  (HS  28-39)  a  plurilateral  proposal 
foresees the harmonisation of duties mainly at 5.5 and 6.5%. 
US  tariff peaks are  concentrated  in  the chemicals,  textiles,  footwear, 
ceramics,  glass  and  trucks  sectors.  As  a result of the  market access 
negotiations,  peaks  in  the  chemicals  and  ceramics  sectors  will  be 
effectively reduced  by more than 50%.  Reductions in the other sectors 
are  more  modest  and  tariff  cuts  in  the  field  of textiles,  where  most 
peaks are maintained, will only average 12%. The 25% duty on imports 
of trucks will remain in place. Thus many US tariff peaks will be upheld 
even after implementation of the Uruguay Round results. Classification 
problems solved 
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As regards reclassifications, two issues of concern to the EU  listed in 
last  year's  Barriers  Report  were  solved  in  the  course  of 1993.  The 
classification  problems  regarding  gaskets  have  been  resolved  by  a 
decision  of the  Harmonised  System  Committee  (administered  by  the 
Customs  Cooperation  Council)  taken  at  its  meeting  of 18-19  October 
1993. The Committee decided in favour of the EU  point of view and as 
of 1 January 1994 the rates applicable to gaskets and gasket materials 
were reconverted from  18% and  15% to  3.5%  and  3. 7%  respectively. 
Also,  the  dispute  between  the  EU  and  the  US  over  the  correct 
classification of empty  perfume bottles was  resolved  on  a bilateral 
basis. 
The conclusion of an EU-US customs cooperation agreement for which 
first negotiations are now underway will certainly facilitate the pursuit of 
the  kind  of  problems  discussed  in  this  chapter.  In  particular,  the 
excessive  invoicing  requirements  could  well  be  tackled  within  such  a 
framework. 
Some  positive  development  can  finally  be  noted  with  regard  to 
invoicing  requirements.  The  Customs  Modernisation  Act  has 
entered  into  force.  As  it  provides  for  the  acceptance- of  electronic 
equivalents of invoices,  it might become easier for exporters to provide 
the  necessary  information.  Implementing  regulations  are  currently 
under discussion. Discriminatory 
tax burdens 
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F  Tax Legislation Affecting Trade and 
Investment 
1  Some Introductory Remarks 
The  US  have taken radical  steps to reduce their budget deficit with the 
Omnibus  Budget Reconciliation  Act of 1993.  Considerable  budget 
cuts  have  been  applied  across  the  board.  Additionally,  federal  tax 
revenue has  been increased,  and  a number of budgetary burdens have 
been shifted to the States.  However,  this last measure in  particular has 
given rise to some anxiety amongst foreign investors in the US.  It is not 
yet clear to what extent an already existing discriminatory tax burden will 
remain  in  place  and/or new revenue  mechanisms which  target non-US 
economic operators will be instigated. 
The discussion on a levy on imports of high-energy products and the US 
Administration's  support  for  California  in  the  unitary  tax  case  pending 
before the  US  Supreme Court provide  a worrying  precedence.  Striking 
the  right  balance  in  taxation  matters  at  sub-federal  level  will  be  of 
considerable importance. Notwithstanding the EU's general sympathy for 
and  support  of  any  measure  leading  to  budget  consolidation,  it  will 
nevertheless  closely  monitor further developments  in  the  tax  field  and 
their effects on European investors in the US. 
2  Cumbersome and Discriminatory Reporting 
The  existing  information  reporting  requirements  of the  US  Tax  Code 
may lead to discrimination of foreign-controlled companies: 
•  The  foreign  ownership threshold  for reporting  includes  corporations 
with at least 25% foreign shareholders; 
•  The offshore record keeping requirements oblige foreign corporations 
to transfer records, in certain circumstances, to their US subsidiary; 
•  Foreign  corporations  are  required  to  nominate  US  subsidiaries  as 
their agents to receive Internal Revenue Service summonses; 
•  Penalties for failure to comply with  reporting  requirements are up to 
$10,000. 
According  to  the  Omnibus  Budget  Reconciliation  Act  of  1990 
reporting  requirements  and  related  provisions  not  only  apply  to 
subsidiaries  of  non-US  controlled  companies,  but  also  to  all  other 
"foreign"  entities  such  as  branches.  This ·will  primarily  affect  foreign 
banks. Limited 
deductions from 
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These requirements are onerous and in several cases of extra-territorial 
effect. They also  run  counter to the principle of national treatment.  The 
objective  of the  legislation to  ensure that the  Internal  Revenue Service 
can obtain relevant information on transactions between a US  operation 
and  a foreign  affiliate where  foreign  ownership might be  used to avoid 
taxes.  Fulfilling the requirements is,  however,  burdensome and  adds to 
the  complexity  of  doing  business  in  the  US  for  foreign  owned 
corporations.  Accordingly,  these  provisions  have  the  potential  to 
discourage foreign investment in the US. 
3  "Earnings stripping" Provisions 
The  Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 which contained the so-called 
"earnings  stripping"  provisions  (Internal  Revenue  Code  163j),  places  a 
limitation on the extent to which interest payments can be deducted from 
taxable  income.  The  limitation  applies  when  interest  is  paid,  by  a 
corporation which is subject to tax in the US, to a "related party" which is 
not liable to US tax,  and in instances where the payer has a high debt to 
equity ratio.  The  majority of "related parties" affected will  in  practice be 
foreign corporations. 
The legislation is designed to  prevent foreign companies from  artificially 
loading a US subsidiary with debt, and so arranging for profits to be  paid 
out of the US in the form of deductible interest payments,  rather than as 
dividends  paid  out  of  taxed  income.  These  provisions  were  further 
extended  in  the  1993  Budget  Reconciliation  Act  to  include  interest 
payments  on  loans  guaranteed  by  a  related  party  not  liable  to  US 
taxation. 
The  objective  of limiting  excess  interest  payments  is  reasonable  and 
consistent  with  internationally  agreed  tax  policy.  However,  in  the 
calculation  of excess  interest,  US  law  uses  an  arbitrary formula  rather 
than the internationally accepted arms length principle.  This could  have 
discriminatory  consequences  in  its  application  because  a  tax  treaty 
partner would  not  be  obliged  to  make  a  corresponding  adjustment  of 
such  an  arbitrary  nature.  In  practice  this  discriminates  against  foreign 
companies  investing . in  the  US,  as  US  companies  suffer  no  such 
restriction on the amount of interest they can deduct for tax purposes. 
The  latest changes,  designed to  prevent evasion  of the  rules  by  using 
"back to back" loans and guarantees, are particularly controversial. Many 
lenders routinely ask for parent company guarantees for loans  made to 
US  subsidiaries of foreign  companies.  Moreover,  with  the  backing  of a 
parental guarantee,  US  subsidiaries are able to borrow at a lower rate. 
Borrowing  without  a  guarantee  will  discriminate  against  foreign 
companies.  In  addition,  since the  rules  apply to  existing loans this may 
lead to considerable (disruptive) restructuring of borrowing requirements. Risk of 
double taxation 
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4  State Unitary Income Taxation 
Some  US  States  (Alaska,  Arizona,  California,  Colorado,  Connecticut, 
District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,  Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire,  New  Jersey,  New  York,  Ohio,  Rhode  Island  and  West 
Virginia)  assess  State  corporate  income  tax  for  foreign-owned 
companies  operating  within  their  state  borders  on  the  basis  of  an 
arbitrarily  calculated  proportion  of  the  total  world-wide  profits  of the 
company.  This  proportion  of total  world-wide  earnings  is  assessed  in 
such  a way  that  a  company  may  have  to  pay  tax  on  income  arising 
outside the State,  which may give rise to  double taxation. A particularly 
discriminatory  manifestation  of the  taxation  of world-wide  income  has 
been  its  application  by  certain  States  (most  notably  California)  to  so-
called  "unitary"  groups - whereby  States  attempt to  tax  the world-wide 
profits of companies having no presence within their borders. 
Quite apart from  the  added fiscal  burden,  a state which  applies unitary 
taxation is reaching beyond the borders of its own jurisdiction and taxing 
income  earned  outside  that  jurisdiction.  "World-wide"  unitary  taxation 
conflicts with bilateral tax treaties concluded at the  Federal  level  by the 
US with foreign countries.  A company may also face  heavy compliance 
costs  in  furnishing  details  of  its  world-wide  operations  and  with  the 
operation of the internationally agreed arm's length principle. 
In response to the protests of multinational corporations, the demarches 
of  foreign  governments  and·  pressure  from  the  US  Federal 
Administration, the State of California amended its law in  1986 to allow 
corporations  to  opt  for taxation  on  the  basis  of "water's  edge"  (rather 
than  "world-wide")  unitary taxation.  Under this  method,  companies  are 
taxed  on  the  basis  of  a  share  of  their  total  US  income.  However, 
companies  had  to  pay  a  substantial  non-returnable  fee  to  make  this 
option  and  remained  subject  to  a "throw  back"  provision  under which 
world-wide  unitary  tax  could  still  be  imposed  without  reason  and 
regardless  of  their  choice.  Following  additional  pressure,  California 
further  amended  its  law  in  1993  by  abolishing  the  fee  for  electing 
"water's edge" taxation and  making other administrative changes. Whilst 
these changes have removed concerns about current treatment, they do 
not  resolve  the  issue  of the  legality  of past  practice.  Consequently,  a 
case is still being pursued and is now before the US Supreme Court. 
Contrary  to  the  policy  of  past  US  Administrations,  the  Clinton 
Administration  has  filed  a  brief  in  support  of the  Californian  position 
without,  however,  defining  a  US  position  on  the  issue  of  world-wide 
unitary taxation. The brief is based on the argument that the law was not 
unconstitutional  at the  time  the  tax  was  imposed.  The  outcome  of the 
case  will  have  important ramifications  for foreign  investors,  both  those 
already established and  those considering setting up in  the US.  For the 
time  being,  businesses  are  concerned  about the  possibility  that world-Disproportinate 
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wide unitary taxation will continue to apply and will be reintroduced by a 
number of States. EU companies consider their planning to be adversely 
affected under these circumstances. The EU  and  its Member States will 
continue to closely monitor any development. 
Discussions continue within the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs. 
5  US Car Taxes Discriminate Against European Imports 
Since  1990,  sales  of European  automobiles  in  the  United  States  have 
been  severely  harmed  by  the  cumulative  impact of new luxury excise 
and  higher "gas guzzler" taxes.  In  addition,  the  Corporate Average 
Fuel  Economy  (CAFE)  regulations  continue  adversely  to  affect 
European  car makers.  These  three  provisions  of US  law  have  almost 
exclusively affected  non-US  automobiles.  Domestic  manufacturers  and 
their customers  have  had  to  pay  virtually  no  CAFE  penalties  and  only 
minimal gas guzzler and  luxury taxes for comparable vehicles. Together, 
these measures have resulted in disproportionate and discriminatory tax 
burdens on imported European passenger cars sold in the United States. 
A  luxury  excise  tax  was  introduced  as  of  1 January  1991  by  the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990.  The tax,  as  applied  to 
cars,  was  set at  10% of the  retail  price exceeding  $30,000 of any new 
passenger  vehicle.  This  threshold  was  evidently  set  at  a  level  which 
would  not  affect  the  vast  majority  of  American  cars.  Sales  figures 
continue  to  bear this  out.  Virtually  all  US-produced  cars,  including  US 
luxury vehicles, sell for less than $30,000.  By contrast, in the US market, 
many  European  producers  have  concentrated  on  the  high-end  market 
segment covering autos that incorporate advanced styling, features, and 
technology  and  therefore  generally  sell  for  more  than  $30,000.  As  a 
result,  in  1992,  the  luxury tax was  levied  on  41.2%  of European  autos 
sold  in  the  US,  but  only  on  2%  of  the  US-produced  vehicles. 
Consequently,  nearly  70%  of the  revenue  generated  by  the  luxury tax 
was paid  by  European  auto producers ($209 million), while only slightly 
more than  1  0%  of the  luxury tax was  paid  by  American producers ($32 
million),  even though US  cars constituted 73%  of the US  market. Thus, 
the tax  falls  disproportionately  on  imports  from  Europe.  This  disparate 
impact  will  be  exacerbated  further  by  the  Omnibus  Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1993 which subjects the luxury tax threshold to a 
cost-of-living adjustment. This has raised the threshold to $32,000 as of 
1 January 1994 and will  reduce the already limited  impact of the luxury 
tax  on  US  autos,  without  similtaneously  benefiting  imported  European 
cars. 
In  1978, Congress amended Section 4064 of the US Internal Revenue 
Code (IRC) to impose a federal excise tax on  any  individual passenger 
automobile "of a model  type"  sold  in  the  US  whose fuel  economy falls 
below  22.5 miles  per  gallon  as  determined  by  the  US  Environmental Tax targeted at 
imports 
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Protection Agency. This tax,  known as the "gas guzzler" tax, took effect 
in  the  1980  model  year.  After .a  phase-in  period,  the  gas  guzzler tax 
originally started at $500 for autos with fuel economy ratings of less than 
22.5 mpg  and  rose  to  $3,850  for  autos  with  ratings  of  less  than 
12.5 mpg.  The 1990 Omnibus Budget Act, which added the lu':<ury tax, 
also doubled the gas guzzler tax.  Consequently,  any model type with  a 
fuel  economy  of  less  than  22.5 mpg,  as  determined  by  EPA,  is  now 
subject to  a gas guzzler tax of at  least $1,000.  The tax rises sharply to 
$7,700  for  automobile  models  with  a  fuel  economy  of  less  than 
12.5 mpg. 
The tax has been targeted almost exclusively at imports.  In  1990, when 
Congress doubled  the  gas  guzzler tax,  over 70%  of the  118,544 cars 
subject to  the tax were  imported,  and  60%  of that total  (71 ,449)  were 
European.  European  makes  accounted  for  73%  of  the  revenue 
generated by  the tax,  whereas US  cars  only  sourced  20%.  In  1990, 47 
model  types  were  subject to the  gas  guzzler excise tax.  Of these,  44 
were  European,  and  only  two  were  American.  In  terms  of  total  tax 
burden,  the European share of total  gas guzzler taxes was  nearly 85% 
($84.65  million)  in  1992,  although  European  models  constituted  just 
3.3%  of the  US  market.  Thus  European-origin  models  were  21  times 
more likely to be subject to the gas guzzler tax than US vehicles. 
While  the  original  and  laudable  intent  of the  gas  guzzler  tax  was  to 
encourage  energy  conservation,  it  has  long  since  become  simply  a 
device for  raising  revenue.  A  key  advantage  of the  tax  as  a revenue 
raiser  is  that almost all  of the  revenues  are  generated  by  foreign  auto 
producers. The recognition of this disparate impact is clearly apparent in 
the 1988 statement of Senator D'Amato when he proposed to double the 
gas  guzzler tax  as  a way  to  fund  additional  mass transit  subsidies.  In 
introducing  the  bill,  Senator D'Amato  stated:  "The  Joint  Committee  on 
Taxation has estimated that this proposal would cost the  Treasury some 
$400  million  over 5 years.  How  do  we  pay this?  I  do  not think  we 
should go to the American taxpayer and say "You are going to have 
another burden." We  intend to  offset this by doubling the  gas guzzler 
tax  which  is  paid on  the  purchase  of certain  new low-mileage  cars  ... 
According to  the  Environmental Protection Agency,  in  model year 
1988  only  the  most  expensive  imported  cars  triggered  this  tax. 
There  are absolutely no  domestic-made cars  that are impacted by 
this tax." At the time when  Senator D'Amato introduced his bill  in  1987, 
gas guzzler collections totalled $80 million, almost all of which was levied 
on cars from Germany, Italy, Sweden, and the UK. 
Under IRC  section 4064(c)(1 ),  the US  Treasury Department applies the 
gas  guzzler tax  to  "model  types" that fall  below  22.5 mpg  in  EPA fuel 
economy ratings.  Model type fuel  economy is determined by  EPA which 
relies on the same methodologies used to determine Corporate Average 
Fuel  Economy  (CAFE)  penalties.  American  manufacturers  produce 
multiple  vehicle  configurations  in  a  single  model  type.  The  EPA Exemptions of 
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regulations  permit  these  manufacturers  to  take  advantage  of  the 
"averaging" concept which allows a car with poor mileage to be offset by 
a  more  fuel-efficient  configuration.  Congress  was  fully  aware  of these 
circumstances during the debate on the 1990 Omnibus Revenue Act, but 
chose  to  reject  an  approach that would  have  eliminated  the  averaging 
concept. 
According  to  1992  EPA  data,  more  than  20  American-manufactured 
vehicle  configurations  did  not  meet  the  gas  guzzler tax  threshold,  but 
were  nevertheless  exempted  from  the  tax  because  their  poor mileage 
ratings were averaged in  with  other models using the  same engine and 
transmission  combination.  These  vehicle  types  include  some  of 
America's best known car lines such as Corvette, Mustang, Camara, and 
Lincoln Town Car.  Because EPA's rules  permit a manufacturer to select 
which  vehicle sub  configuration  in  a model  type  will  actually  be  tested, 
there  are  undoubtedly even  more  US-made vehicle  configurations that 
fail  to  meet  the  22.5 mpg  threshold  but  pay  no  gas  guzzler  tax.  In 
contrast,  because  European  manufacturers do  not have  large numbers 
of vehicle  configurations  in  each  model  type,  they  must  test  a  much 
higher  percentage  of  their  different  vehicle  sub  configurations.  As  a 
result,  unlike  US-produced  automobiles,  nearly  every  European  model 
that fell  below the 22.5 mpg threshold  paid  the tax.  The comparatively 
low fuel economy of European origin  models is  a function  of the weight 
and  performance  characteristics  of high  performance vehicles,  not the 
inefficiency of the engine. 
In  1975,  the  Energy  Policy  and  Conservation  Act (Energy Act),  the 
United  States  established  the  Corporate  Average  Fuel  Economy 
(CAFE)  Program.  The  Energy  Act  required  each  manufacturer  and 
importer of passenger automobiles to attain an average fuel economy for 
its entire US  sales  volume  of 18 miles  per gallon  (mpg)  of gasoline  by 
1978. It also contained a schedule for increasing each manufacturer's or 
importer's overall average fuel  economy rating to 27.5 mpg  by the 1985 
model  year.  The  27.5 mpg  standard  remains  in  effect  today  despite 
several legislative proposals over the years to raise the standard. 
The methodology for calculating CAFE fuel  economy ratings  has  led to 
discrimination  against  European  manufacturers,  which  have  incurred 
99.99%  of all  CAFE  fines  ($263  million).  In  addition,  the  fuel  economy 
measurement for various vehicle "model types" determined as part of the 
CAFE calculation is also the basis for the imposition of gas guzzler taxes 
on  individual  European  automobiles.  Thus,  factors  that  are  biased 
against  European  manufacturers  under the  CAFE  program  carry  over 
into the gas guzzler tax program,  as  described above.  Accordingly,  it is 
important to  understand  how the  method  of calculating  CAFE  leads to 
different treatment of similar automobiles. 
The  key  to  understanding  CAFE  is  to  recognise  that  it  regulates  the 
"average" fuel economy of a manufacturer's or importer's total "fleet" of Advantages for 
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passenger  automobiles  sold  in  the  US.  For  purposes  of CAFE,  each 
manufacturer's fleet must attain  an  average fuel  economy of 27.5 mpg. 
Accordingly, the statute and  regulations seek to  raise the fuel  economy 
of a manufacturer's aggregate output,  as opposed to  regulating the fuel 
economy of individual vehicles.  Thus,  under CAFE,  manufacturers may 
produce  vehicles  with  fuel  economy  below the  level  of the  standard  if 
they produce sufficient numbers of vehicles with fuel economy above the 
level  of  the  standard.  In  other  words,  larger  vehicles  with  poor  mpg 
ratings  can  be  averaged  with  smaller,  less  fuel-consuming  vehicles  to 
reach  the  27.5 mpg  standard  for  CAFE  compliance.  This  system 
provides  obvious  advantages to  large  full-line  manufacturers - such  as 
the "Big Three" in the US which market numerous vehicles and have the 
flexibility to adjust their product mix to  achieve a 27.5 mpg  average.  At 
the time CAFE was enacted, Congress specifically recognised that fleet-
wide  averaging  would  be  more  beneficial  to  US  manufacturers than  a 
product-specific tax,  which  might  encourage  increased  imports  of fuel-
efficient automobiles. 
The national treatment obligation of GATT Article Ill is  a cornerstone of 
the  General Agreement on  Tariffs and  Trade  (GATT).  Article Ill obliges 
each  contracting  party  to  provide  non-discriminatory  treatment  to 
imported  goods.  It  guarantees  imported  products  equality  of 
competitive  opportunity  by  prohibiting  discriminatory  internal  taxes, 
laws,  and regulations. Such discrimination can take two forms. The most 
straightforward type of discrimination involves  laws  and  regulations that 
single out imports for less favourable tax or regulatory treatment on  the 
basis  of origin.  In  addition,  GATT  has  long  recognised  that  laws  and 
regulations  which  appear  to  apply  to  both  imported  and  domestic 
products  can  violate  Article Ill  if  they  have  the  effect  of  imposing 
disproportionate  burdens  on  imported  merchandise  or  serve  to 
protect  domestic  industries.  There  is  a  clear  GATT  precedent 
prohibiting  a  contracting  party  from  using  artificial  and  contrived  tax 
categories  and  criteria  to  target  imports  for  higher  tax  burdens  than 
similar domestic products. 
The  effect,  however,  of the luxury and  gas guzzler taxes,  as  well  as  of 
the CAFE penalties, is to shift to foreign auto makers a disproportionate 
share  of the  burden  of reducing  the  US  federal  budget  deficit.  As  a 
result,  European automobiles have been uniquely saddled with steep US 
excise  taxes,  as  well  as  bearing  the  stigma  of  being  labelled  as 
overpriced and  environmentally unsound "luxury" products for American 
consumers. Therefore, the European Union requested the establishment 
of a GATT panel.  Two  hearings took place  at  the  end  of 1993.  A final 
decision is expected by the end of May 1994. Discriminatory 
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6  Beer and Wine Excise Taxes 
The  Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 created  a new tax 
credit  for  domestic  wine  producers  of  90  cents/wine  gallon  and 
augmented the credit provided to  domestic beer producers by  between 
$9 and $11  per barrel.  In the case of wineries, a producer is afforded the 
credit  if no  more  than  250,000  gallons  (roughly  10,000  hectolitres)  of 
wine  are  produced  annually,  applicable  to  the  first  100,000 gallons  of 
production,  and  for  breweries,  if no  more  than  2,000,000  barrels  are 
produced  annually,  applicable  to  the  first  60,000  barrels  production. 
Many  of  the  individual  states  also  maintain  such  discriminatory  tax 
exemptions or credits. 
These  tax  credits  are  solely  available  to  qualifying  "small"  domestic 
producers and  not for third country producers.  In  practice,  this measure 
would  provide a maximum total benefit of $660,000 per eligible brewery 
(of which,  it has been estimated there are more than 200 in the US) and 
of  $90,000  per  winery  (of  which,  there  are  1  ,400  estimated 
beneficiaries). 
In  September  1991,  the  EU  made  a  submission  to  the  GATT  panel 
which had been requested by Canada on,  inter alia, this issue.  In  March 
1992, the panel reported that the Federal and State tax exemptions and 
credits  were  inconsistent  with  Article  111.2,  first  sentence.  The  panel 
report  was  adopted  at  the  GATT  Council  meeting  on  19  June  1992. 
Implementation  is  not yet complete;  apparently hindered  by  constraints 
imposed by US constitutional law on  Federal Government involvement in 
State  regulation  of  alcohol.  The  EU  noted  its  dissatisfaction  that 
implementation was  incomplete at  the  GATT Council  on  9-10 February 
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G  Standards, Testing, Labelling and 
Certification 
1  A Closer Look at the Issue 
In  the  US  products  are  increasingly  being  required  to  conform  to 
multiple technical regulations regarding consumer protection  (including 
health and safety) and environmental protection. Even if,  in general, not 
intentionally discriminatory, the complexity of US  regulatory systems in 
this domain can  represent a very important structural impediment to 
market  access.  This  situation  is  aggravated  by  the  lack  of  a  clear 
distinction  between  essential  safety  regulations  and  optional 
requirements for quality, which is due in part to the role of some private 
organizations  as  providers  of  assessment  and  certification  in  both 
areas. 
A particular problem in the US is the relatively low level of use, or even 
awareness,  of standards set  by  international  standardizing  bodies.  All 
parties to the GATT Code on Technical Barriers to Trade are committed 
to the wider use of these standards;  but although a significant number 
of  US  standards  are  claimed  to  be  "technically  equivalent"  to 
international ones,  very few indeed  are  directly adopted.  Some are  in 
direct contradiction. One example of the problems this can cause is the 
case of food labelling, which is set out in Chapter 3A9. 
There are  more than  2, 700  State and  municipal  authorities in  the  US 
which  require  particular  safety  certifications  for  products  sold  or 
installed  within  their jurisdictions.  These  requirements  are  not  always 
uniform  or consistent  with  each  other,  or  even  transparent;  in  some 
cases  a national  standard  may  not exist.  In  this  case,  product  safety 
requirements  are  not  set  out  by  mandatory technical  regulations,  but 
are determined in  the market place through product liability insurance. 
Individual  States  may  set  environmental  standards  going  far beyond 
what is provided for at federal  level, as has occurred in  California (with 
regard to lead  levels and  glass recycling).  Then again, the US  Labour 
Department  may  require  certification  for  equipment  used  in  the 
workplace;  the  county  authorities  for  electrical  equipment;  large 
municipalities for virtually any equipment they choose to  regulate;  and 
insurance companies for other product safety aspects depending on the 
company. 
Acquiring  the  necessary  information  and  satisfying  the  necessary 
procedures is a major undertaking for a foreign enterprise, especially a 
small or medium sized one,  as  at present there is no central source of 
information  on  standards  and  conformity  assessment.  One  company 
has  estimated  that the  volume  of lost  sales  in  the  US  due  to  these 
factors  is  15% of total  sales.  The hidden costs could  be  much  greater Negotiations 
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because the time and  cost involved can  be  greatly reduced  simply by 
using US  components which have already been individually tested and 
certified.  In  addition,  the  private  organizations  providing  quality 
assurance may impose the use of certain specific product components 
under their own programs which are not in conformity with international 
quality  assurance  standards  (ISO  9000).  In  some  cases  (e.g.  that  of 
telecommunications  network  equipment)  an  expensive  evaluation 
procedure is required which does not lead to certification and does not 
take account of any additional requirements by individual buyers. 
-
EU/US negotiations began in  1993 for the conclusion of bilateral mutual 
recognition  agreements  covering  those  industrial  products  for  which 
mandatory  conformity  assessment  procedures  apply.  The  scope  of 
these  negotiations  extends  to  sectors  such  as  telecommunications, 
terminal equipment,  EMC requirements,  electrical equipment, pressure 
vessels;  lawn  mowers,  recreational  craft,  medical  devices, 
pharmaceuticals and airworthiness. 
2  Some Illustrative Cases 
EU  exporters  of  ceramicware  must  comply  both  with  Federal 
regulations  setting  tolerance  levels  on  the  amount  of  lead  in 
ceramicware,  and  with  those  enacted  by  State  legislatures  such  as 
California. At the end of 1991, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
unilaterally set tolerance  levels for lead  in  wine and  introduced  "new" 
action  levels  for  lead  release  from  ceramicware.  These  action  levels 
represent  a  significant  tightening  of the  standards  and  are  used  to 
determine  the  need  for  enforcement  action  against  specific  lots  of 
shipments. The sampling and testing methods used to assess levels of 
leachable lead from  cups  and  mugs are not satisfactory. As it stands, 
the FDA can take action on the basis of a single sample.  EU  exporters 
believe that  if the  FDA insists on  new action  levels,  they ought to  be 
introduced  in  such  a  way  at  least  to  prevent  individual  states  from 
imposing  more  stringent  standards  and  unnecessary  labelling 
requirements.  In  this  context,  California  approved,  in  October 1993,  a 
limit  of 150 ppb  for lead  levels  in  wine  after 1 January  1994 which  is 
more  stringent  than  the  internationally  recommended  level  (and  the 
current federal limit). 
In  this  respect,  California's  Safe  Drinking  Water  and  Toxic 
Enforcement Act  (Proposition 65)  is  of concern  to  the  EU.  The  Act 
requires  a warning  label  on  all  products containing  substances known 
to  the  State  of California to  cause  birth  defects or reproductive harm, 
including  lead.  In  addition,  enforcement  of  Proposition  65  by  the 
Attorney General of California has meant that European manufacturers 
of  ceramicware  have  to  finance  a  $1  million  lead  safety  information 
campaign for consumers. More recently, a court settlement in California 
will  annul the effect of a paragraph  of Proposition  65  pertaining to  an Glass 
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interim measure for food,  drug, cosmetic and medical device products, 
and,  as from 16 December 1993, imposes stricter Californian standards 
in place of federal standards. 
The  Public  Resources  Code  of  California,  requires  that  glass 
containers which  are  used  for food  and  beverages  have a  minimum 
percentage  of  recovered  glass  in  their  composition.  The  minimum 
percentage is progressive from  15% in  1992 up to 55% in  2002.  Glass 
container manufacturers are requested to give a monthly report on  the 
percentage of postfilled glass  used,  i.e.  the  glass  containers found  in 
bottle banks which have been previously filled with a beverage or food. 
In-house  cullet  (broken  scrap  glass  resulting  from  the  manufacturing 
process) is not considered to be recycled glass. 
This  legislation  applies  to  all  glass  containers  produced  or  sold  in 
California,  and  thus  also  affects  EU  exports  to  California.  The  only 
element of flexibility in  the legislation is the possibility of a reduction or 
a  waiver  of  the  percentage  requirement  if  its  achievement  is 
technologically  infeasible.  At  the  Federal  level  there  have  also  been 
proposals  to  Congress  to  require  a  minimum  percentage  of recycled 
glass  in  glass  containers.  The  State  legislature  of  New  Jersey  is 
presently  even  considering  a  total  ban  of  green  glass  beverage 
containers. 
In  1991, sales of European food and  beverage glass containers to the 
US  totalled  US  $10  million.  Although  the  share  being  exported  to 
California and  New Jersey is  not known,  it can  be  assumed that it is a 
high  percentage,  as  California  is  the  main  wine  producing  state  and 
New  Jersey  is  host  to  major  European  breweries.  If the  Californian 
legislation were  to  be  introduced  at the  federal  level  and  extended to 
food  and  beverages  sold  in  such  receptacles,  the  economic  impact 
would  clearly  be  enormous.  The  same  would  apply to  a New Jersey 
enactment of a ban on green glass beverage containers. 
While the  Community  shares the  environmental  objective  of recycling 
glass  containers  in  order  to  save  landfill  spaces,  to  reduce  energy 
consumption  and  to  preserve  natural  resources,  it  questions  the 
Californian  approach  to  this  objective.  It  is  worth  noting  that  any 
environmental  damage  caused  in  California  by  the  import  of  glass 
containers  is  in  no  way  related  to  the  amount of recycled  glass  used 
when  the  product was  manufactured  in  a third  country.  Therefore the 
application of such  a domestic environmental  requirement to imported 
products  is  not  in  conformity  with  GATT  rules.  Furthermore,  the 
reporting requirements are unnecessarily burdensome. 
Federal,  State  and  local  jurisdictions  require  product  testing  and 
certification  of the  safety  of numerous  electrical  products  and  parts 
thereof. At the State and  local level, there are more than 2,700 State, 
City  and  Municipal  governments  in  the  US  which  require  particular Industrial 
fasteners 
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safety  certifications  on  certain  products  sold  or  installed  within  their 
jurisdictions. These requirements are not always uniform and consistent 
with one another and in some cases a national standard may not exist. 
In addition, the electrical code requirements are more closely monitored 
and  more  problematic  (due  to  the  use  of  non-US  components)  for 
suppliers of imported equipment than for US manufacturers. 
For example, in  order to be able to sell electrical appliances in the US, 
in  a  number  of  States  it  is  a  legal  necessity  (and  for  others  a 
commercial  one)  to  obtain  "listing"  by  Underwriters'  Laboratories  (UL) 
and to apply the UL mark on the appliances. UL listing can be obtained 
after submitting  product samples to  the  UL laboratory for safety tests 
according to UL standards. 
In early 1993 the UL issued a revision of its standard 1028 Hairclipping 
and  Shaving  Appliances  which  also  covers  electrical  shavers.  This 
revision includes a new requirement (effective from 5 April 1995) that a 
single  pole  on/off  switch  or  overcurrent  protective  device  must  be 
mounted  in  the  live  conductor of the  supply  circuit.  As  switches  and 
overcurrent  devices  in  these  appliances  are  always  single  pole 
switches/devices, for European producers of electrical shavers this new 
requirement has the implication that: 
•  a new polarized plug has to be used; and 
•  the  worldwide  standardized  appliance  coupler  (ace.  to  IEC 
publication  320,  endorsed  by  CENELEC  as  EN 60320)  has  to  be 
polarized. 
As  hairclipping  and  shaving  appliances  exported  by  European 
manufacturers to the US are double insulated, the new UL requirement 
does not add anything to the safety of these appliances. The necessary 
constructional changes, will,  however, cause considerable costs. 
Similarly,  the  requirements  of the  1990  Fastener Quality  Act (FQA), 
which aims to deter the introduction of sub-standard industrial fasteners 
into the US,  are onerous: compliance will be costly and the definition of 
"critical  application"  vague.  The  FQA will  have  the  effect  of requiring 
European  manufacturers  to  revert  to  final  sampling  and  testing 
methods  at  a time when they  have  invested  heavily in  internationally 
agreed  quality  assurance  systems  such  as  ISO 9000,  designed  to 
improve quality and  reduce the  need for multiple assessments.  Under 
the terms of the FQA, fasteners will have to be tested by an accredited 
laboratory and certified by the manufacturer; each batch will require an 
original laboratory testing report certifying that the standards are met. 
The testing and  certification  requirements translate into lost sales and 
further expense  (in  terms  of time  and  money)  related  to  hiring  a  US 
inspector.  Expansive  product  liability  insurance  (a  far  less  significant Disadvantages 
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factor in  Europe) is  an  additional expense borne  by  manufacturers on 
sales in the US.  One company has estimated the volume of lost sales 
in the US due to the multiplicity of standards and certification problems 
to be about 15% of their total sales.  The expense of certification alone 
was  put  at  5%  of total  sales,  as  was  the  amount  spent  on  product 
liability insurance.  Federal,  state and  local jurisdictions should  reduce 
the divergence in safety certifications and adopt national standards for 
electrical safety certification.  Such national standards should be  based 
on  the  appropriate  international  standards  set  in  the  International 
Electrotechnical  Commission  (IEC)  or  the  International  Standards 
Organization (ISO). These are the standards that have been adopted in 
EU Directives. 
Section 355  of the  Transportation  Appropriations Act of 1992 has 
introduced, as of 1 January 1994, an obligation for automakers and car 
dealers to  place  labels  on  new cars  detailing  among  other things the 
percentage  of US/Canadian  parts  that  went  into  the  car  as  well  as 
indicating  the  final  assembly  point  by  city,  state  and  country.  It  has 
been suggested that transparency is the aim of the proposed language. 
Providing  consumers  with  accurate,  useful  information  is  certainly  in 
everyone's best interest. The obligatory labelling system,  as set out by 
Section 355  of  the  Transportation  Appropriations  Act  of  1992,  will, 
however,  not  provide  any  useful  information  to  consumers  about the 
product as such and  its characteristics. The only information contained 
in the label is whether and to what extent the parts of the product or the 
product  itself  are  of  domestic  origin.  Such  information  can  only  be 
intended  to  influence  consumers  to  buy  cars  of US/Canadian  origin. 
This  is  clear from  the  language  used,  and  from  the  speech  made  by 
Senator Mikulski  in  sponsoring  her amendment.  References to  "stand 
up  for  America",  "help  provide  jobs"  and  ''practice  pocketbook 
patriotism" cannot be interpreted in any other way. 
The  EU  believes  that  the  labelling  requirement  constitutes  an 
unjustifiable discrimination, contrary to Article 2.1  of the GATT Code on 
Technical Barriers to Trade: 
•  the  US proposed obligation to indicate the origin of the engine and 
gearbox  could  discourage  US  constructors  from  importing  them 
from  their  European  subsidiaries  or  from  European  component 
manufacturers. 
•  within  the  EU,  the  assembly of vehicles  is  quite flexible  as  to the 
origin  of car components,  due to  the  internal market.  For a single 
model  of motor vehicle,  a specific part  may  originate from  one  of 
several  countries.  The  US  proposal  will  therefore  have  greater 
administrative  costs  for  European  importers  than  for  other 
importers. EUrequest 
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The EU  is seriously concerned that the implementation of the labelling 
requirement will  create  unnecessary trade  barriers,  and  would  put an 
excessive financial  burden  on  importers to  access the  US  market.  In 
addition,  the  fulfillment  of the  labelling  requirement  may  involve  the 
disclosure  of  confidential  data  from  manufacturers  other  than  US 
manufacturers.  The  EU  has  therefore  requested  the  US,  within  the 
GATT framework, to adapt their car labelling requirements accordingly. 
3  Comments 
In the Uruguay Round the US have agreed on an expanded Agreement 
on  Technical  Barriers to  Trade  (TBT)  which  will  improve the  rules  for 
enforcing  standards  and  technical  regulations.  The  TBT Code will  be 
applicable by  all wro members ensuring for each country the right to 
adopt  and  maintain  appropriate  international  standards,  with  the 
exception  of  their  chosen  level  of protection  for  health  and  human, 
plant,  animal  life  and  the  protection  of environment.  A  proportionality 
criterion  is  found  in  the  TBT  Code  to  ensure  that  standards  do  not 
create unnecessary obstacles to trade and that they can  be justified on 
the basis of the best available scientific evidence. 
The  EU  has  already  forwarded  proposals  for  the  implementation  of 
these  multilateral  guidelines:  firstly,  the  sharing  of  experience  and 
information  in  the  regulatory  process  leading  to  drafting  of legislation 
and  standard-making  with  a  view  to  achieving  increased  regulatory 
convergence;  and  secondly,  the  launching in  1994 of a bilateral round 
of plurisectoral  negotiations for agreements  on  Mutual  Recognition  of 
Conformity Assessment and Good Laboratory Practice. Discriminating 
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H  The Protection of Intellectual Property 
1  Patents and Related Areas 
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 provides holders of US  patents, 
who  are  manufacturing  in  the  US,  with  remedies  which  keep  imported 
goods  which  infringe  such  patents  out  of the  US  (exclusion  order),  or 
have  them  removed  from  the  US  market  once  they  have  entered  the 
country (cease  and  desist order).  These  procedures are  carried  out by 
the  US  International  Trade  Commission  (lTC)  and  are  not  available 
against  domestic  products  infringing  US  patents.  Under the  Omnibus 
Trade  and  Competitiveness Act of 1988,  several  modifications  have 
been  introduced to  Section 337,  such  as  the  availability of remedies  in 
relation to imported goods which infringe a US process patent. 
In  July 1987,  the  EU  requested  the  establishment of a GATT panel  to 
consider the compatibility of Section 337  of the Tariff Act with the  US's 
obligations  under  the  GATT,  notably  with  the  national  treatment 
requirement of its Article Ill. The Panel Report which was adopted by the 
Contracting  Parties  in  November  1989  came  to  the  conclusion  that 
Section  337  is  inconsistent  with  GATT  Article  111:4.  The  incriminated 
provision  accords  to  imported  products  alleged  to  infringe  US  patent 
rules treatment less favorable than that accorded under Federal  District 
Court procedures to like products of US origin as a result of the following 
factors: 
•  the  choice  of forum  in  which  complainants  can  challenge  imported 
products, whereas no corresponding choice is available to challenge 
products of US origin; 
•  the  potential  disadvantage to  producers  or  importers  of challenged 
products of foreign origin resulting from the tight and fixed time-limits 
in  proceedings  under Section  337,  when  no  comparable  time-limits 
apply to producers of challenged products of US origin; 
•  the  non-availability  of opportunities  in  Section  337  proceedings  to 
raise counterclaims, as is possible in the Federal District Court; 
•  the  possibility  that  general  exclusion  orders  may  result  from 
proceedings brought before the USITC under Section 337, given that 
no comparable remedy is  available against infringing products of US 
origin except where this might be justified under GATT Article XX (d); 
•  the possibility that producers or importers of challenged products of 
foreign  origin  may  have  to  defend  their  products  both  before  the 
ISITC  and  in  the  Federal  District  Court,  whereas  no  corresponding 
obligations exists with respect to products of US origin. 
Despite the GATT Panel findings of 1989, the US  has to date not taken 
any  measure  to  bring  Section  337  into  line  with  its  international 
obligations  under  the  GATT.  The  adverse  effects  of  Section  337  on Lacking 
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European  companies'  activities  have  meanwhile  been  highlighted  by 
several cases.  Its discriminatory nature became  particularly apparent in 
one case in which the Federal District Court stayed the procedure before 
it  on  the  ground  of  an  arbitration  clause,  which  did  not  prevent  the 
International  Trade  Commission  (which  was  subsequently  petitioned) 
from taking action.  In  1992 Senator Rockefeller introduced a bill into the 
US  Senate which  was  intended  to  bring  Section  337  into  line  with  the 
GATT panel findings. While the bill indeed addresses some of the issues 
raised in the panel findings,  it clearly falls short of a meaningful solution 
to the GATT inconsistencies.  In  February 1993 the bill was reintroduced 
Senate with  minor modifications.  With  a view to the  national treatment 
requirement contained in Article Ill of the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights  (TRIPS),  including 
Trade in Counterfeit Goods , as well as its chapter on the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights, the US is expected to regularize Section 337 
within the framework of its Uruguay Round implementing bills. 
US patent law is based  on  the "first to invent system",  whereas the rest 
of the  world  follows  the  "first  to  file  system".  Section  104 of the  US 
Patent Law states that it is not possible to establish a date of invention 
by reference to any activity in a foreign country.  A non-US inventor who 
typically carries out research and  development activities outside the US 
cannot therefore  establish  a date  earlier than  that  in  which  he  or she 
applied  for  the  patent.  This  treatment  clearly  discriminates  vis-a-vis 
foreign  inventive  activities  in  comparison  to  US  domestic  inventive 
activities and  thus  has  the effect of forcing  foreign  companies to  carry 
out  research  and  development  in  the  US  rather  than  abroad.  The 
discrimination  features  under  Section 1  04  appear  incompatible  with 
Article 27 of the Agreement on TRIPS. The US will have to undertake the 
necessary modifications in implementing the Uruguay Round. 
US  law  allows  governmental  use  of  intellectual  property  rights 
without even having to notify the right holder. This practice is particularly 
frequent  in  the  activities  of the  Department  of Defence.  For  obvious 
reasons  this  practice  is  particularly detrimental for foreign  right  holders 
because they will  generally not be  able to  detect such  government use 
and  are  thus  very  likely  to  miss  the  opportunity  to  initiate  an 
administrative claims  procedure.  The  TRIPS Agreement contains some 
safeguards  for  the  patent  holder  which  should  eventually  lead  to 
considerable  changes  in  the  US  law  and  practices  on  mandatory 
licensing. 
2  Copyright and Related Areas 
Despite  the  unequivocal  obligation  contained  in  Article 6  bis  of the 
Berne Convention, to which the  US acceded  in  1989, to make "moral 
rights"  available for authors,  the  US  has  never introduced  such  rights 
and  has  repeatedly  announced  that  it  has  no  intention to do  so  in  the Imbalance of 
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future.  It is  clear that while  US  authors fully  benefit from  moral rights  in 
the EU,  EU  right holders do not enjoy such rights in the US, which leads 
to an  imbalance of benefits from  Berne Convention Membership for the 
European side. 
Article 18 of the Berne Convention stipulates that works  which  have 
not fallen into the public domain by the entry into force of the Convention 
shall  benefit from  its  protection. According to Article 5,  protection  under 
the  Berne  Convention  is  not dependent on  the fulfilment  of formalities. 
Contrary  to  these  provisions,  the  US  does  not  grant  copyright 
protection to third country works created before 1989 in the absence of 
the  completion  of the  formalities  under  US  copyright  law.  Thus,  films 
which at the time  have not been  appropriately registered  in  the US  are 
not granted any copyright protection. This situation has apparently led to 
widespread  copying  and  rental  of  such  films  in  the  US,  which  is 
financially detrimental to the legitimate EU right holders. 
3  Comments 
The EU is confident that a full and faithful implementation of the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on TRIPS will  not only reduce but also prevent trade 
frictions.  Like  most  developed  countries,  the  EU  and  the  US  have  an 
interest in  administrating multilateral rules which both  protect intellectual 
property rights and make redundant the use of unilateral trade measures 
such  as  Special 301  of the Trade  Act  of 1988  (see  Chapter 2A2).  The 
Agreement  on  TRIPS  is  an  important  step  as  it  includes  a  national 
treatment provision and is built upon the dispute settlement procedure of 
the  new  World  Trade  Organization.  It  will  cover  a  wide  range  of 
European  industries:  consumer goods,  textiles  and  clothing,  processed 
food,  wines  and  spirits,  pharmaceuticals,  chemicals,  computer 
programming and entertainment. Enhancing 
conditional 
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Conditioning National Treatment 
1  The Principle of  National Treatment 
The principle of national treatment is  one  of the pillars of liberalization 
of the world  economy.  It  is  a well  established  legal  standard,  used  in 
international treaties and other multilateral instruments. OECD Member 
countries  have  declared  that "enterprises  operating in  their territories 
and owned and controlled directly or indirectly by nationals of another 
Member country''  should  be  accorded  "treatment  no  Jess  favourable 
than that accorded in like situations to domestic enterprises", that is to 
say they should be  accorded "National Treatment". This principle was 
incorporated in the GATT 1947 and continues to be fundamental to the 
GATT  1994  as  applied  to  goods.  It  has  been  included  within  the 
framework of the  Uruguay Round  in  the Agreements on  Trade-related 
investment  measures  (TRIMS)  and  on  Trade-related  Aspects  of 
Intellectual  Property  Rights  (TRIPS).  Also,  the  General  Agreement  on 
Trade in ·services (GATS) promotes the principle of national treatment, 
provided this qualification is set out in the respective schedules. 
2  Proliferation of  conditional national treatment in the US 
Although  within  the  OECD  framework,  Member countries  have  taken 
steps to extend  their application  of the  national treatment principle  by 
gradually removing existing  restrictions,  the US  has  retained  a certain 
legislative stock of provisions conditioning national treatment of foreign 
economic operators in different economic sectors. 
The  European  Commission  is  now  concerned  about  a  growing 
tendency  in  the  1  03rd  US  Congress  to  proliferate  legislation 
conditioning  the  principle  of  national  treatment  and  providing  for  the 
possibility  of increased  discrimination  against European  economic 
operators in  the  US.  This  proposed  legislation  is  not only directed at 
non-US  companies'  participation  in  federally  funded  Research  and 
Development  (R&D)  and  related  activities,  but  extends  to  a  growing 
variety of sectors such as: 
•  Antitrust exposure of production joint ventures; 
•  Collaboration  in  environmental  research  and  implementation 
projects; 
•  Aeronautical  technology  research,  development,  and 
commercialisation; 
•  NASA procurement; 
•  Financial services; 
•  Research in low-emission power sources; Reciprocity 
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•  High-risk commercial space ventures; 
•  Application  of Section  301  of the  Trade  Act  of 197  4  in  cases  of 
denial of national treatment for US  companies operating  in  foreign 
countries; 
•  Earthquake equipment. 
The following legislation is affected: 
•  National Cooperative Production Amendments Act of 1993,  signed 
into law on  10 June 1993 
•  National Competitiveness Act (S 4 I HR.820) 
•  Aeronautical Technology Consortium Act (S 419/ HR 1675) 
•  National Environmental Technology Act (S 978) 
•  Hydrogen Future Act (HR 1479) 
•  National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Administration  Authorisation  Act 
(HR 2200) 
•  Omnibus Space Commercialisation Act (HR 2731) 
•  Fair Trade in Financial Services Act (S 1527) 
•  Defence Authorization Legislation (HR 2401  IS 1298) 
•  Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974 (HR 249) 
•  Authorisations for the  Earthquake  Hazards  Reduction  Act of 1977 
(HR 3485) 
•  Fair Trade in Services Act (HR 3565) 
The  discrimination  of non-US  controlled  companies  is  mainly  brought 
about  by  two  different  kinds  of conditioning  the  granting  of national 
treatment.  On  the one hand,  there is the straightforward conditioning 
of  national  treatment  towards  private  operators  by  requiring  the 
country  of origin  of the  foreign  economic operator to  grant reciprocal 
treatment  to  US  companies  which  are  economically  active  in  that 
country  in  order  for  the  foreign  company  to  receive  formal  national 
treatment  in  the  US.  It  is  important  to  note  that  the  reciprocity 
condition  is  not  always  related  to  the  sector  in  which  the  foreign 
company  is  active  in  the  US,  but  may  also  be  cross-sectoral.  The 
proposed  US  legislation  contains  distinctive  operative  conditions 
either in the form of a definition of the notion of "US company", or in the 
form of additional performance requirements for non-US companies. In 
general,  the  performance requirements formally  apply to  all  economic 
operators whether or not they are  domestic or foreign-controlled,  and 
thus  do  not  constitute  a  de  jure  deviation  from  the  formal  national 
treatment  principle.  However,  in  these  cases  foreign-controlled 
enterprises  can  face  indirect, de facto discrimination, in  that  they 
experience  more  practical  difficulties  than  US  firms  in  fulfilling  the 
performance requirements. Important EU 
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3  Undesirable consequences 
Valued  on  a historical-cost basis,  direct investment of EU  origin  in  the 
US  amounted  to  almost  $229  billion  at  the  end  of  1992.  This 
corresponds to  more  than  50%  of total  foreign  investment  in  the  US 
market.  It  is  acknowledged  by  the  US  Government that the  growth of 
US  affiliates  has  had  a  net  positive  effect  on  the  US  economy, 
contributing  to  capital  formation,  value  added,  and  technological 
development.  Exports  from  foreign  investors  in  the  US  totalled  $91 
billion. 
If the  trend  in  Congress  on  conditioning  national  treatment  were  to 
prevail,  this  would  make  foreign  direct  investment  in  the  US 
considerably less attractive and impact on the overall EU-US trade and 
investment  relations.  In  a  multilateral  context,  this  kind  of legislation 
would seriously distort a major element of the global trade system, and 
eventually  even  lead  to  a  blurring  of the  principle  of Most Favoured 
Nation  (MFN)  treatment.  The  European  Commission  has  already 
expressed  its  concerns  on  several  occasions.  It  has  proposed  to 
continue  consultations  between  the  EU  and  the  US  with  a  view  to 
working on the formulation of mutually acceptable criteria regarding the 
eligibility  of  companies  for  participation  in  R&D  and  technology 
programs.  The  pursuit  of  such  consultations  and  an  eventual 
understanding  would  contribute  much  towards  creating  a  stable  and 
investment climate in the US beneficial to all sides. CVDas 
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·  J  The Application of Countervailing Duty 
Legislation 
US countervailing duty (CVD) legislation aims to offset the competition-
distorting effect of subsidies bestowed in a foreign country on  products 
entering the US market. This legislation is thus designed to protect the 
US  market  from  unfair  competition  from  foreign  products  by 
establishing  an  equal  competitive  level.  While  this  is  a  legitimate 
objective,  and while it is clear that US  CVD legislation does not intend 
to bar or restrict imports in  general, its recent application has assumed 
the character of a barrier to trade. 
The Agreement on Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and 
XXIII of the GATT (Subsidies Code) sets out on the one hand to ensure 
that  the  use  of subsidies  does  not  adversely  affect  or  prejudice  the 
interests  of any  signatory  to  this  Agreement  by  allowing  relief to  be 
made available to producers adversemu affected by subsidies.  But on 
the  other  hand  the  Agreement  tries  to  ensure  that  countervailing 
measures do not unjustifiably impede international trade. The European 
Commission firmly believes in the need to respect this balance,  and to 
ensure that the legitimate use  of GATT remedies against unfair trade 
practices remains within the boundaries of GATT rules. 
The  US  imposed  in  the  course  of 1993  countervailing  duties  on  a 
significant  part  of  the  EU's  steel  exports  to  the  US  market.  The 
European Commission considers these CVD cases to be  unwarranted 
and/or excessive because of their sheer number and, more importantly, 
because of the methods used by the US investigating authorities: 
•  The  US  has  countervailed  subsidies which were granted  up to  15 
years ago to EU  steel companies. While not contesting the right to 
allocate subsidies over time,  the  European  Commission  considers 
this  practice to  be  arbitrary  and  not  in  conformity  with  the  GATT 
1985 Guidelines on Amortisation and Allocation. 
•  The US  also  recalculates the actual amount of a grant given by  a 
government and,  by doing so,  unjustifiably increases the amount of 
the subsidy. This leads to  a CVD of sometimes two or three times 
the actual amount of the subsidy granted. 
•  Countervailing duties were  imposed  on  the  products from  one  EU 
steel producer because the company produced steel with assets it 
had bought from a company which allegedly had received subsidies 
in the past. The steel producer and the European Commission have 
argued in vain that this producer, by purchasing these assets at full 
market  value,  cannot  have  received  any  benefits  from  subsidies 
which  may  have  been  granted  in  the  past  to  the  seller  of those 
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•  The  US  has  also  countervailed  the  debt  forgiveness  that  private 
German banks have granted to  a steel producer. The Commission 
considers that private payments cannot be considered as a subsidy 
given the absence of any financial contribution from or constraint by 
the public authorities on these private banks. 
•  The  European  Commission  finally  questions  whether  the  US 
subsidy findings  in  the  case  of capital  infusions or the granting of 
credit  facilities  to  steel  companies  by  public  authorities  entail 
subsidies  at  all.  The  Commission  is  of the  opinion  that  in  many 
instances the US  could only make its subsidy findings by resorting 
to artificial and arbitrary methods in order to determine whether the 
company was "equity" or "credit" worthy. 
The  above  mentioned  US  methods  have  led  either  to  findings  of 
subsidies where none existed or to an  overstating of the actual amount 
of subsidies when  they  did  exist.  On  this  basis the  US  has  imposed 
countervailing duties at an  exaggerated  level  on  a large  proportion of 
EU  steel  exports  to  the  US,  thereby  seriously  impairing  or hindering 
these trade flows.  These measures are thus not in  conformity with the 
Subsidies  Code.  As  a  consequence,  the  European  Commission  has 
requested  a  GATT  Panel  with  regard  to  one  product  group  (lead  & 
bismuth steel). The GATT Committee on  Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures decided on  4 June  1993 to  establish a Panel  to  review the 
facts of these anti-subsidy cases. Procedures are ongoing, with a panel 
report expected during the first half of 1994. For other steel cases (flat-
rolled  steel  products)  further  consultations  and  conciliation  are 
underway. Positive 
developments 
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CHAPTER3: 
SECTORAL BARRIERS 
AND IMPEDIMENTS 
A  Agriculture and Fisheries 
1  An Introduction 
Traditionally,  bilateral  EU/US  agricultural  trade  has  been  one  of the 
more  contentious  areas  of trade  relations.  However,  in  recent  years, 
several  factors  have  contributed  to  a  distinct  relaxation  of  trade 
tensions.  Firstly,  the  EU's  internal reform of its agricultural policy 
has  also  had  beneficial  external  effects,  notably the  reduced  level  of 
export  refunds  on  a  range  of  agricultural  products  as  well  as  the 
elimination of export subsidies for some others. Secondly, the reaching 
of a solution on the long-running oilseeds dispute removed  a serious 
bone of contention between the two  sides.  And thirdly,  the agreement 
reached in December 1993 on the Uruguay Round negotiations also 
constitutes  a  positive  development.  The  overall  effect  of  these 
developments will  be  to  facilitate  international  agricultural  trade  flows 
and  reduce the possibility of potentially trade disrupting disputes in the 
future.  The  relative  peace  between  the  world's  two  major agricultural 
traders should have spillover effects in terms of the expansion of global 
agricultural trade and  important economic benefits for both agricultural 
producers  and  those  involved  in  agribusiness  throughout  the  world. 
However,  notwithstanding the fact that a lot of the heat has been taken 
out  of  EU/US  agricultural  disputes,  a  variety  of  issues  remain 
unresolved. 
2  Export and Other Subsidies 
The Food Security Act of 1985 required the United States Department 
of Agriculture  (USDA)  to  use  Commodity  Credit  Corporation  stocks, 
under the Export Enhancement Program (EEP) to subsidise exports of 
US wheat to a limited number of countries, most of which are traditional 
EU  markets. EEP is now used for a wide range of commodities (mainly 
wheat and flour,  barley,  barley malt,  sorghum,  poultry feed,  vegetable 
oils,  frozen  poultry,  eggs,  rice,  semolina,  dairy  cattle  and  canned 
peaches) and for exports to over 70 food-importing countries. Internal 
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The  1988 Trade Act extended the  program to  1990 and  increased  it 
from $1.5 billion to $2.5 billion. The 1990 Farm Bill reinforced the tough 
US attitude,  providing for the continuation of the EEP without specified 
program limits.  It provided for a minimum of $500 million per year,  for 
five years. The expenditure for EEP for FY 1992 was $968 million. The 
estimated expenditure for FY  1993 is  $1.2 billion and,  in  FY 1994,  has 
amounted to $536 million as of 7 February 1994. 
From FY 1985 to February 1994, about 142.8 million tons of wheat, 4.4 
million tons of wheat flour,  13.6 million tons of feedgrains,  1.67 million 
tons  of vegetable  oil  and  substantial  quantities  of eggs,  dairy  cattle, 
frozen poultry and canned peaches were targeted for export subsidies 
within  the  program.  In  financial  terms,  subsidies  already  granted  are 
valued  at  approximately  $5,306 million.  According  to  the  US 
Department  of Agriculture,  the  1992  EEP  measure  of  $1  million  on 
exports of 9,000 tons of canned peaches to Japan,  Korea and Mexico 
was taken as a retaliation against the EU  because of the EU  refusal to 
apply retroactively a modification of the processing aid for canned fruit 
which had become necessary under the EU-US agreement on canned 
fruit.  In  FY  1993,  2,654 tons  of canned  peaches were the  subject of 
EEP subsidies. 
In addition, in FY 1993, the US Government spent approximately $1.61 
million  on  the Dairy Export Incentive Program (DEIP),  $25.3 million 
for the Sunflower Oil Assistance Program (SOAP),  and $6.8 million 
for  the  Cottonseed  Oil  Assistance  Program  (COAP).  These 
programs are  mainly  targeted  against  EU  agricultural  exports to third 
countries.  The  US  Administration  has  recently  indicated  that it  is  not 
planning  to  reduce  EEP  in  anticipation  of the  implementation  of the 
Uruguay Round  agreement,  although it will  have to do so afterwards, 
and is also expected to retain export subsidies under the DEIP. 
Marketing  loans were  provided  for in  the  Farm  Act of 1985,  on  a 
discretionary  basis  for  feedgrains,  wheat  and  soyabeans,  but  on  a 
mandatory basis for rice and upland cotton. They permit the repayment 
of government buying-in  loans  for certain  agricultural  commodities  at 
less than the  loan rate  and thus function  as  an  additional measure of 
internal support. The Agricultural Competitiveness and Trade Act of 
1988 established  a mechanism  for automatically triggering  marketing 
loans for wheat and  feedgrains  if it were judged by  the  US  that there 
had  been  insufficient  progress  in  the  agricultural  negotiations  in  the 
Uruguay Round.  These  triggers  remain  on  the  books  with  respect to 
wheat  and  feedgrains.  The  1990  Farm  Bill  provided  for  the 
continuation  of mandatory marketing  loans for upland  cotton  and  rice 
and for extension of the scope of same to include soyabeans and other 
oilseeds. 
The  Food Security Act of 1985 established  a new program,  entitled 
Targeted  Export Assistance  (TEA).  Under  this  program,  for  fiscal Export 
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. years  1989  and  1990  figures  of  $200  million  and  $220  million  were 
approved.  Under the  1990  Farm Bill  the TEA program was  renamed 
the Market Promotion Program (MPP) and  expanded to  "encourage 
the  development,  maintenance  and  expansion  of commercial  export 
markets for agricultural commodities". Whereas the TEA program was 
limited to commodities where the US considered that exports had been 
adversely  affected  by  unfair foreign  trade  practices,  the  MPP,  while 
according such exports priority for assistance, allows consideration also 
to be given to other commodity groups. The allocation for FY 1992 was 
$200  million,  for  FY  1993  is  $148  million  and  for  FY  1994  is  $100 
million. 
The US  supports its agriculture by commodity loans which guarantee 
the  farmer a  minimum  price  (loan  rate)  if he  cannot  sell  his  produce 
above  this  price  on  the  open  market,  and  by  deficiency payments 
which  are  calculated  as  the  difference  between  a  government-
established target-price and the higher of the market price or the loan 
rate.  Deficiency  payments  are  an  internal  support  measure  which, 
nevertheless,  may  impact  substantially  on  external  trade.  Deficiency 
payments allow the US to have lower internal prices than within the EU 
and to start with direct export subsidies from lower levels. 
The  Export Credit Guarantee Program (GSM-102)  is the largest US 
agricultural export promotion program  and  has been functioning since 
1982.  It  guarantees  repayment  of private,  short-term  credit  for  up  to 
three  years.  The  Intermediate  Export Credit Guarantee  Program 
(GSM-103)  was  established  by  the  Food Security Act of 1985 and 
complements GSM-102 by guaranteeing repayment of private credit for 
3-1 0  years.  Guarantee  coverage  of  at  least  $5  billion  annually  is 
provided  for under GSM-1 02  and  of $500  million  under GSM-1 03.  A 
total  of $3.6  billion  of guaranteed  credit was  announced  for FY  1993 
under GSM-102 and GSM-103. 
Public law 480  (P.L.480)  has  amongst  its  other  (generally  altruistic) 
aims the expansion of foreign markets for US  agricultural products.  Its 
Title I makes US  agricultural commodities available through  long-term 
dollar  credit  sales  at  low  interest  rates  for  up  to  40  years  (as  from 
Spring  1992).  In  FY  1992,  Title I agreements were estimated  at $494 
million  and  the  Administration  is  seeking  $312  million  in  budget 
authority for FY 1994. Donations for emergency food relief are provided 
under Title  II  (valued  at  $470  million  in  FY  1992).  Title Ill  authorises 
"food  for development"  projects  (valued  at  $240  million  in  FY  1992). 
The program level for P.L.480 for FY 1993 is about $1.7 billion. 
3  Trade Hampering Import Quotas 
Section 22  of the  US  Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 requires 
import restrictions to  be  imposed when products  are  imported  in  such US quotas 
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quantities  and  under  such  conditions  as  to  render  ineffective,  or 
materially  to  interfere  with,  any  US  agricultural  program.  Such 
restrictions are contrary to  GATT Articles II  and XI.  Therefore, the US 
sought  and  was  granted  in  March 1955  a  waiver,  subject  to  certain 
conditions,  for  its  GATT  obligations  under  the  above  articles  with 
respect to Section 22 quotas.  Nearly 40 years have since elapsed and 
in  the  EU's view the  continuation  of the waiver cannot be  justified.  In 
the annual examination of the waiver in the GATT, the EU together with 
other Contracting Parties has always insisted that the conditions under 
which  the waiver was  granted  should  be  fully  respected  and  that the 
application of the waiver should be  brought to an  end.  The conclusion 
of the Uruguay Round  will  have the effect of replacing the Section 22 
quotas  with  new  current  access  quotas  which  will  be  "bound"  in  the 
GATT. 
The  US  regulates  imports of a variety of agricultural products through 
the  establishment  of  quotas.  These  cover  certain  dairy  products 
(including cheese),  ice-cream, syrups,  certain articles containing sugar 
(including  chocolate  crumb),  cotton  of certain  staple  lengths,  cotton 
waste and strip,  and peanuts. While these restrictions are covered by a 
GATT  waiver,  they  restrict  EU  exports  to  the  US  and  have  a 
considerable  negative  effect  on  world  markets.  The  EU  exports 
potentially  most  heavily  affected  by  US  quotas  are  dairy  products, 
cheese and sugar-containing articles. 
In  this  context,  attention  has  to  be  drawn  to  the  fact  that  unilateral 
decisions  of the  US  administration  on  the  application  of the  cheese 
import quota in  1988,  1989,  1991  and  1993 resulted in  a globalization 
of  certain  EU  allocations  in  favour  of  other  third  countries.  Such 
decisions  are  incompatible  with  the  provisions  of the  1979  cheese 
arrangement between  the  EU  and  US  as  was  indicated to  USDA on 
several occasions. 
4  Disproportionate Burden Through Cotton Import Fee 
The  Cotton  Research  and  Promotion  Act Amendments  of  1990, 
enacted under the  1990 Farm Bill provide,  inter alia,  for a levy of $1 
per bale on imports of cotton and cotton-containing products, in addition 
to  a  supplemental  assessment  of  six  tenths  of  one  percent  of the 
historical value of the cotton  (based  on  the  average price  received  by 
US  producers  of upland  cotton).  This  import  fee  does  not  appear to 
discriminate, in principle, against foreign producers exporting to the US, 
as  a similar fee  is  imposed on  domestic US  producers  of raw  cotton. 
However, it may prove discriminatory in practice for two reasons, which 
have been explained to the US Administration. 
Firstly,  the  assessment  of  the  fee  tends  to  place  the  cost  of 
administration disproportionately on  imports. These high administrative Promotion of 
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costs,  besides  being  burdensome  in  themselves,  may  also  have  the 
effect  of a  non-tariff  barrier  in  discouraging  foreign  producers  from 
exporting to the US.  The EU  is also concerned that the list of imported 
products upon which this fee is to be levied appears to include a range 
of  products  which  are  classified  as  containing  blends  of  a  high 
percentage  of other textile  fibres,  for example,  many  wool  garments, 
sales  of which  would  in  no  way  benefit  from  measures  destined  to 
increase cotton consumption. 
Secondly,  it  is  understood  that this fee  is  to  be  used  to fund  the  US 
Cotton  Board.  To  the  extent  that  the  activities  of this  organisation 
benefit domestic and foreign  cotton  equally, there would not appear to 
be  discrimination.  However,  the  EU  is  concerned  that  foreign  cotton 
may not,  in  fact,  receive  equitable treatment,  especially as  one of the 
express  purposes  of  the  Cotton  Board,  as  set  out  in  the  Federal 
Register  notice,  is  "to  maintain  and  expand  domestic  and  foreign 
markets and uses for US cotton". 
The  final  rule  became  effective  on  1  0 November  1992.  This  was 
unchanged except for the  reduction  of the  rate  from  0.6%  to  0.5%  of 
the value  of cotton  bales  or bale  equivalent.  The EC's  concerns were 
not met.  The US Department of Agriculture proposes to raise the rates 
again  in  1995/96.  In  summary,  the  EU  is  concerned  that  the  two 
aspects of the proposed legislation referred to above may amount to de 
facto discrimination against imports into the US  and a non-tariff barrier 
for foreign exporters of cotton-containing products. 
5  Sanitary and phytosanitary requirements 
Differences in  US and  EU sanitary and  phytosanitary requirements can 
have  restrictive  effects  on  trade.  In  the  past,  there  have  been  cases 
where  US  customs follow a sampling  and  inspection procedure which 
fails  to  define  adequately  which  goods  require  urgent  processing  by 
customs  if deterioration  is  to  be  avoided.  EU  exports  of fruit  (apples, 
pears, citrus), ornamental plants, cut flowers and smoked salmon to the 
US  have encountered problems due to  delays,  resulting  in  damage to 
the  goods  and  subsequent  commercial  losses  for  the  exporters.  In 
particular,  the  Food  and  Drug  Administration's  time-consuming 
scrutinising  controls  on  the  detection  of  pit  fragments  in  imports  of 
canned  peaches from  the  EU  has lead  to  detentions and  subsequent 
destruction or obligatory re-export of this product, hampering the flow of 
trade and  negatively affecting the volume of exports. The EU  does not 
dispute the  right  of the  US  authorities  to  inspect  imported  goods  but 
considers  that  adequate  steps  should  be  taken  to  deal  expeditiously 
with perishable goods. 
In the phytosanitary field the following main difficulties persist in spite 
of some progress within the framework of bilateral discussions between Insect 
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the  European  Commission  and  the  US  Department  of Agriculture  in 
1993. 
Prior  to  the  introduction  of administrative  instructions  governing  the 
entry of apples and pears from certain countries in Europe (Fed.  Reg. 
of 1987,  Title VII,  ch.3,  par.  319-56-2r},  a pre-clearance program  was 
applied  in  agreement between the French and  US  authorities with the 
objective of guaranteeing the absence of an  insect pest known  as the 
pear  leaf  blister  moth.  The  new  administrative  rules  extended  the 
inspections  to  other Member States  and  to  "other  pests  that  do  not 
exist in the US  or that are not widespread in the US",  the result being 
that US  inspection operated on  the basis of an  open  list of prohibited 
pests. 
Operating on the basis of an open list is not a scientific approach and is 
contrary to the spirit of transparency as provided for in the International 
Plant  Protection  Convention.  Notwithstanding the  continued  operation 
of the  pre-clearance  program,  the  rate  of rejection  of consignments 
increased significantly. The extended and  more stringent inspection as 
well  as  the  ensuing  increased  costs  have  had  an  evident  negative 
impact  on  EU  exports  of apples  and  pears  to  the  US.  Negotiations 
between the EU and the US have so far failed to solve the issue. 
The  prohibition  of import of fruit and  vegetables from  pathogen-free 
regions of an  EU  Member State adjacent to  regions  in  which  a given 
pathogen is known to occur (Fed.  Reg.  of 1987, title VII, ch.3,  par.  319-
56-2r)  creates  undue  obstacles to  export  from  pathogen-free  regions 
within the EU. An example is the prohibition of import of tomatoes from 
Brittany because of the presence of the Mediterranean Fruit Fly in the 
Mediterranean  regions  of  France.  Although  Brittany  is  ecologically 
isolated from the infested regions of France, and the French authorities 
carry  out  the  necessary  surveillance  to  avoid  dissemination,  imports 
into the US  of ripe tomatoes from  Brittany are not permitted by the US 
authorities. The EU  considers these measures to  be excessive and  not 
justifiable on phytosanitary grounds. 
The revised  provisions regarding  standards and  certification  of plants 
established in growing media (Fed. Reg. of title VII, par. 319-37-8) have 
reduced  the  obstacles  encountered  so  far  for  EU  exports  of potted 
plants to the US.  However,  the certification of plant genera involves a 
very long procedure which may considerably delay the approval of EU 
plant  genera.  A  proposed  rule  (Fed.  Reg.  Vol.  58  No.  171)  of 
7 September  1993  provides  for  an  amendment  to  CFR.  319-37-8  to 
allow the importation of five additional genera of plants. While approval 
of these five genera is expected in  1994, the EU considers the decision 
to  reevaluate  the  previous  risk  analyses  done  on  EU  plant  genera 
unnecessary and an undue obstacle to trade in this area. Stringent 
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The US  insists on zero pesticide residue levels for substances which 
have  not  been  approved  for  use  in  the  US  or  for  which  no  import 
tolerance  has  been  established  even  where  these  substances  are 
manufactured  in  the  United  States  and  exported  to  foreign  countries 
(i.e. Mercabam).  In  some  cases,  time-consuming  or  unduly  delayed 
approval procedures have led to trade disruption. 
In  February  1990,  the  Food  and  Drug  Administration  (FDA)  found 
residues of a fungicide "procymidone" in  imported wines.  The fact that 
the  manufacturer  had  not  applied  to  the  Environmental  Protection 
Agency (EPA) to have a tolerance level fixed for this product led to an 
effective zero tolerance level being imposed and consequent disruption 
of EU  wine exports to the US to the tune of $200 million in  1990. This 
situation  prevailed  despite  the  fact  that  a  Scientific  Advisory  Panel 
subsequently  found  that  the  health  risk  to  consumers  of wine  with 
residues of procymidone is negligible. The interim solution of the trade 
dispute, in April 1991, has allowed the resumption of the bulk of normal 
trade flows.  The  establishment by  the  EPA of a permanent tolerance 
has not yet taken place but is anticipated shortly. 
In  July  1992,  the  Californian  Court  of Appeals  effectively  ruled  the 
EPA's negligible risk policy as  illegal.  This ruling would have the effect 
of rejecting food  products  (fresh  or processed) containing  residues  of 
more  than  35  frequently  used  pesticides.  The  Administration  is 
presenting a proposal  to  Congress  on  widespread  reform  in  pesticide 
legislation including the Delaney clause which imposes a zero level for 
any cancer-inducing residue. 
Table olives and  pickled vegetables from certain EU  Member States, 
despite the  fact  that they  constitute  products  of natural  fermentation, 
are considered by FDA to be either low acid or acidified, resulting in the 
obligation  on  their producers to register with the FDA.  As  attested by 
regulations  both  of the  International  Council  of Olive  Oil  and  FAO's 
Codex  Alimentarius,  these  are  natural  products  for  which  the 
fermentation in  brine leads to a slight natural level of acidity,  rendering 
it unnecessary for acids or other chemical  preservatives to be  added. 
The obligation on  these producers to register with the FDA constitutes 
an  administrative  barrier,  which  seriously  hampers  imports  and  often 
results in unjustified detentions at US ports of entry. 
In the sanitary field the following difficulties persist: 
The US  rules on  importation of animal products and by-products from 
countries  where  Bovine  Spongiform  Encephalopathy  (BSE)  exists 
(docket  number  90-252,  Fed.  Reg.  56  :  19794,  April  30,  1991, 
amending  9  CFR  parts  94  and  95)  contain  three  requirements 
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•  the~t the meat does not originate from any animal which has been in 
a country in  which BSE exists during a time when the country was 
permitting the use of ruminant meat and bone meal for the feeding 
of ruminants; 
•  all  meat  has  to  be  deboned  and  all  visually  identifiable  lymphatic 
and nerve tissue have to be removed; 
•  each animal has to be inspected prior to slaughter by a veterinarian 
and found free of neurological disorders. 
The  EU  has  taken  restrictive  veterinary  measures,  which  have  been 
approved  by  the  International  Office  for  Epizooties  (IOE),  in  order to 
protect  animal  health  and  public  health  in  the  EU.  However,  the  US 
measures go beyond these measures on important points such as: 
•  US  does  not  make  any  distinction  between  countries  with  low  or 
high  incidence  of  BSE,  while  the  EU  in  accordance  with  IOE 
requirements  takes  restrictive  measures  only  in  countries  with  a 
high  incidence  of  BSE  (UK).  This  position  whereby  the  varying 
incidents of BSE in  countries is not taken into account was restated 
in  the  7 September  1993  rule  (9  CFR.94.18)  which  unjustifiably 
banned import of animal casings from all countries listed by the US 
as  having  BSE  (UK,  FR,  IRL,  P).  Furthermore,  the  temporary 
addition of Denmark and subsequent addition of Portugal to the US 
list  of countries  where  BSE  exists  on  the  basis  of one  imported 
infected cow was not justified; 
•  all  meat  from  all  countries  with  BSE  (UK,  FR,  IRL,  P)  must  be 
deboned, while EU requirements for deboning only concern UK; 
•  double requirement of deboning and the ban on meat from animals 
born prior to the ban on feeding on ruminant meat and bone meal. 
The  EU  considers  that  the  US  measures  constitute  an  unjustified 
restriction  on  trade.  There  is  no  justification  for  going  beyond  the 
recommendations  of  the  authoritative  international  institution  (IOE) 
especially  when  the  US  has  not taken  measures to protect  its  cattle 
population from the internal threat of scrapie in the US. In particular, the 
application of the severe measures (as applied to the UK) to countries 
with only a few cases of BSE cannot be justified. 
Some restrictions  on  live animals relate to the non-recognition by  the 
US of freedom from certain diseases, e.g. contagious equine metritis. 
The  principle  of  regionalization  as  an  effective  means  of controlling 
animal disease has been incorporated in the US Tariff Act 1930 by the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).  However,  US  import 
administrative  rules  concerning  Foot  and  Mouth  Disease,  Rinderpest 
and  other  relevant  diseases  remain  to  be  amended  to  reflect  this 
change in legislation. Non-recognition 
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Non-comminglement means  that  establishments  exporting  animals, 
meat  or  meat  products  to  the  US  do  not  handle  at  the  same  time, 
animals,  meat  or  meat  products  from  countries  which  are  not 
recognised as free from relevant diseases and that there is no mixing of 
meat or meat products destined for the US with meat or meat products 
from  such  countries.  These  requirements  are  unnecessary  in  view  of 
the EU policy of regionalized control of animal diseases. 
Imports into the  US  of uncooked meat products (sausage,  ham  and 
bacon)  have  been  subject to  a long-standing  prohibition,  only  part of 
which  may  be  justified  on  health  grounds.  Following  repeated 
approaches by the  EU,  US  import regulations were  modified to  permit 
importation of Parma  ham.  However,  the  US  still  applies a prohibition 
on  other  types  of  uncooked  meat  products,  e.g.  San  Daniele  ham, 
German sausage, ham and bacon and cured hams from Spain. 
The import of egg products is only allowed under very strict conditions. 
One  of  these  requirements  is  the  continuous  inspection  of  the 
production  process.  This  is  superfluous  and  expensive  and  has  a 
negative effect on  prices  and  competitiveness.  However,  a system  of 
periodic inspection of the production process would be acceptable from 
a human health point of view. 
In  1989 in  response to  a Community ban  on  the  use of hormones in 
the  production  of  livestock,  the  US  imposed  unilateral  retaliation 
measures under Section 301  of the Trade Act of 1974 on  EU  exports 
to the US to the value of $97.2 million. This amount represents the US's 
perceived loss of trade to the EU  in  beef and beef products for human 
consumption. 
In  an  effort  to  de-escalate  the  dispute  later  that  year  the  EU/US 
Hormones Task Force agreed "to lift retaliation  on  EC  products to the 
extent that  US  meat  exports  to  the  EC  resumed".  In  fact,  two  small 
reductions were made in 1989 on this basis. 
Earlier this year, the EU requested in writing that a further reduction be 
made.  The  US  replied  that,  having  examined the  relevant trade data, 
they  considered  that  no  adjustment  of  the  retaliation  measures  is 
warranted.  Although the issue was raised  during the final phase of the 
Uruguay  Round  negotiations,  the  US  Administration  is  currently  not 
prepared to give a commitment to reduce the retaliation. GATT illegal 
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6  Domestic Content Requirement for Tobacco 
The  Omnibus  Budget  Reconciliation  Act  of  1993  contains 
provisions, notably a 75% domestic content requirement for tobacco in 
cigarettes  manufactured  in  the  US,  which  will  negatively  affect  EU 
exports of tobacco to the US.  The EU  presented a written demarche to 
the Department of State in July 1993 expressing its concerns regarding 
the provisions of this legislation. The EU considers that these measures 
infringe  its  GATT rights,  in  particular with  respect to GATT Article Ill, 
and  announced  at  the  GATT  Council  on  22 September  1993  its 
intention  to  request  consultations  with  the  US  under  GATT 
Article XXIII:1. The EU  consultations with the US were held in  October 
1993 but  proved  unsatisfactory.  Consequently,  at the  meeting  of the 
GATT  Contracting  Parties  in  January  1994,  the  EU  announced  its 
intention to make its views known to the GATT Panel which has been 
requested  by  a number of other Contracting Parties. The EU  has also 
commented  on  the  implementing  rules  published  in  the  Federal 
Register with respect to the Domestic Content Requirement and to the 
Tobacco Importer Assessments. 
7  Inadequate Protection of  Geographical Indications of 
European Wines and Spirits 
EU  legislation  protects  the  geographical  indications  of  wines.  US 
legislation does not afford the same level of protection against misuse 
of EU denominations. In  1983, an exchange of letters between the EC 
and  the  US  provided  a  measure  of  protection  for  EC  geographical 
names that designate wine. The US  undertook not to appropriate such 
names,  if known  by  the  US  consumer  and  unless  this  use  by  US 
producers was traditional. The exchange of letters expired in  1986 but 
the US has maintained its commitment to this undertaking. 
In  April  1990 the  Bureau  of Alcohol,  Tobacco  and  Firearms  (BATF) 
published  a  list  of  examples  of  "Foreign  Nongeneric  Names  of 
Geographic Significance Used in  the  Designation of Wines".  However, 
many EU  geographical  designations do  not figure  on  this  list and  the 
EU  indicated  to  BATF  that the  list,  as  published,  is  not  satisfactory, 
since  it does not ensure protection  of EU  wine  denominations in  the 
US. A petition to complete the list of EU protected distinctive indications 
was denied on the grounds of '1ack of evidence". 
Moreover, no progress has  been achieved to date with respect to wine 
names  defined  as  semi-generic  under  US  legislation.  The  US 
regulations  allow  some  EU  geographical  denominations  of  great 
reputation to be  used by American wine producers to designate wines 
of  US  origin.  The  most  significant  examples  are  Burgundy,  Claret, Agreement 
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Champagne,  Chablis,  Chianti,  Malaga,  Marsala,  Madeira,  Moselle, 
Port,  Rhine Wine, Sauternes, Haut Sauternes and Sherry. This issue is 
clearly  a major one  in  the ongoing  EU/US  discussions on  a new  and 
better wine accord. 
American producers also use  some of the  most prestigious European 
geographical indications as  names of grape varieties. This abuse could 
often  mislead  consumers  as  to  the  true  origin  of  the  wines. 
Furthermore,  the  improper  use  of  EU  geographical  designations  for 
wines and spirits places the respective EU  products at a disadvantage 
on the US market. 
With  regard  to  spirits,  the  US  regulations  basically  provide  protection 
against  practices  misleading  to  the  consumer.  Furthermore,  they 
explicitly  protect  five  EU  denominations.  This  limited  protection  does 
not prohibit the improper use of geographical designations of spirits or 
even  the development of certain  names into generic designations.  An 
agreement was approved by the Council of the European Communities 
in  February  1994 for the  reciprocal  protection  of two  US  and  six  EU 
designations  and  discussions  on  the  mutual  recognition  of  further 
designations should take place shortly. 
8  Labelling 
US  legislation  requires  certain  products  to  be  labelled  as  to  their 
content and origin. The implementation of the Nutrition Labelling and 
Education  Act  1990  requires  the  US  Food  and  Drug  Administration 
(FDA) to follow an  accelerated timetable in  their extensive program  of 
changes to US food  labels.  In this context, the FDA published a series 
of  proposed  rules  (amounting  to  over  600  pages)  in  the  Federal 
Register  of  27 November  1991,  with  a  comment-period  deadline  of 
25 February  1992.  The  US  Department  of Agriculture  has  also  been 
working  along  the  same  timetable  with  regard  to  the  labelling 
requirements for fresh  meat and  poultry.  Final rules were published  in 
January 1993 with respect to both the FDA and USDA nutrition labelling 
with effective dates in May 1994. 
The  EU  is  concerned  that the  proposed  rules  differ from  international 
standards on labelling established by Codex Alimentarius (upon which 
the  corresponding  EU  legislation  is  based)  and,  furthermore,  that this 
legislative action would have serious negative consequences on EU/US 
trade in  foodstuffs. As  it  stands,  the proposed implementing legislation 
would  result  in  significant  commercial  obstacles  to  EU  food  products 
marketed in the US and vice-versa. 
With respect to wine labelling, there exist procedures, both at Federal 
and State level, for the approval of labels on the front and rear sides of 
wine  bottles.  In  general,  an  average  of three  months  is  required  to Marketing 
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obtain  label  approval  at the  Federal  level  and,  at the  State  level,  the 
approval  period  varies from  State to State but may be as  long as  six 
weeks. This renders the approval procedure time-consuming, confusing 
to exporters (who have to comply with different regimes from  State to 
State) and costly. 
9  Phytomedicines 
The Food and  Drug Administration (FDA) has implemented a statutory 
requirement  for  old  (but  generally  recognised  as  safe  and  effective) 
drugs to the  effect that  marketing experience  must have taken  place 
only in the US. Apparently this marketing limitation was placed on Over-
the-counter (OTC)  products  in  order to  facilitate  the  FDA's  extensive 
OTC Drug Review which took place in the 1970's and 1980's. Given the 
fact that international harmonisation efforts for pharmaceuticals are on 
the increase, this limitation presents a major trade barrier to European 
companies. 
On  24 July  1992,  the  European  American  Phytomedicines  Coalition 
(EAPC) filed  a Citizen  Petition with the  Food· and  Drug Administration 
asking  the  Agency  to  expand  its  OTC  Drug  Review.  The  Petition  is 
under review in  FDA's Office of the General Counsel and  its Office of 
OTC  Drug  Products  to  include  plant  medicines  (also  known  as 
phytomedicines) which are marketed in Europe. 
10  Driftnet Fishing 
The Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1983 
(MFCMA)  was  re-authorised  in  1990  with  a  resulting  impact  on 
international fisheries matters. The amended Act proposes that the US 
apply a number of unilateral measures to its partners with which it has 
Governing International Fisheries Agreements (GIFA)  on  the  high 
seas. The measures include the right for the US authorities to know the 
whereabouts of driftnet vessels beyond their exclusive economic zone, 
to  board  and  inspect those  vessels  and  to  have  on-board  observers. 
However, the GIFA with the EU expired on 1 January 1994. 
Amendments also require the Department of Commerce to list nations, 
the nationals of which engage in large-scale driftnet fishing in a manner 
unacceptabl~ to the US  authorities.  Such a nation may be certified for 
the  purposes  of  the  so-called  "Pelly  Amendment"  and  its  marine 
products may be consequently embargoed. 
The US introduced a compulsory system of Certificates of Origin for 
yellowfin tuna caught in  the  Eastern Tropical Pacific from  1 July 1992. 
Certification rules are also applied for countries using large-scale trawl 
nets.  These rules may be  considered to  be  a serious  obstacle for EU International 
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exporters.  The  prov1s1ons  of  the  High  Seas  Driftnet  Fisheries 
Enforcement Act of 1992  allow  for the  possibility  of  EU  Member 
States,  if engaged  in  large  scale  driftnet fishing,  being  faced  with  an 
embargo in the future. 
11  Allocations to Foreign Fishing Fleets 
Each  year,  the  US  fixes  the  total  allowable  level  of foreign  fishing 
(TALFF)  and  accordingly  makes  allocations  to  foreign  fishing  fleets. 
Squid fishing  possibilities for EU  vessels off the east coast of the  US 
have been gradually phased out under the terms of both the Magnuson 
Fishery Conservation and  Management Act (MFCMA) and the former 
Governing  International  Fisheries  Agreement  (GIFA)  in  favour of the 
development  of the  US  domestic  fishing  industry.  Though  mackerel 
migrating  off the  east  coast  is  the  only  stock  currently  identified  as 
being  in  surplus  in  the  US  Exclusive  Economic  Zone  (EEZ),  the  US 
authorities have  proposed  a zero TALFF for both  1993 and  1994 for 
this  stock following  pressure from  the domestic industry to  protect its 
markets.  The  EU  believes  that  this  line  neither  corresponds  to  the 
provisions  and  intentions  of  the  MFCMA  nor  to  the  provisions  of 
Article 62 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
The EU  acknowledges the entitlement of the US to link access to living 
resources  in  its  EEZ  to  certain  conditions.  There  seems  to  be  a 
tendency, however, to use US measures (such as the definition of large 
driftnets) as benchmarks of other countries' policies with the possibility 
of  sanctioning  accordingly.  No  matter  how  well-founded  are  the  US 
objectives,  their  actions  should  be  based  upon  international 
cooperation.  Otherwise,  unilateral measures may be  out of proportion 
with  the  objective  of  conservation  and  destabilizing  for  international 
trade. 
12  Comments 
The conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations in  December 1993 
represents  the  integration  of  agricultural  trade  into  the  multilateral 
trading system. This agreement, once implemented, will  ensure that in 
the  future  agricultural  trade  will  be  subject  to  rigid  multilateral 
disciplines.  In  addition,  the  US,  together with  other GATT Contracting 
Parties,  has  agreed  to  specific  disciplines  on  internal  support 
measures,  on  export  subsidies  and  on  market  access  which  will 
substantially  affect  the  measures  which  have  been  discussed  in  the 
preceding chapter. With regard to  internal  support,  for instance, it  has 
been  agreed  that  deficiency  payments  may  be  exempted  from  the 
requirement of reduction provided they satisfy certain criteria such as a 
direct  link  to  set-aside.  However,  the  internal  support  provided  by 
marketing  loans  will  require  reduction.  As  regards  export  subsidies, Scientific 
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EEP and DEIP will have to be substantially reduced in  accordance with 
UR  commitments  although  it  appears that  SOAP  and  COAP  may  be 
phased  out  before the  deadline for UR  implementation  (probably July 
1995). It would appear that the MPP will be exempt from reduction in as 
far as  promotion activities do not directly affect production.  In  1992, at 
Blair House,  the  European  Commission  and  the  US  agreed  to  work 
towards  the  development  of  internationally  agreed  disciplines  (for 
example within the framework of the OECD) to govern the provision of 
export  credits,  export  credit  guarantee  or  insurance  programs.  Thus 
negotiations should take place with  regard to such measures as GSM-
102, GSM-103 and P.L.  480. 
In  addition,  the  UR  package  of  15 December  1993  includes  an 
Agreement  on  Sanitary  and  Phytosanitary  measures  (SPM).  This 
Agreement will  allow for the distinction between legitimate SPMs from 
protectionist SPMs. The Agreement both acknowledges the right of the 
importing  countries  to  establish  the  level  of protection  determined  by 
any of these countries and the right of the exporting countries to certify 
that  certain  exports  are  free  of  pests  or  diseases  subject  to  the 
importing  countries  concerned.  In  the  footnote  under  §11  of  the 
Agreement, the Contracting Parties have agreed to the principle that "a 
scientific justification" is  a basis for a SPM which is  more stringent than 
the international standard  but which "is not more trade restrictive than 
required to  achieve their appropriate level of protection".  Being placed 
under  the  World  Trade  Organisation  (WTO)  dispute-settlement 
procedure,  it is  possible that many instances of abuse  of SPM  will  be 
brought to the attention of the WTO. 
Finally, in the Uruguay Round negotiations on  intellectual property, the 
EU sought to establish a high level of protection to prevent any use of a 
geographical indication  identifying  a wine or spirit  on  a  product which 
did  not  originate  from  the  area  indicated.  The  text  agreed  partially 
addresses this concern;  it represents an  important step forward insofar 
as it obliges member countries to protect geographical names for wines 
and  spirits  which  originate  in  that  geographical  area,  and  it  aims  to 
secure  a  standstill  on  the  usurping  of  geographical  indications. 
Nevertheless,  the  Contracting  Parties  agree  to  enter  into  bilateral 
negotiations  aimed  at  increasing  the  protection  provided  by  the 
agreement,  particularly  as  far  as  generics  and  semi-generics  are 
concerned, and the EU's goal remains to eliminate completely all  illicit 
use of its appellations. Growing 
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B  Services 
1  An Introduction 
The  US  economy,  although  still  considered  to  be  strongly  based  on 
manufacturing, has become increasingly orientated towards the services 
sector.  Whether this will  continue at the  same  pace  as  in  the  1980s is 
unclear.  The  Clinton  Administration  has  pledged  to  stimulate  capital 
growth in  small  and  medium  size  businesses,  arid  has  indicated that it 
intends to focus its action on promoting industrial growth in certain high-
tech or strategic industries. 
Services  exports  from  the  US  have  grown  steadily  over the  past  six 
years  - from  $77 billion  in  1986  to  $152 billion  in  1991.  The  services 
sector  in  the  US  economy  includes  areas  such  as  communications, 
transport,  public utilities,  finance,  insurance and  real  estate,  wholesale 
and  retail  trade,  government,  as  well  as  business  and  health  care 
services.  Nearly  75%  of  the  US  labour  force  is  employed  in  service 
industries. In every State more people are employed in service jobs than 
in  manufacturing,  agriculture  and  mining.  Widespread  impediments for 
foreign  service  providers  to  obtaining  effective  access  to  the  services 
market in the US therefore continue to be of concern to the EU. 
2  Financial Services 
a)  Federal Restrictions 
The US Government has made unsuccessful attempts to reform the US 
banking  system  However,  Congress  has  opposed these  attempts and 
called  into  question  the  unconditional  national  treatment  of  foreign-
controlled  financial  services  operators.  An  example  of this  is  the  Fair 
Trade  in  Financial  Services  Act.  Submitted  to  Congress  in  October 
1993,  this  legislation aims to  improve market access  in  third  countries 
for  US  banking  and  securities  firms.  By  introducing  requirements  for 
reciprocity, access to the US financial services market can  be denied to 
foreign  companies  whose  home  country  does  not agree to  remove  its 
market  access  barriers  for  US  financial  service  providers.  Despite 
assurances that the legislation is  not targeted at the EU,  the European 
Commission is monitoring further developments carefully to ensure that 
the interests of EU financial services providers in the US are secured. Tightening of 
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The  latest  US  offer for  commitments  in  the  financial  services  sector 
under GATS confirms the impression that US  policy is  moving towards 
conditioning market access and  national treatment,  at least with regard 
to new operations and new establishments. As its binding commitments 
are  limited  to  existing  activities,  any  expansion  of existing  operations, 
the establishment of a new commercial presence, or the conduct of new 
activities  are  all  potentially  subject  to  regulation  which  discriminates 
against foreign operators. 
It  is  already  the  case  that  EU  financial  institutions  in  the  US  are  not 
always  granted  national  treatment,  but  are  discriminated  against  and 
restricted in their business activities. 
The implementation of current legislation such  as the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991  (FDICIA)  and  the 
Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act (FBSEA) has tightened 
regulation and supervision requirements, notably for foreign banks.  The 
implementing regulations of the FDICIA have created uncertainties and 
delays in  establishment.  Under the FBSEA, the  Federal Reserve Board 
must now approve all  foreign bank applications for branches,  agencies 
and  representative  offices,  including  those  seeking  or  holding  state 
charters.  In  doing  so,  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  must  determine 
whether the foreign bank is  subject to comprehensive supervision on  a 
consolidated basis by  its home country authorities.  It also has to check 
whether the  bank's  top  management  and  local  office  managers  have 
been associated with any criminal activity. While it is recognized that the 
new procedures are based on legitimate concerns, it should be possible 
to  address  these  concerns  without  creating  barriers  for  foreign 
operators. 
Only recently, the Federal Reserve Board published for public comment 
a  proposal  for· charging  annual  examination  fees  to  foreign  bank 
branches,  agencies  and  representative  offices  on  the  grounds  that 
under  the  FBSEA  it  is  obliged  to  charge  fees.  Like  US  banks,  US 
branches and  agencies of international banks already pay examination 
fees to their primary regulator, whether it be a state authority for a state-
licensed  branch  or whether it be the Comptroller of the Currency for a 
federal  branch  or agency.  The  Federal  Reserve  Board's  long  standing 
policy  has  been  not  to  charge  US  banking  institutions  for  its 
examinations.  Consistent with the treatment of US  banking institutions, 
the Board has not charged US branches, agencies and other operations 
of  international  banks  since  1978,  when  it  was  first  authorized  to 
examine  international  banks  under  the  International  Banking  Act.  To 
charge  US  offices  of  international  banks  for  Federal  Reserve 
examinations  would  effectively  require  international  banks  to  pay  two 
sets of examination fees, while US banks continue to pay only one. This 
would clearly be inconsistent with the principle of national treatment and 
with US obligations under international and bilateral treaties. Discrimination 
in the 
securities 
market 
Burdensome 
regulations in 
the futures 
and options 
market 
Extra-
territoriality 
87 
Bank  subsidiaries  of a foreign-controlled  bank  incorporated  in  the  US 
may  not  own  a  securities  firm  (Section  20  of  Glass  Steagall  Act), 
although  in  January  1990  some  of  them  were  authorized  to  own 
subsidiaries which  may  engage to  a limited  extent in  underwriting and 
dealing in corporate debt and equity securities  on the same basis as US 
owned  bank  holding  companies.  Similarly,  non-US  banks  with  a  bank 
subsidiary  in  the  US  may not own  a securities firm  (Section 4(a)(1)  of 
the Bank Holding Company Act).  US  branches of non-US  banks are 
subject to  the  same  restrictions  when  engaging  in  securities  activities 
(Section 8(a) of the International Banking Act). 
Under section 7(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, a foreign 
investment company may not sell its securities in the US,  unless the US 
Securities and  Exchange Commission (SEC)  finds that investors in  the 
foreign investment company will enjoy the same protection as  investors 
in  domestic  investment  companies.  The  SEC  recognizes  that  this 
standard  is  hard  for  foreign  companies  to  meet.  Therefore,  it  has 
suggested  that  foreign  money  managers  organize  an  investment 
company  in  the  US  that  invests  in  the  same  type  of securities  as  the 
foreign  investment  company  and  register  the  "mirror"  fund  to  sell  its 
shares  in  the  US.  Foreign  money  managers  are  reluctant to  incur the 
additional costs necessary to do this. 
With certain exceptions,  non-resident firms can  only provide investment 
services,  including  the  provision  of  investment  research  to  non-
institutional  investors,  to  US  residents  through  a  registered  broker-
dealer.  However,  as  regards  dealing  in  futures  and  options,  the 
Commodities  and  Futures  Trading  Commission  (CFTC)  Part  30 
Exemption  Order  permits  the  exemption  of  foreign  firms  from  US 
registration  and ·regulation  to  provide  services  to  US  residents.  The 
CFTC issued an  order in  October 1992 which had the effect of relaxing 
previously  imposed  restrictions  on  the  marketing  activities  of  those 
foreign  firms  granted  relief  in  accordance  with  Part  30  for  their  US 
activities.  While  the  granting  of the  order  was  appreciated,  business 
done for US  residents under non-US  contracts on  a non-US exchange 
by  non-US  firms  is  nevertheless  subject  to  a  number  of burdensome 
regulations. The foreign firm needs to segregate all  US customer money 
and must accept that US customers have the right to resort to arbitration 
in  the US.  Furthermore, the foreign firm  must provide the CFTC with a 
list  of all  its  US  affiliates  carrying  on  related  business  and  procure  a 
consent from  these  affiliates that the  CFTC  may  have access to  their 
books.  Such  a requirement is  not imposed  on  local  dealers.  Certain  of 
these  requirements  may  even  be  imposed  in  cases  of  unsolicited 
business carried out at the initiative of the investor. 
Access by  US  residents to  non-US markets may also  be  hampered by 
the  extraterritorial  application  of  US  regulations  determining  in 
certain  instances,  for  business  carried  out  in  a  non-US  exchange  or 
market by a US resident, the terms of contracts, the acceptance by the Impediments 
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foreign firm  of US jurisdiction, or otherwise imposing US regulation and 
jurisdiction  on  non-US  exchanges  or  markets  in  which  US  residents 
participate. 
The  Securities  and  Exchange Commission  (SEC)  has  proposed  large 
trader reporting rules which appear to require reporting of large trades 
in  US-listed  securities even  when  they  take  place  outside  the  US  and 
are  not  carried  out  through  US  brokers/dealers.  The  EU  is  concerned 
that,  if implemented  in  the  way  envisaged  by  the  SEC,  this  proposal 
would have extraterritorial effects. 
There  are  a  number  of  other  restrictions  which  further  impede  the 
operations of EU financial institutions in the US.  Foreign banks still have 
lower uncollateralized overdraft possibilities than US  banks. Although 
the  uncollateralized  Fedwire  daylight  overdraft  ceiling  for  foreign 
banks  was  raised  by  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  in  1991,  further 
improvement is needed. 
Federal  savings  and  loan  associations  are  restricted  in  their  ability  to 
make  investments  in  certificates of deposit issued by  uninsured offices 
of foreign banks (Section S(c) of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933), 
or to invest in  certificates of deposits and other time deposits offered by 
foreign  banks  (Section  5(c)(1 )(M)  of the  Home  Owners'  Loan  Act  of 
1933 and  section A(b)(1)  of Federal Home Loan  Bank Act).  Most US 
branches of non-US  banks do  not engage in  retail  deposit activities in 
the US and are not required to obtain FDIC insurance. 
At Federal  level,  Section  3502  (b)(1)  of the  1988 Omnibus Trade Act 
(Primary  Dealers  Act)  prohibits  firms  from  countries  which  do  not 
satisfy  reciprocity  requirements  becoming  or  continuing  to  act  as 
primary  dealers  of US  government bonds,  if they were  not  authorized 
before 31  July 1987. Exceptions exist for Canadian and Israeli firms. 
Non-US  banks  operating  in  the  US  have  to  calculate  their  allowable 
interest expense deduction in  a form which is  disadvantagous to them. 
They are subject to  a 30%  branch  profits tax similar to a withholding 
tax regardless of whether those earnings have been transmitted outside 
the  US  and they may  be  subject to  a tax dependent on  the amount of 
the bank's interest expense deduction (excess interest tax), even if the 
bank has no taxable income.  Furthermore, in  the application of this tax, 
non-US banks are disadvantaged in the use of certain tax exemptions. 
The Internal Revenue Code of 1986 establishes a special 4% excise 
tax on  casualty insurance or indemnity bonds issued by insurers and  a 
special  1%  excise tax on  life insurance,  sickness and  accident policies 
and  annuity  contracts  issued  by  foreign  insurers.  It  also  establishes  a 
special  1%  excise  tax  on  premiums  paid  for  certain  reinsurance 
contracts. Importance 
of  state level 
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Finally,  under  Federal  law,  directors  of  EU  banks'  subsidiaries 
incorporated in  the US  must be  US  citizens although, with the approval 
of the  Comptroller of the  Currency;  up to  half of the  directors may  be 
foreign. 
b)  State Restrictions 
Banking regulation at State level is traditionally important because of the 
existence of the dual banking system in the US,  in which responsibilities 
are shared between Federal and  State authorities.  State activities have 
also  become  particularly  significant  because  deregulation  has  often 
appeared  first  at  State  level  before  being  adopted  at  Federal  level.  In 
the  1970s,  deregulation  of interest  rates  occurred  initially  at  the  State 
level before being adopted by Congress. Similarly, in  recent years many 
States are  attempting to  avoid federal  interstate banking  restrictions or 
limits on lines of business through changes in State law. 
Bank  holding  companies,  regardless  of  their  incorporation  inside  or 
outside the US,  are prohibited from establishing or acquiring control of a 
bank outside their "home State", unless the host State expressly permits 
this (Section 5 of the International Banking Act and Section 3(d) of the 
Bank  Holding Company Act of 1956).  However,  a majority of States 
have  now  enacted  laws  allowing  out-of-state  banks  to  set  up 
subsidiaries in  their territory,  although there are  still  some States which 
do  not  permit  (or  impose  restrictions  on)  the  establishment  of  or 
takeover by bank holding companies which are not of the same State. In 
addition,  according to  Section 5(a) of the International Banking Act,  a 
foreign  bank or its  subsidiary  not incorporated  in  the  US  cannot  open 
branches  in  more  than  one  State.  Foreign  banks  with  branches  in 
several  States  before  7  July  1978,  however,  were  grandfathered  by 
Section  5(B)  of  the  International  Banking  Act.  Domestic  banks  are 
similarly restricted by the McFadden Act. 
Certain States impose reciprocity  requirements for the establishment 
of  branches  or  agencies  of non-US  banks,  and  most  States  impose 
similar  reciprocity  requirements  for  the  establishment  of  branches  of 
non-US insurance companies. US banks and insurance companies from 
other States may also be  affected by  these provisions.  The restrictions 
and  discriminations  thus  existing  at  the  State  level  have  a  smaller 
adverse  impact  on  the  competitive  opportunities  available  to  EU 
financial  institutions,  but are  nevertheless obstacles to  effective market 
access. 
Even  so,  activity at  State level  has become increasingly important, and 
there  is  concern  that  many  States  have  adopted  or  are  introducing 
measures which discriminate against EU banks. Discrimination 
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•  A number of States prohibit foreign banks from establishing branches 
within their borders, do not allow them to take deposits, or impose on 
them special deposit requirements; 
•  Some  States  have  citizenship  requirements  for  bank  incorporators 
or directors; 
•  Certain States still exclude the issuance of stand-by letters of credit 
for insurance companies for reinsurance purposes by branches and 
agencies from foreign banks; 
•  Certain States exclude the possibility of expanding to other States for 
"regional  compact" banks established in the "regional compact" 
whose parent bank is a non-US owned bank, or limit the benefits of 
such expansion only to bank holding companies which hold a large 
proportion of their total deposits within the region; 
•  In many States, branches and agencies of non-US banks are 
required to satisfy burdensome registration requirements to engage 
in broker-dealer activities, with which US banks need not comply; 
•  Several States restrict the ability of branches and agencies of non-
US banks to serve as depositories for public funds. 
As  regards  insurance,  the  fact  that  the  competence  to  regulate  and 
supervise insurance activities is  left to the States (McCarran-Ferguson 
Act) has meant that there is a requirement to obtain a separate licence 
to operate in  each State.  Certain States do not allow the  operation and 
establishment  of insurers  owned  or  controlled  in  whole  or  part  by  a 
foreign  government  or  state,  whereas  other  States  impose  special 
capital  and  deposit  requirements  for non-US  insurers  or other specific 
requirements for the  authorization of non-US insurers.  However,  some 
of these  requirements  are  also  imposed  on  out-of-State  US  insurance 
companies.  For  non-US  insurers,  some  States  only  issue  renewable 
licences limited in time . 
At the end of 1991, the Interstate Commerce Commission introduced 
a  requirement  that  truck  operators  involved  in  interstate  commerce 
should  only  be  allowed to insure with  domestic insurers.  This  in  effect 
bars  European  insurers  from  doing  business  in  a  sector where  they 
have been  active for many years.  This is a restraint on  trade which  is 
against  the  interests  not  only  of  European  insurers,  but  also  of  US 
consumers.  It is  against the spirit of the OECD Capital Movements and 
Invisible Transactions Code  and  also contrary to  the desire to improve 
market  access  underlying  the  current  agreement  in  the  GATS.  The 
decision is currently being challenged in the US courts. 
c)  An Assessment 
In  an  increasingly  globalized  international  market,  the  separation 
between  banking  and  securities  activities  continues  to  be  at  odds Some 
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with  developments  elsewhere,  and  is  likely  to  constitute  a  significant 
competitive disadvantage for EU banks which cannot compete in the US 
for  certain  businesses,  while  US  banks  can  engage  in  securities 
activities  in  most  Member States  of the  EU.  The  US,  however,  have 
respected  the  existing  securities  operations  of  some  EU  banks' 
securities  subsidiaries  in  the  US  and  have  allowed  them  to  continue. 
Foreign  banks  now  have  an  opportunity  to  underwrite  and  deal,  to  a 
limited extent and through a separate subsidiary,  in  corporate debt and 
equity on  the same  basis  as  that  recently granted to  US  bank holding 
companies.  This  ability,  however,  is  subject  to  certain  conditions  (so-
called "firewalls" between the non-US parent bank and  its affiliates and 
its US securities subsidiary) which in some instances encroach upon the 
authority of the home country bank supervisor. The restrictions on  inter-
State  activities  are  also  a  significant  obstacle  for  the  conduct  of  EU 
business within the US. 
The application of internal US specialization requirements beyond US 
borders  could  also  have  a substantial  and  undesirable  impact  on  the 
structure  of  European  financial  groups.  However,  the  European 
Commission  acknowledges  the  flexibility  so  far shown  by  the  Federal 
Reserve Board in  limiting, to the extent possible under current US  law, 
these  extraterritorial  effects.  It  is  now  necessary  to  work  towards  a 
permanent solution,  rather than the temporary exemption from  US  law 
used  until  now.  EU  banks  with  a  subsidiary  in  the  US  may  become 
affiliated  within  the  EU  with  an  insurance  company  which  has  an 
insurance subsidiary in  the US,  or with an  EU  securities firm with  a US 
subsidiary. There may  also  be  cases where an  EU  bank with  a branch 
or subsidiary in  a State of the US  merges with  another EU  bank with  a 
branch or subsidiary in another US State. In all of these cases, it may be 
necessary, unless exempted from the prohibitions of the  Bank Holding 
Company  Act,  either  to  divest  of  an  existing  bank,  securities  or 
insurance  operations  in  the  US,  or  in  any  case  to  restrict  drastically 
existing US operations in the securities field.  It is thought that up to 200 
EU  banking  groups  might  be  affected  by  this  problem.  The  European 
Commission therefore stresses the need for reform to end the adverse 
effects  on  non-US  based  banking  organizations  of  the  present 
application  beyond  US  borders  of  specialization  requirements, 
geographical restrictions  or other operating  conditions,  such  as  certain 
"firewalls"  between  the  US  securities  operations  and  the  non-US 
affiliates of the same financial group. 
3  Air Transport 
Airline  foreign  ownership  is  subject  to  limitations.  Current  US 
legislation allows foreign investors to own up to 49% of the shares in an 
air carrier,  but  only  25%  of the  voting  stock.  These  restrictions  place 
European  investment  interests  at  a disadvantage  and  thus  inhibit  the 
free  flow  of  transatlantic  investment  in  this  sector.  As  a  first Drug tests 
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step,  the European Commission welcomes the recommendation  of the 
"National Commission to Ensure a Strong Competitive Airline Industry" 
to  liberalize  ownership  restrictions  (up  to  49%  voting  capacity  in  US 
airlines). 
In  November 1988,  the  Federal  Aviation  Administration  (FAA)  adopted 
regulations concerning an  anti-drug program for personnel engaged in 
specified  aviation  activities.  According  to these  regulations,  employees 
performing  sensitive  safety  and  security-related  functions  - including 
employees  located  outside  the  territory  of  the  US  - would  have  to 
undergo  a drug  test.  The  rule  is  already  applicable within  the  US,  but 
insofar as  it  relates to testing outside US  territory,  the compliance date 
was extended several times, first until  January 1992, then until January 
1993,  and  once  again  until  January  1995.  However,  drug  testing  for 
personnel  located  outside  the  US  is  objectionable  because  of  its 
extraterritorial  reach.  The  US  published  a  Notice  of  Proposed  Rule 
making  (NPRM)  on  15 February  1994 which  proposes to withdraw any 
extra-territorial application of the anti-drug program i.e. the testing of US 
and  foreign  nationals  working  in  safety  sensitive jobs overseas for US 
carriers.  However, the US propose in the same NPRM to require foreign 
air carriers to establish anti-drug and alcohol misuse programs in the US 
for  their  employees  performing  safety  sensitive  functions  within  the 
territory of the US by January 1996. Such a requirement interferes in the 
employment  relationship  between  foreign  companies  and  their foreign 
employees,  and  as  such  goes  beyond  what  is  permitted  under 
international  law.  Discussion  on  drug  and  alcohol  abuse  should  take 
place within an  appropriate international civil aviation forum  such as the 
international  Civil  Aviation  Organisation  so  that  the  issue  could  be 
resolved  through  cooperation  between  states  rather than  by  unilateral 
extra-territorial action. 
Revised rules on Computerized Reservation Systems (CRS) issued by 
the  US  Department of Transportation  became effective on  7 December 
1992 and will terminate on  31  December 1997. These rules maintain the 
approach  of  their  predecessors,  allowing  US  Computer  Reservation 
Systems  in  the  principal  CRS  displays  to  give  preference  to  "on-line" 
services  (connections  with  the  same  carrier)  over  "interline"  services 
(connections  with  other carriers).  This  implicitly  disadvantages  all  the 
non-US  airlines  which,  unlike the  US  carriers,  have to  rely  on  interline 
connections  for  traffic  to  and  from  US  points  other  than  their  own 
gateway points. 
This  method  of display  amounts  in  effect  to  a  disguised  restriction  of 
international trade in services. As a result,  airline bookings are distorted. 
The consumer (the passenger) is  only given the selection of US on-line 
services  on  the  first  screens  (some  80%  of  all  bookings  are  made 
through  the  first  screen),  and  this  despite  the  fact  that  the  quickest 
connections may be ensured through  interline services.  The problem of 
"on-line" preference in  US CRSs remains valid,  although the situation of Delayed 
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European  carriers  has  improved  somewhat.  This  is  due,  first,  to  an 
increasing  use  by  US  CRSs  of  an  ECAC  (European  Civil  Aviation 
Conference)  -type  neutral  display  as  the  default display  for availability 
requests  including  a city outside the  US,  and  second,  to  the  increasing 
number of code-sharing  agreements  between  European  and  American 
air carriers which will give European carriers in principle the same on-line 
preference in US CRSs as their American partners. 
However, the option  of code  sharing  may in  practice be  open  only to  a 
relatively small  number of European carriers, thus distorting competition 
between  them.  Furthermore,  code-sharing  is  only  feasible  if  the 
corresponding traffic rights are granted under bilateral agreements. From 
the  CRS  point  of  view,  code-sharing  may  increase  the  problems  of 
"screen padding" and  "starburst" flights by which the flights of non-code 
shared partners will  be shifted to  remote screens. As this will happen in 
addition  to  the  "on-line"  effect,  European  carriers  may  be  seriously 
disadvantaged in the US market in  particular,  as there are no provisions 
in  US  CRS  rules  on  code-sharing,  contrary to the  EC  Code of Conduct, 
which restricts the display of code-sharing. 
As  regards  the  certification  of  foreign  aircraft  repair  and 
maintenance stations,  in  1988 the Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR 
145) was  amended  in  order to  allow  routine  repair and  maintenance of 
US  registered aircraft to be performed anywhere in the world.  In order to 
perform  maintenance or repair work on  US  registered  aircraft,  a foreign 
repair station needs to be  approved (certified) and annually inspected by 
the  US  Federal  Aviation  Administration  (FAA).  Until  such  approval  is 
given,  the station  cannot be  used  by  US  registered  aircraft.  Due to  the 
length  of  the  process,  it  is  very  difficult  for  an  EU  firm  pmviding 
maintenance and/or repair for aircraft to be certified by the FAA, because 
of  lack  of  FAA  resources  to  carry  out  the  necessary 
inspections/certifications across the EU. Although there are over 100 EU 
firms operating with FAA approval, there is a 2-year backlog of requests 
affecting in particular equipment manufacturers and airlines. It is thus the 
delayed implementation of the Federal Aviation Regulation which acts as 
a  barrier to  trade  in  services  in  this  particular sector.  The  commercial 
impact is  very damaging, since an  EU  manufacturer may not be  able to 
repair or to sell maintenance equipment to US customers. 
4  Space launching 
The National Space Policy Directive of 6 September 1990 establishes 
that  US  Government  satellites  will  be  launched  on  US  manufactured 
launch  vehicles  unless  a  specific  exemption  has  been  granted  by  the 
President. The measure can be explained as part of a set of coordinated 
actions to strengthen the US launch industry . 
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The promotion of the US commercial space launch industry, by reserving 
all  US launches of government satellites exclusively for domestic launch 
service  suppliers,  is  clearly  detrimental  to  European  launch  service 
providers.  European  launch  operators  are  effectively  barred  from 
competing  for  US  government  launch  contracts,  which  account  for 
approximately 80%  of the  US  satellite  market.  The  restriction,  which  is 
justified  by  the  US  for  national  security  reasons  for  the  launching  of 
military  satellites,  is  now  also  imposed  on  government  satellites  for 
civilian use. 
5  Professional services 
As a result of the Uruguay Round negotiations on services, the access of 
professional  service suppliers  in  the  US  will  be  improved:  a number of 
nationality  conditions  and  in-state  residence  requirements  will  be 
removed.  However,  the  general  problem  will  remain:  licensing  of 
professional  service  suppliers  is  regulated  at  State  level  and  in  many 
instances  there  are  no  rules  regulating  the  access  for foreign  service 
suppliers. In a sector such as professional services, which is by definition 
highly  regulated  and  in  which  the  exercise  of the  activity  depends  on 
specific access conditions and qualifications, this is a serious barrier. 
For  legal  services, the  situation  of foreign  legal  consultants  remains 
unsatisfactory.  Only  15  States  permit  foreign  legal  consultants  to  be 
licensed  to  practice  in  international  law.  This  is  subject  to  additional 
specific conditions, permitting practice of home country law. The general 
conditions are very demanding: on average, experience requirement of 5 
to 7 years preceding registration, minimum age requirement of 26 years. 
In  the following States it is not possible at all to practice as foreign legal 
consultant:  Alabama,  Arizona,  Arkansas,  Colorado,  Delaware,  Idaho, 
Indiana,  Iowa,  Kansas,  Kentucky,  Louisiana,  Maine,  Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Hampshire,  New  Mexico,  North  Carolina,  North  Dakota,  Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Utah, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming. 
As regards accounting services, only North Carolina has maintained a 
nationality  requirement  for  licensing.  In-state  residency  is  required  in 
Arizona,  Arkansas,  Connecticut,  District  of  Columbia,  Idaho,  Indiana, 
Iowa,  Kansas,  Kentucky,  Louisiana,  Maine,  Michigan,  Minnesota, 
Mississippi,  Missouri,  Nebraska,  New  Hampshire,  New  Mexico,  North 
Carolina, North Dakota,  Ohio,  Oklahoma, Rhode Island,  South Carolina, 
Tennessee and West Virginia. An  in-state office is required in Arkansas, 
Connecticut,  Iowa,  Kansas,  Kentucky,  Michigan,  Minnesota,  Nebraska, 
New Hampshire,  New Mexico,  Ohio,  Vermont and Wyoming.  However, 
the  major  obstacle  in  accountancy  relates  to  the  treatment  of 
qualifications.  Most  of  the  States  do  not  take  into  account  home Licensing 
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qualifications  and  therefore  licensing  often  requires  total  or  partial 
requalification. 
Access  for  medical  services  (doctors,  veterinaries  and  para-medical 
service  suppliers)  is  very  difficult  because  of  numerical  limitations, 
nationality conditions and lack of procedures for qualifications. 
For architectural, urban planning and landscape services two-thirds 
of  the  officers,  partners  and/or  directors  of  an  architectural  firm  in 
Michigan  must  be  licensed  in  Michigan  as  architects,  professional 
engineers  and/or  land  surveyors.  In-state  residence  residence  is 
required in Illinois. 
For engineering and  integrated engineering services US  citizenship 
is required in  the District of Columbia,  in-state residency in  Idaho,  Iowa, 
Kansas,  Maine,  Mississippi,  Nevada,  Oklahoma,  South  Carolina,  South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas and West Virginia. 
6  Comments 
The  General  Agreement  on  Trade  in  Services  (GATS)  is  one  of the 
major achievements of the  Uruguay Round.  It provides a framework of 
open  trade rules  relating  to transparency,  MFN  and  national treatment, 
together with a first package of initial market opening concessions, which 
are  included  in  sectoral  annexes.  The  US  schedules  of concessions 
include commitments in specific sectors such as: 
•  professional services (accounting, architecture, engineering); 
•  business services (computer services, rental, leasing, advertising, 
market research, consulting, security services); 
•  communications (value-added telecoms, couriers, audio-visual 
services); 
•  construction; 
•  distribution (wholesale and retail trade, franchising); 
•  educational services; 
•  environmental services; 
•  financial services (banking, securities, insurance); 
•  health services; 
•  tourism services. 
The liberalization of the  provision of services aimed  at  by GATS will  be 
progressive.  Further  negotiations  have  been  programmed  to  eliminate 
MFN  exemptions,  to  adopt  substantive  disciplines  on  subsidies, 
government  procurement  and  safeguards,  and  to  include  new  areas 
such  as  basic  telephone  services,  maritime  services  and  additional 
professional services. I-
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In  the  balance of benefits accruing from  GATS and  the wro, it should 
be noted that the integrated dispute settlement procedure will apply to all 
sectors regardless of the level of commitment made in the schedules of 
concessions  annexed  to  GATS.  As  a  result,  the  EU  expects  that 
GATSIWTO  will  be  the  forum  in  which  any  future  disputes  will  be 
exclusively  addressed,  precluding  the  use  of  other  means,  such  as 
unilateral  trade  provisions  contained  in  general  or  specific  national 
legislation. Obstacles to 
market access 
remain 
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C  Telecommunications and Broadcasting 
1  An Overview 
Both  in  Europe  and  in  the  US  the  issues  of growth,  competitiveness 
and  employment  are  at  the  core  of current  economic  and  industrial 
policy debate.  In  this  respect,  emphasis is  put  on  the development of 
the  information  technology  and  communications  industries.  In  the 
telecommunications  sector,  technological  change  is  accelerating; 
regulatory  reforms  leading  to  the  strengthening  of competition  on  the 
US  and  the  EU  markets  are  being  introduced  in  order  to  foster the 
competitiveness of industry.  New development prospects,  in  particular 
concerning  telecommunications  networks,  are  sketched  out  in  the 
December  1993  White  Paper  for  the  EU  side  and  the  National 
Information  Infrastructure  (Nil)  for  the  US  side.  Hence  initiating  a 
dialogue  with  the  US  on  telecommunications  and  information 
infrastructure seems appropriate. Yet there remain significant obstacles 
for EU  companies  in  acceding  to  the  US  telecommunications  market, 
including  ownership  restrictions  for  the  granting  of  radio  licences  to 
foreign owned carriers. 
In  particular,  Community  companies'  access  to  the  US  network 
equipment  market  is  impeded  by  a  variety  of  factors,  such  as 
insufficient  transparency  in  Regional  Bell  Operating  Companies 
(RBOC)  and  AT&T procurement procedures,  the  special  rights  and/or 
dominant  position  enjoyed  by  these  utilities,  the  existence  on  this 
market of strong manufacturers who are also carriers, the ability of the 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and  of State Public Utility 
Commissions  (PUCs)  to  influence the  procurement  practices of these 
utilities,  and  the  effect  of  a  US  standardisation  policy  which  is  not 
closely linked to international standards. 
AT&T  (the  dominant  long-distance  carrier)  also  manufactures 
equipment.  Therefore,  as  a vertically  integrated  company,  it  has  little 
incentive to  buy  competitively. Thus it is far better placed than outside 
companies to supply its own  network,  and  in  practice buys  most of its 
equipment from  itself. AT&T also benefits from  a range of advantages. 
These include the company's large base of equipment already in place, 
the  fact that network specifications are  based  on  the  requirements  of 
the  original  AT&T  monopoly  telecommunications  network,  and  the 
influence that the company  has  on  the  standardisation  process  in  the 
US.  At  the  same  time,  however,  its  procurement  procedures  are  not 
transparent, nor is it obliged to go out to tender. 
With  regard  to  the  RBOCs,  the  Community  is  aware  that  these 
companies are obliged to ensure that their procurement procedures are 
non-discriminatory  in  the  sense  of  not  favouring  AT&T  above  other Procurement 
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suppliers.  However,  these procedures fall  short of those set out in  the 
EU  directive  on  procurement.  Notably,  the  procurement  process 
followed by the RBOCs is not very transparent - intimate knowledge of 
their organisation and preferences is necessary. The process inherently 
favours  those  suppliers  which  are  most  familiar  with  the  RBOCs.  In 
addition,  the  expense  of testing  certain  network  equipment  through 
Bellcore can  be very high in  some cases.  Thus although the system is 
open to all  in theory,  in  practice it is  open  only to  those suppliers with 
the ability to make this investment. 
To  a great extent,  the RBOCs enjoy monopolies on  provision of basic 
services in their areas of operation, and they are subject to regulation in 
a number of ways.  The  FCC  must  authorise the  construction  of new 
lines  for  all  carriers,  including  RBOCs  (S214  of  the  1934 
Communications Act).  It also  regulates  inter-state tariffs through  price 
caps.  Intra-state  communications  are  regulated  by  the  local  State 
Public Utility Commissions (PUGs) whose administration of price-setting 
involves them  in  all  aspects  of the  RBOCs'  operations  - indeed,  it  is 
estimated that as much as 70% of BOC revenue is  regulated by PUGs 
rather  than  by  the  FCC.  This  means  that  irrespective  of ownership, 
public or private, the major telephone companies in the US are subject 
to  a  significant  degree  of  federal  and  local  government  control. 
Companies  are  therefore  not  free  to  act  on  the  basis  of  purely 
commercial criteria,  and there is  concern that this could  also  apply to 
their procurement. 
2  Investing in Telecommunications and Broadcasting 
Section 310 of the Communications Act of 1934 imposes limitations 
on  foreign  investment  in  radio  communications:  "No  broadcast  or 
common  carrier or aeronautical  en  route  or aeronautical  fixed  radio 
station licence  shall be granted to  or held by" foreign  governments or 
their  representatives,  aliens,  corporations  in  which  any  officer  or 
director is  an  alien  or of which  more than  20%  of the  capital  stock is 
owned by an alien (25% if the ownership is indirect). 
Most  common  carriers  need  to  integrate  radio  transmission  stations, 
satellite earth stations and  in  some cases,  microwave towers into their 
networks. Therefore, foreign-owned US common carriers are faced with 
unnecessary  obstacles  in  competing  in  much  of  the  long-distance 
market  and,  more  importantly,  through  a  minority  shareholding 
provision  in  the  mobile  market.  Foreign  news  organisations  are  also 
hampered in  their activities in  the  US.  Section  310 also  applies to the 
Communications  Satellite  Corporation  (COMSAT)  which  as  US 
signatory to the INTELSAT and INMARSAT agreements is sole supplier 
of INTELSAT space  segment  services  to  US  users  and  international 
service  carriers,  and  of  INMARSAT  international  maritime  and 
aeronautical satellite telecommunications services. The Act provides for National 
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waivers  to  be  made  by  the  FCC  in  the  specific  case  of  indirect 
ownership,  if it finds that this would  be  in  the  public interest.  Thus the 
statute  imposes on  the  FCC  the  burden  of finding  that the  level  of a 
foreign  company's  investment  or  control  is  contrary  to  the  public 
interest. However, the FCC has rarely used this possibility. 
Foreign  operators are  denied  access to  ownership in  these sectors in 
contradiction  to  the  principles  of the  OECD  Code  of Liberalisation  of 
Capital Movements, and the US  government has had  to take a waiver 
under the Code to cover this point. As foreign companies may not own 
wireless facilities and  networks,  and  may  not take a large stake in  US 
companies  providing  them,  they  are  effectively  prevented  from 
competing  in  many  common  carrier  services.  Effectively,  Section 310 
obliges foreign carriers either to enter into subcontracting arrangements 
with  US  carriers,  or  to  use  alternative  (non-radio)  technology.  As 
wireless  services  continue  to  grow  in  importance  and  customers 
demand  integrated  local  and  long-distance  solutions  from  a  single 
carrier,  the ability to  participate in  and  hold  radio  licences will  become 
more  critical  to  the  long  term  success  of  all  carriers.  The  ultimate 
rationale  for  these  restrictions  is  the  argument  that  US  control  of 
communications  is  essential  at  all  times,  for  reasons  of  national 
security.  However,  where there  is  no  national security risk there is  no 
basis for invoking the policy. 
3  Public Procurement Restrictions 
Telecommunications  equipment  is  still  not  within  the  GATT 
Procurement  Code  - apart  from  the  inclusion  of NTT of Japan  - but 
examination  of  a  possible  extension  to  this  sector  has  been  taking 
place for a number of years.  Negotiations on telecommunications have 
been held up due to the difficulty of agreeing on which particular utilities 
should  be  included.  In  the  view of the  EU,  the  criteria for inclusion  of 
entities  should  be  based  not  on  the  distinction  between  public  and 
private  companies,  but  on  the  identification  of  underlying  conditions 
which  lead  entities  in  the  telecommunications  sector  to  pursue 
procurement  policies  that  tend  to  favour  particular national  suppliers. 
These  conditions  include,  first,  insulation  from  market  forces  through 
the possession of a monopoly or a dominant position over a network, or 
through the possession of special rights relating to the management of 
the  network;  and,  second,  the  means  which  government  may  use  to 
influence the  operations of an  entity,  such  as  regulation  of tariffs  and 
financing,  or authorisation  to  operate.  Thus,  the  EU  view  is  that  both 
publicly owned and  private status utilities operating under monopoly or 
dominant  conditions  should  be  covered  under  GATT  Government 
Procurement  Code  procedures.  This  would  introduce  a  high  level  of 
transparency and would lead to improved market access. Differing 
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Currently,  highly competitive European manufacturing companies face 
great difficulties  in  the  US  market,  because  US  operating  companies 
have historically bought equipment from  local  suppliers,  and  because 
AT&T buys network equipment almost exclusively from itself. A 6% Buy 
America  preference  applies  to  DoD  procurement  (unless  waived 
under the  Memorandum  of Understanding  with  NATO  allies),  and  to 
procurement  of Rural  Telephone  Cooperatives  financed  by  the  Rural 
Electric Administration  (USDA).  Draft legislation tabled  in  Congress  in 
1990,  1992,  1993  and  1994  would  explicitly  impose  local  content 
requirements on RBOC procurement and is monitored by the EU. 
4  Standardisation in the Telecommunications Field 
The  EU  recognises  the  problems  in  standardisation  arising  from  the 
speed  of innovation and  the difficulty for standards-setting to keep up 
with  it.  However,  the  Union  continues  to  be  concerned  about  certain 
developments taking place in the United States and the fact that these 
developments are not transparent. 
With  regard  to  telecommunications services, for example,  the  ONA 
(Open Network Architecture) plans of the RBOCs, which continue to be 
monitored by the Federal Communications Commission, are not closely 
related to international standards-setting. The indications are that ONA 
is  being  developed  independently  of  national  and  international 
standardisation procedures, and that this is true for ISDN and intelligent 
network equipment and  service  plans  as  well.  The  latter is  now partly 
being redressed through the promotion of uniformity. 
With  regard  to  network equipment, the costs  of adapting  European-
based switching equipment to  US  specifications are much  higher than 
the costs for the necessary adaptation work required for the rest of the 
world.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  the  telecommunications  technical 
environment in the US differs to a large degree from that of most other 
countries.  Thus,  entry  to  the  market  is  effectively  limited  to  large 
companies  with  substantial  financial  resources.  This  is  all  the  more 
apparent  given  that  even  when  the  Bellcore  evaluation  has  been 
completed,  at a cost of perhaps several millions of dollars,  a company 
has still no guarantee that its products will be bought. 
As regards standards for terminal equipment, the FCC  requirements 
are,  in  principle,  limited  to  "no  harm  to  the  network"  requirements 
(according  to  Part  68  of  the  FCC  rules).  In  practice,  however, 
manufacturers  have to  comply with  a number of voluntary  standards, 
such  as  those  required  by  individual  Bell  Operating  Companies,  to 
ensure  end-to-end  compatibility,  or  those  set  by  industrial 
organisations,  such  as  Underwriters  Laboratories  (UL).  The  latter 
produces standards in order to ensure safety concerning connection to 
the  electrical  supply  system  covered  by  the  National  Electrical  Code FCC 
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and  covering  risks  of fire,  electrical  shock  and  personal  casualty.  As 
they  are  in  practice  universally  regarded  as  a  necessary  addition  to 
FCC  requirements,  these  rules  are  "de  facto  mandatory".  Due  to 
changes  in  the  National  Electrical  Code,  manufacturers  of  terminal 
equipment  who  wish  to  be  connected  to  the  network  now  have  to 
submit their products to  a nationally recognised  laboratory in  order to 
demonstrate  conformity  with  UL  standards.  In  many  states  this  has 
been made mandatory. 
Moreover,  about two-thirds of products which  have to comply with the 
"no harm to the network" requirements (Part 68 of the FCC  rules) also 
have to  comply with  frequency  requirements  (Part  15  of those  rules). 
The  technical  standards  developed  by  the  FCC  for  radio  frequency 
equipment are  mandatory.  In  reality,  therefore,  the  FCC  requirements 
are not the only ones which imported equipment will have to meet, and 
it  is  not  clear  which  of the  other  requirements  will  apply  in  a  given 
jurisdiction.  Although  officially  FCC  requirements  are  the  only 
mandatory standards imported terminals have to meet,  exporters have 
no  certainty  as  to  which  other  standards  will  in  practice  need  to  be 
complied with in order to sell their products. 
Digital  European  Cordless  Telephones  (DECT)  is  an  area  of mobile 
communications which, together with the GSM,  has been  at the centre 
of  EU  telecommunications  policy  efforts  to  create  pan-European 
services and  terminal  equipment for the single market.  The frequency 
allocation process under way in the  US  in  the area of unlicensed PCS 
services  has  seen  the  set-up  of an  unofficial  industry grouping  called 
WIN FORUM developing an "etiquette" - or set of rules for freqency use 
- to enable coexistence of different technologies in  the  allocated  band 
of 1910-1930 MHz.  The FCC requires such an etiquette to issue a rule 
under part 15 of its  procedures and  has recognised WINFORUM  as  a 
designated feeder organisation for this purpose (somewhat as EWOS is 
to CEN/CENELEC). The technical argument is complex but, on the face 
of it,  and on the recommendation of an industry grouping, the FCC is in 
the  process  of creating  a technical  barrier to  trade  against European 
DECT systems. 
The  multiplicity  of "voluntary" standards  and  the  absence of a central 
point  where  information  on  all  relevant  standards  can  be  obtained 
represents an effective trade barrier. 
5  Services in Telecommunications and Broadcasting 
Foreign  firms  face  obstacles  in  the  provision  of  common  carrier 
services as a result of the FCC  licensing process under Section 214 of 
the  Communications Act of 1934 and/or the  implementation  by  the 
FCC  of the restrictions on  foreign investment under section 310 of the 
same  Act.  The  latter  provision  also  affects  broadcasting  services.  In Enhanced 
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addition,  foreign  firms  operating  in  the  US  face  discrimination  in  their 
regulatory treatment. 
Furthermore,  uncertainties about the extent to which federal regulation 
of  major  US  common  carriers  may  be  reduced  ("streamlined")  and 
about  possible  involvement  of  sub-federal  authorities  in  regulating 
"enhanced"  or  "value-added"  services,  have  led  to  concerns  that 
foreign  enhanced  service  providers  may  face  new  barriers  to  market 
entry or predatory behaviour by network operators. 
Common Carrier telecommunications services may be provided without 
restriction  by  foreign-owned  business  (for long-distance service  only  -
services at local  level being generally regarded  as  a monopoly) only if 
no  radio  communication  is  involved.  However,  non-radio  businesses 
also face discrimination in their regulatory treatment. 
The  FCC  establishes  a  distinction  between  "dominant"  and  "non-
dominant" carriers.  In  theory,  dominant carriers  are  those which  hold 
market power and  bottle-neck facilities.  They must comply with stricter 
regulations than  non-dominant carriers.  At present the  only US  carrier 
so designated is AT&T and COMSAT for certain services. The extent of 
regulation  implied by this designation is  under consideration.  Formerly 
the  FCC  classified  as  "dominant"  all  foreign-owned  carriers,  15%  or 
more of whose stock is owned by a foreign telecommunications entity, 
irrespective of their size,  and  irrespective of the  route  being  operated. 
In November 1992, the FCC adopted a rule modifying this policy.  Now, 
carriers will be  regulated as dominant only on those routes where their 
foreign affiliates have the ability to discriminate against unaffiliated US 
international  carriers  through  control  of  bottle-neck  services  and 
facilities  in  the  foreign  market.  Under  the  new  framework,  carriers 
affiliated  with  a foreign  carrier that  is  a  monopoly  in  the  destination 
market  will  presumptively  be  considered  dominant  for  that  route. 
Carriers affiliated  with  a foreign  carrier that is  not a monopoly  on  the 
destination route will  receive closer scrutiny by the FCC.  However, the 
modified  policy  deals  only  with  the  manner in  which  US  international 
carriers will  be  regulated  once they  obtain  authority to  operate,  but  it 
does  not  address  the  standards  the  FCC  will  apply  in  determining 
whether to authorise entry. The FCC does not have to act on  petitions 
for  classification  of  carriers  as  "non-dominant"  within  specified  time 
limits. 
Classification is a crucial issue because dominant carriers face heavier 
regulation with respect to the construction of lines, tariffs and traffic and 
revenue  reports.  Section  214  of the  Communications  Act  requires 
common  carriers  to  seek  FCC  authorisation  to  construct  new  lines, 
extend existing lines,  acquire or operate new lines. The FCC  currently 
forbears regulation of non-dominant carriers for domestic services.  For 
international services,  "dominant" carriers must obtain  authorisation of 
the  construction  and  extension  of lines.  Authorisation  is  required  for Filing of 
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each type of service,  and  each  country.  "Non-dominant" carriers must 
only get authorisation for the construction of new lines. 
All  carriers  must  file  tariffs  at  the  FCC  for  international  services. 
However,  "dominant" carriers must file  most tariffs at the FCC  on  a 45 
days'  notice  instead  of 14  days for "non-dominant"  carriers,  and  they 
must also submit their costs; to justify any tariff changes.  Moreover,  in 
1989 the FCC allowed AT&T to file tariffs on a 14-day notice for certain 
IMTS  (international  service)  filings.  AT&T  generally  does  not  need  to 
provide cost support for its IMTS (international filings). 
All carriers must file annual international traffic and revenue reports; 
but only foreign-owned "dominant" carriers must file quarterly domestic 
traffic and revenue reports. 
Regarding  Section  214  authorisation,  common  carriers  may  not 
construct,  extend  or  acquire  a  communications  line  unless  the  FCC 
determines it would  be  in the public interest.  Moreover,  it provides that 
the FCC may attach such conditions to the issuing of the certificate as it 
thinks are in the public interest. The legislative intent behind this section 
of the Act was to make sure that monopoly providers of communication 
services did not duplicate facilities, which would lead to the monopoly's 
"captive" customers paying higher charges than they should for surplus 
facilities. However, there is no definition of what is in the public interest, 
nor are there any set criteria used by the FCC in order to judge whether 
it  is  in  the  present  or future  public  convenience  that  carriers  provide 
services. There is some concern that the FCC, through its application of 
Section 214, has moved away from the original intent of the section and 
independently  makes  decisions  affecting  international  trade  policy. 
Here  again,  the  FCC  does  not  have  to  act  on  Section 214  petitions 
within a specified time limit. 
Finally,  the  Cable Landing Act requires  a common  carrier to  seek a 
(marine)  cable  landing  licence.  Section  2 of the  Act provides  that the 
FCC,  through  power  delegated  by  the  President,  may  withhold  or 
revoke a submarine cable landing licence in order to assist in securing 
or  maintaining  rights  or  interests  of  the  US,  or  may  grant  landing 
licences  on  terms  which  will  assure  just  and  reasonable  rates  and 
services.  The  Act  is  intended  to  achieve  reciprocal  treatment  of US 
interests.  It permits,  among other things,  the  revocation  of an  existing 
authorisation if a country fails to grant US nationals reciprocal rights. 
As for radio based services, Section 308(c) of the Communications 
Act of 1934 permits the FCC,  in certain circumstances, to "impose any 
terms,  conditions  or  restrictions"  on  the  granting  of a  radio  station 
licence,  including  for basic telecoms  for commercial  communications 
between the  US and  a foreign country.  Such conditions or restrictions, 
including withholding or revoking a licence, may be imposed to assist in 
securing  or  maintaining  rights  or interests  of US  providers  in  foreign Regulatory 
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countries, or to assure just and  reasonable rates and services. Section 
309 of the Communications Act covers the granting of radio licences. It 
requires the FCC to determine if such a licence would be  in the public 
interest and permits the FCC to impose conditions. 
Section 310 of the Communications Act of 1934 significantly forecloses 
the  operation  of mobile and satellite facilities and  the  provision  of 
telecom and  broadcast services  by  imposing  limitations  on  foreign 
investment. As  a result,  the FCC  does not grant licences to operators 
owned  by  foreign  governments  or  their  representatives  (e.g.  state-
owned  telecom  operators  and  broadcasters),  nor  to  suppliers  of 
broadcast, common carrier or aeronautical services in cases where the 
foreign ownership exceeds 20% (or 25% indirectly). 
The  provision  of  "private"  services  by  satellite  is  subject  to  great 
regulatory uncertainty. In principle, foreign companies have unrestricted 
access  to  the  provision  of "non-common  carrier"  or  "private  carrier'' 
services. However, the question of whether a proposed satellite service 
may comprise a licensable common carrier service or a private service 
is  not  clear  in  US  regulatory  terms.  This  is  due  to  the  US  treaty 
obligations  to  INTELSAT  regarding  interconnection  with  the  public 
network.  Each  application  is  subject  to  a  lengthy  case-by-case 
consideration,  so  a  non-US  owned  licence  applicant's  commercial 
viability  may remain  very  uncertain  pending  the  outcome  of individual 
FCC  licence  proceedings.  The  use  of  foreign-owned  satellite  news 
gathering terminals in  the  US  by foreign organisations is  hampered by 
Section  310(a)  which  prevents  the  FCC  from  granting  a  licence  to 
foreign governments or their representatives. 
Regarding mobile satellite services (MSS), the FCC decision to give 
American  Mobile Satellite Corporation  (AMSC)  the  monopoly rights to 
serve the domestic US  market means that  any  foreign  competition  is 
excluded.  This  applies  to  both  the  space  segment  and  the  service 
levels. The US Court of Appeals reversed the FCC's decision to require 
several mobile satellite service applicants to join a consortium  under a 
single  licence.  However,  in  January  1992  the  FCC  launched  the 
process for a final  decision granting the US  monopoly mobile satellite 
service  licence  to  AMSC.  The  FCC  has  stated  that  the  reason  for 
imposing this consortium is related to the scarcity of MSS spectrum and 
the limited market for MSS services. 
However,  a number of companies  have  in  the  past  been  licensed  to 
provide mobile satellite services,  albeit in  different frequency bands.  In 
addition,  COMSAT  has  been  allowed  to  provide  international  land-
based  mobile  satellite  services outside  of  North-America.  Thus, 
COMSAT  can  now  compete  in  Europe  for  the  provision  of  MSS 
services  if  it  obtains  the  necessary  European  licenses,  while 
domestically the US retains the AMSC monopoly. Effective 
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As  far  as  aeronautical  mobile  satellite  services  (AMSS)  are 
concerned,  in  1989,  the  FCC  confirmed  its  1987  decision  on  the 
. exclusivity . of  the  AMSC  licence  and  ruled  that  lnmarsat-based 
aeronautical  satellite  services  may  not . be  used  on  the  domestic 
segments of international flights.  This effectively prevents market entry 
by  lnmarsat-based  systems,  since  any  aircraft  in  flight  between  two 
domestic US points would be obliged to use AMSC space segment. 
While the FCC,  in a recent Order, has decided to permit certain parties 
(those  already  authorised  to  provide  lnmarsat  aeronautical  MSS 
services to aircraft in  international flight) to provide interim services to 
aircraft  in  domestic  flight,  it  deferred  consideration  of  a  permanent 
waiver  to  allow  use  of  lnmarsat  for  AMSS  to  aircraft  in  flight  on 
domestic legs of scheduled international flights. 
The  discriminatory  regulatory  requirements  relating  to  "dominance" 
exacerbate the  effective  barriers  to  foreign  competition  in  this  sector. 
By regulating European competitors far smaller than many unregulated 
US  companies,  the FCC  appears to  be  adopting criteria going beyond 
competition policy.  Similarly, the FCC  should not use this authorisation 
procedure  as  a  tool  to  address  broader  policy  issues  beyond  the 
regulatory concerns regarding the service for which the authorisation is 
sought. 
The  US  policy  to  retain  a  domestic  monopoly  for  MSS  while  at  the 
same  time  launching  additional  US-based  consortia  into  global  MSS 
ventures  via  an  effective  control  over  spectrum  allocations  is 
detrimental  to  efforts  of non-US  based  organisations  to  provide  both 
global or US MSS services.  First of all,  the arguments for the domestic 
monopoly  of AMSC  no  longer hold.  Despite  the  so-called  scarcity  of 
spectrum and the so-called limited market,  additional service providers 
have  been  and  continue to  be  licensed  by  the  FCC.  There  exists  no 
justifiable  argument  to  retain  the  monopoly.  Furthermore,  early 
licensing of MSS providers, the early availability of additional spectrum 
in  the  US  only,  and  an  applied  ownership  filter  to  bar  non-US 
competitors  seem  to  indicate  that  the  US  is  trying  to  seek  effective 
control of global MSS ventures, while closing the domestic market from 
foreign competitors. 
6  Comments 
Access to the US telecommunications market is  an  important issue for 
the EU.  Although the US has  unilaterally imposed Title VII  1988 Trade 
Act procurement prohibitions against EU  bidders,  the  EU  has avoided 
escalating  the  conflict  and  has  kept  its  own  counter retaliation  to  the 
appropriate level (see Chapter 20). The 1993 MOU concluded between 
the EU and the US on procurement does not cover the procurement of 
telecommunications  equipment.  The  same  applies  to  the  new  GATT 106 
Government  Procurement  Agreement  to  be  signed  this  year.  The 
Community's offer to  include network equipment had to be  withdrawn 
after the  US  refusal to  cover their privately owned entities.  Therefore, 
the  EU  and  the  US  decided  to  negotiate  a  bilateral  self-contained 
agreement on telecommunications procurement. 
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D  The Maritime Sector 
1  Some General Remarks·· 
Support  measures  for  the  American  shipbuilding  and  ship  repair 
industry  continued  throughout  1993  and  culminated  in  the 
announcement  in  October 1993  of the  Clinton  Administration's  policy 
statement  on  shipbuilding  in  support  of  US  shipyards  and  the 
subsequent approval of the plan  by Congress providing for a research 
and development program and the revitalised Title XI  program for loan 
guarantees.  The  US  Congress  considered  the  Gibbons/Breaux 
legislation  aimed  at  eliminating  foreign  shipyard  subsidies  and  the 
Administration is preparing a plan to support its shipbuilding industry in 
converting to the commercial market. 
Meanwhile, multilateral shipbuilding negotiations resumed at the OECD 
in  Paris  in  September  1993 with  a view to  concluding  a shipbuilding 
trade agreement by the end of November 1993. This proved  not to be 
possible  by  that  daJe,  and  the  negotiations  continued  in  January and 
March  1994.  Reactivation  of  US  legislation  targeting  foreign 
shipbuilding  subsidies  is  seen  as  an  attempt to  increase the  pressure 
on  the  OECD  negotiations,  as  are  measures  for financial  aid  to  US 
shipyards  .. 
Other  legislation  is  still  pending  in  Congress,  such  as  The 
Shipbuilding Trade Reform Act (Gibbons  Bill  - HR  1402/S.990) and 
the  Maritime  Security  and  Competitiveness  Act (HR  2151).  The 
former would call for sanctions - such  as  denial of access to US  ports 
and imposition of fines - against vessels owned or controlled by citizens 
of countries which subsidise shipbuilding or repair industries. The latter 
would  authorise  the  federal  government  to  pay  shipping  companies 
· operating support payments of $2.1  million to  $2.3  million  per US-flag 
vessel  annually for ten  years.  Foreign  controlled  companies'  eligibility 
under the program would be limited through a priority system in favour 
of US-controlled  companies.  The  bill  would  also  include  shipbuilding 
provisions  creating  a  program  of  payments  for  series-built  ship 
construction to subsidise the transition of US yards from the defence to 
the commercial market. 
2  Subsidies and Tax Policies 
The  Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as  amended,  provides for various 
subsidies  schemes  or  tax  deferment  measures  in  the  shipbuilding 
sector which contain domestic build requirements. Commercial 
loans for 
vessel 
construction 
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Title  V  of  the  Merchant  Marine  Act,  provides  for  a  Construction 
differential subsidy (CDS), a direct Federal grant, for the construction 
of  US-flag  merchant  ships  in  US  shipyards  under  Buy  America 
requirements.  However,  no public source funding seems to have been 
provided by the Government since 1981. 
Section  607  of the  Merchant  Marine  Act,  enables  US  shipowners  to 
defer  certain  taxable  income  via  the  Capital  Constructions  Fund 
(CCF) and the Construction Reserve Fund (CRF) to buy or transform 
vessels,  on  condition  that they  use  American  material  or goods  (Buy 
America)  except  for  fisheries  vessels  (under  the  CCF  program). 
Approximately $1.2  billion in  funds  had  accumulated in  the  CCF  as  of 
the end  of 1992 and  there  are  108  fund  holders.  The CRF was  $3.6 
million  in  Fiscal  Year  1993.  This  program  has  a more  limited  use  as 
currently there are only 6 fund holders. 
Section 601  of the Merchant Marine Act provides for the payment of an 
Operating Differential Subsidy (ODS) to US operators of ships built in 
the US of US materials, so as to place their operating costs on  a parity 
with those of foreign competitors. No new ODS contract has been given 
since  1981  but during Fiscal  Year 1993, the US  authorities distributed 
in  excess  of  $215.5 million  in  funds  on  old  ODS  contracts.  It  is 
understood  that the  US  Administration  is  preparing  a  new  legislative 
package  proposing  a  new  program  to  replace  ODS  contracts  with 
contracts under this new program. 
Title XI  of the Merchant Marine Act authorises the  US  Government to 
provide direct Federal Ship Financing Guarantees to US  shipowners 
to  obtain  commercial  loans  for  the  construction  or  reconstruction  of 
nearly  all  categories  of vessels  (except  fishing  vessels).  Guarantees 
may be granted for up to 75% of the vessel's actual cost.  In order for a 
new non-fisheries vessel to be eligible for these financial guarantees, it 
must be .built entirely in a US  shipyard,  all components of the hull and 
superstructure fabricated  in  the  US  and  the vessel entirely assembled 
in  the  US.  As  of  30  September  1993,. Title XI  guarantees  in  force 
amounted to just over $1.8 billion.  The guarantees covered more than 
1900  vessels  (including  288  barges).  In  the  1993  fiscal  year, 
8 applications amounting to  neai'ly  $49  million were approved for new 
construction while 6 applications were for the refinancing of outstanding 
debt. 
The  Buy  America  requirements  imposed  in  these  different  types  of 
subsidies clearly favour US  shipbuilders and equipment manufacturers 
and  (!Ct  as  a restriction on  imports.  Even  if certain  of these measures 
have not been used for some years, there is no  guarantee that they will 
not be implemented in the future,  unl~ss they can be eliminated through 
the conclusion of the draft agreement on normal competitive conditions 
in  the  shipbuilding  and  repair  sector,  on  which  negotiations  in  the 
OECD recommenced in 1993 and are continuing in 1994. Increasing the 
US competitive 
position 
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The  National  Shipbuilding  Initiative  (NSI)  - FY  1994  Defence 
Authorisation Bill  (HR 2401/S.1298) also includes an  Administration-
proposed  NSI  plan,  announced  at  the  beginning  of October  1993.  It 
consists  of a  5-part  program  aimed  at rejuvenating  the  US  civilian 
shipbuilding  industry  by  increasing  its  world-wide  competitive  position 
through the provision of federal loan guarantees ($147 million in Title XI 
export loan guarantees) to  US  shipyards to subsidise exports and  $50 
million  in  defence  conversion  funds  for  ship  design/production  R&D. 
Participation  in  the  NSI  is  limited  to  US-owned  US-located  yards.  In 
addition, the program calls for a regulatory reform  review program and 
the  increased use  of existing export promotional programs to  help US 
shipyards secure foreign orders. 
The United States applies a 50%  ad  valorem  tax on  non-emergency 
repairs  of  US  owned  ships  outside  the  USA  and  on  imported 
equipment for boats, including fish nets. The basis of this tax is Section 
466  of the  Tariff Act  of 1930,  amended  in  1971  and  in  July  1990. 
Under  the  latter  amendment  the  tax  would  not  apply,  under  certain 
conditions,  to  foreign  repairs  of "LASH"  (Lighter Aboard  Ship)  barges 
and  spare  vessel  repair  parts  or  materials.  Furthermore,  the  NAFTA 
agreement provides for the elimination of  these type of taxes for Mexico 
and  Canada  by  1999  at  the  latest.  A  similar  provision  should  be 
extended to Member States of the European Union. 
3  Maritime Transport 
The use of certain categories of foreign-built vessels is restricted in the 
US. This is the case for fishing vessels, vessels used in coastwise trade 
and special work vessels. 
A foreign-built  US  flag  vessel  cannot be  documented  for fisheries  in 
the  US's 200  mile  exclusive  economic zone.  This  prohibition  is  wide-
ranging  since  the  definition  of fisheries  includes  processing,  storing, 
and  transporting  (Commercial  Fishing  Industry  Vessel  Anti 
Reflagging  Act  of  1987).  The  US  has  entered  into  Governing 
International  Fishing  Agreements  (GIFA),  which  give  some  foreign 
flag  vessels. rights  to fish  in  the  US  fishing  zone.  These,  however, 
expired at the end of 1993. 
Foreign-built  (or  rebuilt)  vessels  are  prohibited  from  engaging  in 
coastwise trade either directly between  two points of the US  or via  a 
foreign  port.  Tr;:~de  with  US  i.sland  territories  and  possessions  is 
included in  the definition of coastwise trade (Merchant Marine Act of 
1920 - The  Jones Act).  Moreover, _the  definition  of vessels  has  been 
interpreted by. the US administration -to  cover hover craft and inflatable 
.  ,·  rafts. The US Flag Passenger .Vessel Act of 1993 would include a US 
built. requirement for the vessels involved in "cruise to nowhere"  .. Filing of> 
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The  Limitatiqns  on  Rebuilding  Act  is  another  discrimination  against 
foreign  materials:  the  rebuilding  of a. vessel  of: over 500  Gross  Tons 
(GT)  must be  carried out within the  US  if it is  to  engage in  coastwise 
trade. A smaller vessel (under 500 GT) may lose its existing coastwise 
rights  if the  rebuilding  abroad  or.  in  the  US  with  foreign  materials  is 
extensive (see section 883 of volume 46 of US  Code,  amendments of 
1956 .and  19(30). In addition, no foreign-built vessel can be documented 
and  registered  for  dredging,  towing or· salvaging in  the  US.  Third 
,  ·Countries are thus not able to have access to the US market at a time 
when part of the ageing US fleet needs to be renewed. 
Furthermore,  the Jones Act provides for an  effective monopoly of the 
US Coast Guard Administration for ship classification and  inspection 
services . to  the  American  Bureau  of  Shipping.  EU  classification 
companies are therefore excluded from this market. 
Section 710 of the  Federal Maritime Commission Authorisation Act 
· of  1990  .dealing  with  Non-Vessel  Operating· Common  Carriers 
(NVOCCs),  reinforced the provisions of the 1984 Shipping Act, which 
.requires NVOCCs to file tariffs.  The Authorisation Act puts af  risk the 
business. of many .EU freight forwarders by subjecting them to a range 
of requirements  such  as  posting· of a bond  and  appointing  a resident 
agent in the US. 
In  1991, the Non-Vessel Operating Common Carriers Act amended 
the  1990 Act allowing the Federal Maritime Commission to accept - in 
addition to bonds - insurance and  other surety as  proof of a NVOCC's 
financial  responsibility.  The  $50,000 minimum  amount for a bond  was 
deleted. 
A  final  rule  published  in  the  Federal  Register  on  22 January  1993, 
amended the  FMC  regulations on  NVOCC's in  order to implement the 
1991  Act.  Despite  this  new  flexibility  regarding  the  financial 
responsibility requirements, no amendment has been introduced on the 
tariff filing obligation. This is still considered to be a great administrative 
burden  and  a disadvantage  in  competition,  particularly  for  small  EU 
freight forwarders. The EU considers these financial and administrative 
obligations  an  unnecessary  and  unwarranted  burden  on  the 
international transportation industry. 
Furthermore, according to provisions included in the following statutes, 
certain types of government owned or financed cargoes are required to 
be carried on US-flag commercial vessels. 
The Cargo Preference Act of 1904 requires that all items procured for 
or owned  by  the  military departments  must  be  carried  exclusively on 
US-flag  vessels.  Public Resolution N°17,  enacted  in  1934,  requires 
that  1  00%  of  any  cargoes  generated  by  US  Government  loans Shipment by 
US-flag vessels 
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(i.e. commodities financed by Eximbank loans) must be shipped on US-
flag  vessels,  although  the  US  Maritime Administration  (MARAD)  may 
grant  waivers  permitting  up  to  50%  of  the  cargo  generated  by  an 
individual  loan  to  be  shipped  on  vessels  of the  trading  partner.  The 
Cargo  Preference Act of 1954 requires  that  at  least  50%  of all  US 
government generated cargoes  subject to  law be  carried  on  privately-
owned  US  flag  commercial  vessels,  if they  are  available  at  fair  and 
reC~sonable rates. Finally, the Food Security Act of 1985 increases the 
minimum  agricultural  cargoes  under  certain  foreign  assistance  . 
programs  of  the  Department  of  Agriculture  and  the  Agency  for 
International Development (USAID) to be shipped on US-flag vessels to 
75%. 
The  impact  of these  cargo  preference  measures  is  very  significant. 
They deny EU and other non-US competitors access to a  very sizeable 
pool  of  US  cargo,  while  providing  US  shipowners  with  guaranteed 
cargoes at protected, highly remunerative rates. 
The  US  has  not offered  liberalisation  of its  maritime services.  GATS, 
however,  will  prevent  the  future  use  of  Section  19  by  the  Federal 
Maritime Commission  unilaterally to force the opening  of foreign  ports 
and  shipping  facilities.  The  US  have  agreed  further) to  negotiate  the 
liberalisation of maritime services. 
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